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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This is an investigation of the modern concept of disease and an explication of the 
concept consistent with scientific and medical usage. The core notion involved in the modern 
concept of disease (taken broadly as pathology) is biological abnormality in form or function, for 
a circumscribed biological system, contrasted against a theoretical sense of normal form or 
function. Chapter 2 presents an overview of science, its products and how these are produced. 
This sketch is limited and intended only to clarify my own view of science in as far as this is 
important for the main thesis. Chapter 3 discusses the concepts of normality and abnormality, 
particularly as it is used in biomedical science. I argue that science offers a theoretical sense of 
abnormality importantly different from statistical or conventional senses of abnormality. Chapter 
4 begins with an examination of the normativist /naturalist debate on the concept of disease. I 
then offer my explication of disease and the criteria necessary for a disease claim to be legitimate. 
Chapter 4 closes with an extended discussion of interesting and controversial examples of disease 
claims aimed at clarifying and challenging my own position. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The topic of this thesis is the concept of disease. I am interested in what is being 
claimed when we say that certain problems that a person is having are caused by a 
disease. Claims about newly recognized disease are more frequent now that 
pharmaceutical companies can market directly to consumers via television commercials. 
Some of these claims about disease are controversial. In the United States, for example, a 
series of commercials have recently been warning men about a potential undiagnosed 
medical problem. One of these commercials states “Millions of men 45 and older just 
don’t feel like they used to.” It then asks if you, or someone you love, may be one of the 
sufferers, and also warns: “Don’t blame it on aging.” The commercial then advises those 
concerned to go to a website and take a short quiz to further clarify if they may have 
warning symptoms and if they should seek treatment from a physician.1 The quiz consists 
of the following 10 screening questions: 
 
1) Do you have a decrease in libido (sex drive)? 
2) Do you have a lack of energy? 
3) Do you have a decrease in strength and/or endurance? 
4) Have you lost height? 
5) Have you noticed a decrease in your enjoyment of life? 
6) Are you sad and/or grumpy? 
7) Are your erections less strong? 
8) Have you noticed a recent deterioration in your ability to play sports? 
9) Are you falling asleep after dinner? 
10) Has there been a recent deterioration in your work performance?2 
 
Answering yes to at least 3 of these screening questions, especially to question 1 or 7, 
may mean that low testosterone levels are causing a medical condition (i.e. a disease). 
This biological state is referred to by the commercials and the website as ‘Low T.’ The 
                                                 
1 The commercial I am referring to is available on-line at http://www.isitlowt.com. I 
accessed it last on 8/27/11. 
2 The quiz is available on-line at http://isitlowt.com/do-you-have-low-t/low-t-quiz-
test.html. I last accessed the quiz on 8/27/11. 
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website also advises people to be prepared to talk to their doctor about ‘Low T’ and 
offers a helpful set of questions to ask at your visit with a physician: 
 
1) I don’t feel sick, I just don’t feel like myself anymore. What could be causing it? 
2) Are the symptoms I am experiencing and my other conditions related to Low T? 
(Feel free to discuss your results from the Low T Symptoms Quiz.) 
3) Considering my symptoms, should I be tested for Low T? 
4) What medical treatment options are available if I have Low T? 
5) What is the difference between the different testosterone replacement therapies? 
6) If I have Low T, what happens if I don’t have it treated? 
7) How does my diet, fitness, and lifestyle affect my testosterone?3 
 
 The skeptical may wonder whether ‘Low T’ is a ‘real’ disease or not. If some 
diseases are ‘real’ that implies some claims about a person’s problems being the result of 
disease may be fake or illegitimate in some way.4 Less skeptical viewers, particularly 
those who are feeling a little off, may make their way to the website and may wonder if 
‘Low T’ explains their problems. If so, once diagnosed, medical intervention may 
alleviate the problems. Consider my case. I currently screen positive for more than 3 
symptoms, and perhaps ‘Low T’ explains why I feel this way. However, I may be 
suffering from other sorts of problems. Over the past two years I have been completing a 
medical residency program. I have turned 40 during this time period. I have been working 
in a busy hospital, including, at times, 30 hour shifts without sleep. In addition to the 60-
plus hours of work per week on duty, I have also been trying to read and study medicine 
in my off-duty hours, as well as occasionally working on this thesis. I have not been 
exercising as I was accustomed to as a graduate student, nor have I been eating a very 
healthy diet recently. The job is stressful. Perhaps my symptoms are from too much 
stressful work, too little exercise, and too much cafeteria food. Perhaps my problems are 
not symptoms of a disease. Perhaps they are a different kind of human problem, with a 
different kind of cause.  
                                                 
3 These questions to ask at one’s clinic visit are found at: http://www.isitlowt.com/what-
you-can-do/doctors-discussion-guide.html. I last accessed the website on 8/26/11. 
4 For the remainder of the thesis I will use the terminology of legitimate versus 
illegitimate disease claims for such controversies, and avoid the real vs. the fake 
imaginary dichotomy. It is not clear what un-real amounts to. I hope to specify what 
being a legitimate vs. illegitimate disease claim constitutes.  
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 The example of ‘Low T’ raises several issues with the concept of disease. ‘Low 
T’ is actually being called a ‘medical condition’ that may be caused by another disease 
such as diabetes, hypogonadism, obesity, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, or 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. In fact, ‘Low T’ is merely the state of having a 
serum level of testosterone low enough to be outside the normal range of testosterone 
levels for (presumably healthy) men of a similar age, and it may apparently be caused by 
several other biological problems. It is a statistical abnormality and sign of disease. It 
may be another of the signs and symptoms that something is wrong medically. 
Discovering this underlying cause and reversing it may alleviate the symptoms, but if not 
reversible the symptoms may be alleviated by supplementing the testosterone levels back 
to the normal range. (In chapter 3, I shall discuss statistical abnormality as a warrant for 
disease claims.) To further complicate matters, assume that if tested, I would be found to 
have low levels of testosterone without any of the other associated medical conditions 
like obesity or diabetes. It might be that stress from too much work, too little relaxation 
and exercise, and all that cafeteria food caused my testosterone to drop. After all, I was 
supposed to ask my doctor about how diet, fitness, and lifestyle may be affecting my 
testosterone levels. Could I then claim that I had a disease brought on by stress that was 
causing low testosterone? Perhaps I have stress induced or idiopathic ‘Low T.’ Such an 
explanatory story might make the difference between whether an insurance plan pays for 
the testosterone supplements or not. 
 Compare this to less controversial disease claims. Take the case of a neoplasm of 
the thyroid gland. Consider a follicular adenoma of the thyroid. This often presents, when 
it grows large enough to be felt easily, as a solitary nodule in an otherwise grossly normal 
thyroid gland. It is due to increased growth of the follicular epithelium that makes up 
most of the thyroid gland. The neoplastic nodule consists of the cells that produce thyroid 
hormones as well as follicles or pools of stored precursors. These neoplastic growths are 
often silent as far as symptoms, but may occasionally overproduce thyroid hormone and 
cause the symptoms of hyperthyroidism (i.e. increased basal metabolic rate with weight 
loss, soft, warm, flushed skin, intolerance of heat, tachycardia, palpitations, possibly 
cardiac arrhythmias, tremor, hyperactive tendon reflexes, muscle cramps, emotional 
lability, stereotypical gaze and eyelid lag, etc.). These follicular adenomas are caused by 
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acquired genetic defects that cause the follicular cells to grow regardless of the molecular 
signals that normally regulate growth, initiate cell reproduction, or halt it. Some specific 
mutations are known, but many others are hypothesized and are yet to be determined. 
Epidemiological data show that thyroid adenomas, although neoplastic growths, rarely 
progress to malignancies that could metastasize. However, the clinical problem of 
distinguishing the more common benign local adenomas from rarer potentially malignant 
carcinomas of the thyroid is difficult without cutting out and examining the nodule 
microscopically (see Kumar, 2005). This case of having a neoplastic mass of thyroid cells 
that no longer is under the control of the body’s normal signals is an uncontroversial case 
of disease. Interestingly, such a mass is a disease whether it causes the typical symptoms 
of excess thyroid production or not. Some nodules do not secrete hormone and do not 
cause the systemic symptoms. It is also a disease regardless of being discovered clinically 
on examination of the neck with palpation of the gland through the skin. It may be 
discovered only at autopsy after death or possibly never discovered. In addition to these 
examples, there are paradigmatic cases of disease that must be accounted for on any 
analysis or clarification of the concept. Examples include heart attack, insulin dependent 
diabetes mellitus, and tuberculosis. I will discuss the example of heart attack in greater 
detail in the introduction to chapter 4. 
 Questions about the nature of disease and about particular disease claims can be 
motivated by different concerns or perspectives. The ‘Low T’ disease claims might 
arouse fears that our contemporary society is medicalizing kinds of human problems that 
are not primarily medical problems. The sudden epidemic of attention-deficit 
hyperactivity-disorder (ADHD) affecting our society’s children may also be the 
medicalization of problems that are not biological problems, perhaps not even 
psychological problems. They may not even be problems, except in the eyes of certain 
groups in the community who find certain behaviors abnormal and thus in need of 
remedy. Historical examples of disease claims concerning masturbation, homosexuality, 
drapetomania, or hysteria might also be seen as the medicalization of perceived 
abnormalities that are not primarily biological malfunction nor best addressed in a 
medical context. Sometimes the controversy over a disease claim stems from 
disagreement over the extent to which the sufferer’s problems are within their own 
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control to change. The question may be whether a biological (or even psychological) 
explanation is the appropriate way to try and understand the nature of the problem. 
Alcoholism and addiction generally have been controversial in this regard. Obesity is a 
condition being claimed by some to be a disease, while others see this as medicalization. 
Sometimes the concern is whether the patient is malingering so as to get some non-
physiological benefit from treatment, or from assuming the sick role, etc. Subtly related 
are issues about whether the patient’s goal is gaining some advantage or other desired 
outcome of being treated with biotechnology and not the alleviation of discomfort or a 
return to health. Perhaps some men seek not just feeling back to normal, but hope they 
will feel and perform better than normal once their “Low T’ is treated. Furthermore, the 
claim that ‘Low T’ is a legitimate disease may also involve the difficulty of 
distinguishing normal aging and normal changes in the body from abnormal changes or 
pathology. When are aches and pains, or subtle changes in one’s endurance, abilities, 
memory, etc. just another part of normal aging? On the other hand, perhaps aging and 
death are the two most common and most dreaded diseases. 
 My own project combines intellectual curiosity and practical interests. As a 
physician I am interested in current usage of the concept in medicine and biomedical 
research. Physicians use the term regularly, and attempt to make the distinction for most 
patients between the biologically normal and abnormal. Many patients want to hear that 
their problem is not serious—that it is nothing to worry about—a benign or normal 
process soon to go away. Physicians are asked almost daily about what the cause is for 
the problem troubling the patient. Other patients care little about the cause and want to 
know that the troubling aspects of the process can be ameliorated, if not permanently, at 
least for the time being. The practice of medicine brings one face to face with issues of 
whether some problem is one of biology or something else, as well as questions of where 
normal variation or normal reactions to stressful or imperfect circumstances ends and 
subtle pathology begins. Interestingly, there is little discussion of the general nature of 
disease in medical school. The concept is learned by reviewing particular examples and 
by constantly contrasting the normal processes and functions of biological systems with 
the various ways that malfunction of malformation may occur. One looks in vain in 
respected medical textbooks for a general definition. However, I do believe that there is a 
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general understanding that physicians and biomedical researchers share. This thesis is an 
attempt to distill that concept into somewhat clearer form. 
 Practical concerns are also increasing the need to clarify what disease is, and 
which particular claims are legitimate and which not. I am interested in arguments and 
discussion about the moral concerns with using biotechnology for ends other than 
therapy. This includes using biotechnology for enhancement, self-expression, or 
abnormal longevity and survival. However, determining where the boundary is between 
therapeutic and extra-therapeutic uses of biotechnology rests on some demarcation of 
disease from other types of concern or problems that people may have. Therapy is 
biotechnical intervention for the purpose of curing disease or returning the patient to 
some approximation of normal. Extra-therapeutic biomedical intervention is intended not 
to cure disease or fix a malfunction, but fulfill some other human desire, usually those 
having to do with self-improvement, self-expression, or competition with others. 
 One frequently hears that the goal of medicine is to alleviate suffering. Even a 
short amount of reflection reveals this is either too broad a goal or medicine has been, 
from the beginning, aiming short of the goal. There are many kinds of suffering, and 
some of them do not primarily involve biology. Friends, parents, politicians, economists, 
engineers, lawyers, ethical counselors, religious authorities, etc. all have roles in 
alleviating certain kinds of human suffering. Medicine, particularly modern medicine in 
the Western tradition, is selective about the type of suffering and types of problem it sees 
as its province. A more accurate goal for medicine is the curing of disease. However, 
even given that narrower goal, the actual practice of medicine could be very different 
(and perhaps has been across epochs and cultures) depending on the conception of 
disease being assumed.  
 Medical practice is also changing because of its great success and increased 
ability not only to describe and understand biological phenomena but to manipulate and 
control them. The technology to do this is increasingly costly. Difficult decisions are 
having to be made regarding how much medical care we owe to each other as a matter of 
social justice versus which types of biomedical intervention should be available only to 
those who can afford it. Decisions have to be made about what social apparatuses should 
be arranged to cover the costs of those types of care we want to make available to all. 
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There are also ethical concerns about labeling some biological differences as disease, 
particularly because doing so might foster increased discrimination of those who are 
labeled as defective in form or function. In chapter 3 I shall discuss this in more detail. 
 Many of these issues can be conceptualized as boundary disputes. Controversy 
concerns where to draw a line distinguishing different types of phenomena. For example, 
some wish to distinguish between therapy and enhancement. Other boundary disputes 
include: medical intervention available to all versus optional or unnecessary intervention; 
the line where medical practice ends and other sorts of problem solving begin; and the 
distinction (if any) between psychiatry and the rest of medicine. I am interested in all 
these boundary issues, and think they are all interestingly related to the boundary between 
disease and non-disease. Driving much of the controversy in all these disputes is the 
distinction between the biologically normal and abnormal. For the person arguing that 
disease is an objective scientific term, the crucial question is how can science possibly 
distinguish the normal from the abnormal. How can science do so in a way that is largely 
free of personal and community judgments about what is preferable and desirable about 
human bodies, behaviors and performance? I argue that science can sometimes offer us 
respectable, unbiased descriptions of the biologically normal and abnormal. The view one 
has of science, its intellectual products, and how it produces these products importantly 
informs how one will conceive the concept of disease. Therefore I briefly discuss science 
and its products in chapter 2. 
 My project is clarifying or explicating the concept of disease as used currently by 
physicians, scientists and derivatively by educated adults in Western societies. I am 
interested in the scientist’s and the expert’s term. I am interested in defending a naturalist 
conception of disease as far as possible. Some now argue that the naturalist versus 
normativist conception of the problem of disease is not a helpful way to approach the 
issue (see Schwartz, 2007). I disagree. The normativist/naturalist debate has persisted 
because it continues to capture the fundamental tensions that people find interesting or 
puzzling about the concept of disease. Furthermore, although some crude form of 
naturalism is the position of most contemporary physicians and educated adults in my 
community, there have been surprisingly few naturalist theories of disease offered in the 
philosophical and humanities literature in the past 40 years. The predominant naturalist 
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position is that of Christopher Boorse (1975, 1977, 1987, 1997). The most often defended 
position in the literature, however, is normativism of one variety or another (see King, 
1954; Engelhardt, 1996; Reznek, 1987). My project is to offer a naturalistic account of 
the concept of disease that captures the scientific usage of the term. I find much useful in 
Boorse’s naturalistic theory, and share his project, but ultimately find it in need of 
refinement, and discuss this in chapter 4.  
 There are other projects in the literature examining the concept of disease. These 
are worthy projects and offer valuable insights. However, they are not primarily my 
project. Let me clarify by dismissing some of these other perspectives and projects. Some 
projects are more pragmatic and explore the concept of disease in the context of what 
doctors actually do for patients. Some projects are sociological and explore disease as a 
classifier and describer of kinds of people and their behavior (those with illnesses and 
diseases) and explore the possible roles (sick role, doctor role, etc.) assumable within 
some community (see Parsons, 1971). Disease may have broader and narrower senses 
and be used differently across contexts and for different groups within a community. 
Projects may be more focused on semantics and linguistic usage (see Simon, 2007). In 
chapter 4, I will return to the issues about the actual usage of the term and issues of 
broader or narrower usages. Basically, there may be dispute about whether the word 
‘disease’ actually describes both chronic and acute problems, both systemic and localized 
problems, active problems versus damage sustained from past trauma or currently 
inactive processes, as well as whether it applies to internal and external causes. Here it is 
worth noting that I am interested in the broadest sense of disease, a use perhaps 
synonymous with pathology. As such, the concept of disease may be a cluster concept 
involving many of the diverse elements that can be partially captured from the various 
narrower senses or the other perspectives and projects. The term seems to defy any 
attempt at definition by necessary and sufficient conditions. However, as noted above, 
my project is to see if a coherent and recognizable scientifically respectable explication 
of disease (as pathology) is possible that reliably explains uncontroversial paradigmatic 
examples, explains points of current controversy in a satisfying way, and potentially can 
be applied to future controversial cases. 
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Projects exploring the concept disease may also be primarily historical, and 
account for the changes in the concept across time and culture. Historical projects can be 
combined with any of the other types of concerns and projects above (see Engelhardt, 
1996; Thagard, 1996). I have not primarily investigated the historical development of the 
concept of disease, although I have used historical examples. It is difficult to avoid the 
temptation to investigate past disease claims and see how they fare as contemporary 
claims. I have not addressed how the concept of disease may have developed and evolved 
across different cultures and in response to certain historical developments and events. 
What I would argue (if this question of historical development were an important aspect 
of my project) is that biological (and psychological) abnormality contrasted with the 
biologically normal has always been a fundamental part of the concept of disease. Other 
core elements (in the possible cluster of elements) include those of incapacity, infirmity, 
loss of ability, suffering, and pain, and the perception of being afflicted with a burden 
beyond the control of one’s willpower. I would argue that as biological science has 
grown increasingly successful over the past 200 or so years, the notion of biological 
abnormality has assumed a predominant position at the core of the concept, while the 
other elements have increasingly been marginalized.5 As science has gained the ability to 
describe, explain, manipulate and control biological phenomena at increasingly remote 
(i.e. microscopic and ultrastructural extremes) it has been able to rely less on gross 
symptoms and signs in diagnosing and characterizing disease. Furthermore, explanation 
at the microscopic level has allowed meaningful distinctions between the mere signs and 
symptoms of a particular disease and the actual causal mechanisms constituting the 
disease. It is possible that disease claims from different historical periods and different 
cultures are incommensurable. It may also be the case that disease claims from different 
branches of medicine, or even different branches of biology, are incommensurable. I will 
be assuming that none of these possibilities is the case. We can recognize disease claims 
from other cultures and epochs as expressing commensurate fundamental core aspects of 
the modern concept. Plant biologists, veterinarians and physicians talk of disease and 
understand roughly the same thing by the term, as do psychiatrists and endocrinologists. 
                                                 
5 In chapter 3 I shall discuss the historical origins of the term normal and abnormal during 
the early years of modern physiology. 
 10 
The core notion at the center of the modern concept of disease is biological 
abnormality. I think this has always been a core notion involved with the concept of 
disease, but it has come to dominate the concept as science has experienced exponential 
success in explaining and modeling biological phenomena. Biology has increasingly 
broken down organisms into subsystems, isolated these, and experimentally manipulated 
and described them. These descriptions necessarily involve distinctions between normal 
and abnormal processes and parts for the circumscribed systems being functionally 
decomposed. Smaller more carefully isolated systems are combined to offer larger more 
complex and dynamic models of metabolism, tissue function and malfunction, organ 
function and disease, and eventually models of entire physiological systems, such as the 
cardiovascular or endocrine system. The important question for the modern, scientific 
concept of disease boils down to how biological science can distinguish the normal from 
the abnormal and whether it can do so in ways that are not primarily or exclusively 
reflections of personal or social preference or values. Can science offer a relatively 
objective and primarily descriptive notion of abnormality and thus of disease? I argue 
that it can and does do this. 
As mentioned, the continuing revolution in scientific explanation and exploration 
has also allowed for precise isolation and control of circumscribed biological systems. 
Thus disease is increasingly not considered a global phenomenon but a localized 
malfunction in a discrete localizable biological system. Interestingly, unlike disease, 
health is still most often a term applying to organisms globally.6 A negative definition of 
health would be the absence of disease, but many are interested in a broader, positive, 
welfare conception of health involving not just absence of disease, but some basic level 
of opportunity, capacity and flourishing (see Nordenfelt, 1987, 2006). It is unclear if 
science alone can ever deliver this sort of positive definition, or deliver pronouncements 
of such states of health, independent from political or ethical considerations. Medicine, 
however, may someday be able to offer negative pronouncements of health—essentially 
confirming that all one’s biological and psychological systems, to the limits of detection, 
are functioning normally. 
                                                 
6 Physicians sometimes do speak of a healthy heart or other isolated organ, but this is 
metaphorical and derivative upon the primary notion of the healthy organism. 
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 My main thesis is that the scientific concept of disease, at its core, relies on the 
notion of biological abnormality. This is often biologically abnormal function. This is the 
conceptualization that best unifies the diversity of particular disease claims that we take 
to be legitimate and uncontroversial. Biological abnormality is also the notion that 
arouses most of the controversy when particular claims are disputed. Controversy arises 
over whether the particular type of problem, incapacity, or suffering in question is 
attributable to abnormal biological processes or parts. Consider the controversy over 
alcoholism. This can cause suffering and interfere with one’s ability to successfully 
contribute to the life of the community. The controversy about claiming this is a disease 
concerns whether this is an abnormality of the functioning of some biological system in 
those afflicted, or rather another sort of problem being erroneously medicalized. The 
other sort of problem here might be one of weak will, poor upbringing, poor choices, etc.7 
Much of the controversy over ADHD revolves around whether this is primarily a 
problem of abnormal biological function or abnormal behavioral demands on normally 
functioning children. Determining whether biology is involved is sometimes very 
difficult, and I will look at some difficult cases along these lines in chapter 4. 
 The scientific models that distinguish normal from abnormal biological processes 
are human products. They are representations and as such can be more and less accurate. 
They can be more or less simplistic or detailed. They can be biased by personal or social 
agendas or prejudices, sometimes intentionally and blatantly so, but often their bias is 
more subtle and unintentional. But, as the original hypothetical model is scrutinized, 
challenged, and tested, it can be refined, and some models survive and evolve to be more 
accurate and less biased. Their evolution is effected not just by the social forces that are 
part of the scientific community, but by groups of scientists continuing to interact with 
the phenomena being modeled. These survivors become more sophisticated and intricate 
and increasingly branch out to help support other surviving models while simultaneously 
gaining support and elaboration from these neighbors. Scientific models and theories are 
                                                 
7 It is always a possibility that the problem of alcoholism is multifactorial, combining 
aspects of biological abnormality and weak willpower, poor upbringing, poor choices, 
etc. It is also possible that the biological factors predisposing some to alcoholism are not 
abnormalities but variations of normal biological function that happen, in certain 
environments, to be disadvantages for the individual in question.  
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human and social constructs—they are perspectival and fallible representations created to 
help us understand natural phenomena. They can be flawed, but they can also be 
wonderfully accurate and reveal to us surprising, previously unimagined aspects of the 
workings of nature. I shall argue, in chapter 2, that such representational models can have 
many different virtues (and vices) and that these various virtues come in degrees. 
Learning to recognize these virtues and evaluating for them in particular scientific models 
is something physicians and others do commonly. It is something that people can do 
better with practice. Such evaluation of the scientific models backing claims about 
disease is a crucial part of determining the legitimacy of these claims. 
 Another interesting theme that I shall repeatedly touch on has to do with the fact 
that biological science offers the most uncontroversial and convincing distinctions 
between normal and abnormal function for these isolated systems far removed from gross 
observation. The details of the normal and potentially abnormal functions and structure of 
the cells that make up the thyroid gland are not in dispute nor the target for claims that 
science is discriminating against those thyroid cells marked out as different. The issues 
are much more controversial when biological and psychological science distinguishes 
sexual behaviors as abnormal (e.g. paraphelias) or even when it claims that gross human 
structure is abnormal (e.g. congenitally conjoined twins or albinism).  
This current chapter serves as an introduction to my thesis. Chapter 2 will give a 
brief sketch of my position on science, how it operates, what it produces, and how its 
products are tested, improved, and ultimately adopted as reliable and accurate knowledge 
regarding the phenomena being represented. The theoretical sense of normal and 
abnormal function (as distinct from other senses of normality and abnormality) is created 
simultaneously with other descriptive elements of particular biological models. This 
chapter contains the least original contribution on my part and borrows heavily from the 
work of others with whom I agree. Chapter 3 argues that there are different senses of 
normality and abnormality and in particular argues that modern biological science utilizes 
an importantly distinct sense of normality and abnormality in its descriptions of 
biological phenomena. It is important to be able to distinguish and keep track of different 
senses of normality and abnormality when considering controversial disease claims. 
Distinguishing different senses of abnormality provides insight into the allegation that 
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some disease claim is the ‘medicalization’ of a non-medical problem. It also provides 
insight into the allegations that some disease claims are merely ‘social constructions.’ 
Chapter 4 is the most important chapter. I discuss the dispute between naturalists and 
normativists about disease. I then offer ideal criteria for a legitimate disease claim, 
namely:  
    
i. a specification of a circumscribed biological (or psychological) system  
ii. a specification of the normal structure and normal function for this system 
(and/or its parts) 
iii. a specification of a particular malfunction or malformation in the structure or 
function of the system (and/or its parts) 
iv. these specifications are part of a scientific model (i.e. generated by those in the 
community recognizable as the authorities on the details of the biological or 
psychological system in question) 
v. the scientific models involved are assumed or judged (by at least those 
recognized as authorities) to provide an accurate (i.e. having good ‘fit’) and 
relatively unbiased representation of how human biology or psychology 
normally functions and how it can in this particular way malfunction or be 
malformed. 
 
I also discuss illegitimate and putative disease claims based on these criteria. In the last 
part of this long final chapter I apply my concept of disease, and my criteria for 
legitimate disease claims, to interesting, controversial, and difficult cases. I then conclude 
in chapter 5 with a brief summary.  
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CHAPTER 2 
SCIENCE 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 My main thesis is that a disease is an abnormality in the structure or function of a 
biological system. It is pathology in form or function. This is not a controversial 
understanding of disease among contemporary physicians.8 Furthermore, curing disease, 
along with reducing suffering, are the central goals of medical practice. One searches in 
vain, however, for a definition of disease in medical textbooks. During my own medical 
school education, a definition was never offered nor asked for. This assumption, that 
everyone has a clear enough idea what constitutes disease, is being challenged. 
Advancing technology and increased knowledge provides intervention and control of 
many biological processes, capabilities, behaviors and aspects of appearance. Many of 
these new biotechnological interventions involve managing concerns and addressing 
problems which traditionally have not been considered within the realm of medical 
practice. This creates an opportunity to ask if some issues that patients want medical help 
with are legitimate diseases.9 Is attention-deficit disorder in school children a legitimate 
disease or another sort of problem?10 Are the aches and pains of a depressed middle aged 
women normal or the signs of a disease like fibromyalgia? The wrinkles on an aging face 
or the acne on a young face are frequently problems brought to the medical clinic, but it 
                                                 
8 The controversy arises when one tries to carefully define disease and then considers 
examples to test the definition. It quickly becomes apparent that a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions is not forthcoming if we want to capture all the examples of 
conditions currently called disease. The difficulty is compounded if we include historical 
examples. 
9 An entire host of related questions may arise when one asks is this problem a medical 
problem or asks if the things troubling the patient constitute a ‘legitimate disease.’ 
10 When I have used the phrase ‘another sort of problem,’ people (particularly physicians) 
generally ask what I mean by this, as if diseases are the only real source of suffering or 
difficulty in life. I hope that our society is not so thoroughly medicalized that we cannot 
conceive of non-medical sorts of suffering and anguish, like a child being bullied at 
school or otherwise treated unfairly, or discovering that one’s spouse is having an affair. 
There are problems and difficulties that are not related to pathology or biological 
malfunction. 
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is not clear f they are pathologies. The increasing cost of providing an adequate level of 
medical care to most, if not all, members of society is forcing policy makers and medical 
providers to ask where the boundary between disease and non-disease lies. 
Simultaneously, pharmaceutical companies are increasing the number of products whose 
purpose is to improve the quality of life more than prevent death and disability. 
Presumably the boundary between legitimate disease and non-disease will serve as a 
starting point for discussions about what ought to be paid for by insurance and what sorts 
of services physicians should provide. What is needed is a way to distinguish legitimate 
claims of disease form illegitimate claims.   
 In addition to now being of some practical importance, the nature of disease is an 
intellectually interesting problem. It is one of the fundamental issues in the philosophy of 
medicine. Over the past 30 years, the main point of disagreement about the nature of 
disease has been cast as the disagreement between naturalists and normativists. 
Essentially, the normativist’s position is that disease claims are fundamentally evaluative 
in nature. Diseases are harmful or otherwise disvalued biological states. Saying that some 
biological process is a disease is much like saying that a certain animal or insect is a pest 
or vermin. It tells us more about our personal preferences and social practices than about 
the structure or character of natural phenomena. The main problem for normativism 
generally is that it undervalues or ignores issues regarding the differences in epistemic 
virtues of the explanatory biological models supporting particular disease claims. 
Naturalism is the position that disease claims are fundamentally descriptive, scientific 
claims. Diseases are biological malfunctions. Saying that a certain biological process or 
problem is a disease is like saying that a certain animal or insect is a member of a certain 
species. It tells us more about the natural biological phenomena than human preferences 
or values. The problem for naturalism is explaining the seeming teleology involved with 
designating something a disease. My own position, as will be detailed in Chapter 4, is 
something of a compromise, and might be called a modest or weak naturalism. 
 The current Chapter concerns a global sketch of science, what it produces, and 
how it does so. This is a very difficult task to set oneself, and I take the easy way out. I 
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rely heavily on the work of other philosophers of science with whom I agree broadly.11 
The reason for needing to give such a sketch is that one of the fundamental differences 
perpetuating the dispute between naturalists and normativists concerns their views of 
science, its products, and how these products are created. Basically naturalists tend to be 
pro-science and tend to defend an unrealistically positive view of science as delivering 
the bare facts about empirical phenomena. They frequently discuss cases of spectacular 
and uncontroversial scientific discovery and explanation, of which the history of 
medicine has many examples. Normativists tend to be very skeptical of science and the 
social and political authority it commands. They are critical of the epistemic claims 
offered by over-zealous defenders of science and its products. They frequently discuss 
cases where personal agendas and social biases were passed off as empirical facts 
supported by scientific investigation. Unfortunately, there are also many examples of this 
in the history of medicine. It is not too great an exaggeration to say that the simplicity of 
many of the positions offered on the nature of disease are related to the oversimplified 
and slanted visions of science on which they draw. Furthermore, my own explanation (or 
explication) of disease can be understood as an attempted compromise between 
naturalism and normativism, and my sketch of science also a compromise between the 
errors of over-simplistic praise or criticism. Science is a human endeavor, one open to 
bias and influence by the personal and social agendas or the people and communities 
pursuing empirical investigation, but it also has built up both technological and epistemic 
tools and practices, and institutionalized many of these, so that over time it tends to 
increase the accuracy and decrease the bias in its representational and explanatory 
models. 
 In this chapter I will speak of scientific models, and in particular I am interested 
in the explanatory models offered in biological science. I have a very broad conception of 
such models, and my meaning is close to what others may mean by ‘scientific theory.’ 
Scientific models are circumscribed representations of selected aspects of empirical 
phenomena. They are constructed by humans for use by humans. For instance, there are 
                                                 
11 A disclaimer is warranted from the outset: I select only a few recent philosophers of 
science to draw on. However, these philosopher’s positions are often elaborations of 
earlier views and built on suggestions or ideas offered by previous workers in the field. 
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models of how the human thyroid hormone has its effects on cells. For two excellent 
example see Figures 2 and 4 in Cheng, et. al., (2010).12 These figures are only simplified 
schematic representations of aspects of the overall model of the mechanisms allowing 
thyroid hormones to have effects on cells. Other aspects of the model are represented or 
described through text or via mathematical formulas. The ‘model’13 is a complex 
combination of textual description, formulae, schema, etc. It is important to distinguish 
the simplified, generalized model of some biological system from any actual physical 
system that the model is representing. Models, like those involved with the thyroid gland, 
have been built up, tested and refined over generations. One can find the basic details of 
such models in textbooks dating back several generations. Other models are newer and 
perhaps less well verified and more likely to be substantially improved by continuing 
research, like those explaining how the nucleus accumbins forms part of the circuitry in 
the brain controlling feelings of reward and satisfaction (see Willuhn, et. al., 2010 and 
Gardner, 2011).  
 Models like these, of the function of human thyroid hormone, have very close 
interrelations with other models in this area of research. These groups of models lend 
each other mutual support. The scientific model of the function of thyroid hormone is 
closely integrated with models of how the hypothalamus works in regulating the thyroid 
and other glands in the body. It is integrated with models of how hormones are 
transported in plasma and interact with cell surface or intracellular hormone receptors 
(such as the interactions partially represented in Cheng, et. al., (2010), Figures 2 and 4). 
These are integrated with models of how hormones are metabolized by target tissues, etc. 
The more integrated a model becomes with larger collections of models, the harder it is to 
believe that the group of models, each worked on and constructed somewhat 
independently, and whose results dovetail with each other, could all be mistaken and in 
                                                 
12 This article and the figures that are in it are easily attainable online at no cost at either 
http://edrv.endojournals.org/content/31/2/139.abstract or 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2852208/?tool=pubmed. 
13 We can speak here of models or a model for any circumscribed system. Any model can 
usually be broken down into parts or component models, and any model can be combined 
with others to form a larger system. I freely change, for example, between talking of the 
models that describe the function and structure of the thyroid or of the model that 
describes this.  
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need of revision or replacement. Technology and medical intervention based on these 
models work as predicted. Scientists, physicians and students accept these abstract 
models as explanations for how individual, actual thyroid glands work and why they are 
located where they are and look the way they do, etc. 
There is vertical integration as well as horizontal integration. The details of 
thyroid function are described in increasing depth. There are details of the normal pattern 
of arteries and veins bringing blood to and from the thyroid. There are wonderfully 
detailed models explaining the structure and function of thyroid tissue—specifying how 
follicular cells and C-cells are organized around follicles, or lakes, of stored 
thyroglobulin, and how such parenchymal tissue is organized by septae of connective 
tissue. Other more fine-grained models describe how these cells function to synthesize 
calcitonin and the two main thyroid hormones (T3 and T4). At lower levels of analysis 
there are models of how the enzymes in these particular cells are structured and can 
function to bind and utilize iodine in the synthesis of thyroid hormone, and how the 
concentration and activity of these enzymes are regulated by the interaction of local and 
systemic factors. At even lower levels of analysis are models detailing how genes and 
molecules interact to regulate expression and create and sustain the normal structure and 
functions of a human thyroid gland (as partially and simplistically represented in Cheng, 
et. al., (2010), Figure 2). It is granted that any actual token human thyroid gland may not 
operate exactly as the standard model details, but to a remarkable extent (that allows 
medical practice to be remarkably successful) the idealized model of normal function 
captures the important, reproducible aspects of the actual natural phenomena of any token 
thyroid.14 
                                                 
14 There are of course many complexities even with the idealized models that represent 
normal structure and function of the human thyroid. There is a description of how the 
thyroid develops embryologically, changes with growth and development, and how its 
function declines with age. There are also aspects of the model of normal thyroid 
function that explain how it operates under certain states of stress (like extreme illness or 
injury of some other part of the body, or during pregnancy, etc.). There are also aspects of 
the overall model of the human thyroid that take into consideration certain less significant 
differences in performance—differences within “the normal range of function.” Some 
amount of variety in actual function between token thyroid glands is not an 
insurmountable obstacle to a general model of normal thyroid form and function. The 
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 The horizontally and vertically integrated set of models that explain the normal 
structure and function of the thyroid gland and its place in the larger human endocrine 
system can be considered a paradigm of an unproblematic, objective scientific 
explanation of normal biological function. Almost no one seriously worries that these 
models of ‘normal’ biological function are merely social values being passed off as 
factual so as to perpetuate some personal or political agenda. These models are assumed 
to be both an accurate representation of natural phenomena and an unbiased and objective 
description of normal biological function.  
 My main thesis is that legitimate claims of human disease are made in reference 
to unproblematic models of normal human biological function (e.g. the thyroid gland) 
along with models of the particular manner in which the system malfunctions or is 
malformed. A thyroglossal cyst (i.e. a remnant of thyroid tissue left in the midline of the 
anterior aspect of the neck along the path of migration of thyroid tissues from the base of 
the tongue to the area near the thyroid cartilage) is an abnormality and malformation and 
I would argue it is an unproblematic case of human pathology. The same is true for 
medullary carcinoma of the thyroid, follicular adenomas and carcinomas of the thyroid, 
papillary carcinoma of the thyroid, Hashimoto’s thyroiditis, DeQuervain’s thyroiditis, 
Graves’ disease, and for the various M.E.N (multiple endocrine neoplasia) syndromes 
that can be inherited, etc. These are human diseases because scientific models explain 
them as abnormalities of a biological system which can otherwise be explained as having 
a normal structure and function. 
 Let us turn to historical cases where claims about the existence of a human 
disease were made but now appear to be problematic. Appeals (either implicitly or 
explicitly) were made in these cases to scientific models intended to delineate abnormal 
from normal biological function or structure. Melancholia was a diagnosable disease of 
temperament for many centuries. It was basically either an acquired excess or inherited 
potential for excess of one of the four basic humors, specifically black bile. According to 
some versions of Galenic theory, black bile was produced in normal amounts by the 
spleen as part of the normal digestive process (see Garrison, 1929). Likewise, fever was 
                                                 
issue of normality, normal function, and distinguishing insignificant variety from 
pathology will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.  
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also considered for many centuries to be itself a disease entity. Some models described 
fever as resulting from an abnormality in the normal balance of basic humors, namely an 
abnormal accumulation of yellow bile.15  
 Drapetomania was a disease proposed in 1851 by Samuel Cartwright, a pro-
slavery physician from Louisiana (see Cartwright, 1851). It was a theoretical mental 
illness that afflicted some southern slaves, and resulted in repeated attempts to run away 
from their masters. This disease was a result of improper care of slaves that arose out of a 
failure to properly understand the physiology and temperament of the African race and 
the psychology of the master-slave relationship. From our vantage point Cartwright’s 
disease claim was hardly more than an attempt to pass off his personal and political views 
as a scientific model of normal and abnormal behavior. Even Cartwright’s 
contemporaries must have seen the bias in his model. However, not all cases that we now 
recognize as illegitimate disease claims were so easily detected at the time they were 
proposed. Cartwright had studied with Benjamin Rush, one of the founding fathers of 
American psychiatry, a one-time chemistry professor at the University of Pennsylvania 
Medical School, a staunch abolitionist, and one of the most respected physicians of his 
day. Rush also described a disorder in African Americans that today we recognize as an 
illegitimate disease claim. At the time Rush believed he was observing evidence of a 
biological abnormality in a system that otherwise might operate normally. What Rush 
observed was a case of (what we now recognize as) vitiligo, an autoimmune disorder that 
results in patches of lost skin color. Rush believed what he was seeing was the partial 
cure of abnormally darkened skin. He proposed that darkly-complected persons must be 
suffering from a disease called ‘negroidism’ and for which a cure must be possible—after 
all, he was seeing evidence of its partial remission. He theorized that this skin disease 
was related to leprosy (a disease that was also known to cause hyperpigmentation), and 
urged a search for those factors that might cure it. Rush advised that those suffering from 
the disease not be treated as inferior, just because they suffered from a skin disorder. 
                                                 
15 The excess of a particular bile in the body was usually due either to abnormally 
increased production or abnormalities in the means of excretion or conversion of bile. 
Here, the modern medical theorist is reminded of metabolic diseases such as gout. 
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However, he also recommended against mixed-marriage as children from such unions 
might help perpetuate the disease. 
 In hindsight, it is often easy to spot a putative disease claim backed with poor 
theoretical models of normal and abnormal function. Definitive rejection of such disease 
claims as illegitimate occurs as science slowly replaces the theoretical models such as 
those proposed by Rush with models offering more accurate representations of the 
phenomena being explained. Currently we possess much better models of the normal and 
abnormal functions of the biological systems responsible for skin pigmentation than Dr. 
Rush did. Today we understand more about how the skin acquires pigment and we have 
accurate (though still incomplete) scientific models of how the melanocyte-keratinocyte 
system works. We also have better (although not fully worked out models) of how 
autoimmunity destroys melanocytes in certain regions of skin in some individuals and 
gives rise to the clinical manifestations of vitiligo. It is easy to see now that drapetomania 
was a case of social prejudice being passed off as a descriptive theory of abnormality. 
However, even today the models that science offers concerning what constitutes ‘normal’ 
human behavior are not as well worked out, reliable or as uncontroversial as those for the 
human thyroid or the melanocyte-keratinocyte system. 
 As a community of inquirers, we are better positioned than Dr. Rush regarding 
whether changes in pigment are normal or abnormal biologically. However, we are not in 
any better position than Dr. Rush regarding current controversial claims of disease.16 
Examples include chronic fatigue syndrome, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, 
intermittent explosive disorder, pathological gambling, alcoholism, idiopathic short 
stature, obesity, pedophilia, etc. I will argue that whether these are legitimate diseases 
claims depends on whether or not these conditions can be explained as theoretical 
abnormalities of an otherwise normally operating and structured biological system. 
Importantly, legitimacy depends on whether the scientific models describing the system 
have the sorts of virtues that make them widely accepted as accurate and unbiased. 
Ideally, the scientific model backing a disease claim (and its corresponding claim about 
                                                 
16 It would be interesting to compare and contrast this episode with the more recent 
controversy over the publication of the book The Bell Curve whose basic premise was 
that African Americans may be genetically less intelligent. In each case certain data are 
observed and a theoretical model of normal and abnormal biology is constructed. 
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normal human biology) would be known to be an objective representation of the natural 
phenomena in question with little or no human bias or mistaken interpretation involved, 
and would continue to be recognized as such by future generations of inquirers more 
enlightened and experienced than us. 
 The naturalism/normativism dispute that forms the core of the philosophical 
debate about the nature of disease hinges on whether claims of disease are naturalistic 
descriptions or social/personal evaluations. Questions about how scientific explanations 
are produced, exactly what is the nature of these explanations, and what kind of authority 
they should carry are never far from the surface in this debate. Stereotypical naturalists 
are overconfident about the products of science being unproblematic representations of 
the natural world and its character. For them science delivers the facts. For the 
stereotypical normativist, science itself is a complex of social practices and its models 
ultimately represent the perspectives, values, and pre-occupations of the community and 
people in question. Oversimplification in one’s view of science can lead to oversimplified 
positions on the nature of disease. 
 In this chapter I will sketch a vision of science as a complex human endeavor 
which attempts to understand and describe the natural phenomena around us and within 
us. I shall offer a sketch highlighting points important for understanding my main thesis 
of what distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate disease claims. Rather than a global 
acceptance or rejection of science, what is required to evaluate disease claims is the 
evaluation of individual cases of scientific explanation. Science, particularly biological 
science, has a decent track-record of producing accurate representations. However, as a 
human enterprise, bias can enter into attempts to describe and model the normal and 
abnormal functions of the human body. Science is not a purely rational process of 
producing true statements about the natural world nor merely a power play. It is complex 
and messy. It is difficult even to describe well. Alternatively it is not merely a means for 
the more powerful interests in society to perpetuate their position by clothing their 
subjective values in what appear as factual descriptions of the natural order.  
 Humans do assess the relative reliability of individual scientific theories and 
models. I do so on an almost daily basis as a medical student and physician. I frequently 
make assessments of models of biological function and dysfunction that support claims 
 23 
about particular disease processes. Well-educated adults also make judgments on the 
accuracy and reliability of isolated scientific models specifying what constitutes normal 
human biology and behavior. Such models encountered when assessing or trying to 
understand claims about ADHD, depression, obesity, chronic fatigue syndrome, 
fibromyalgia, gulf-war syndrome, etc. must be evaluated for their reliability? How 
speculative are they? The factors relied on in such assessments are often not explicitly 
discussed nor sometimes even consciously acknowledged. As this chapter progresses I 
will try to highlight some of the factors or clues I think people should rely on when faced 
with determining whether a particular scientific model of biological normality and/or 
abnormality has the sort of qualities that make it likely to be reliable and accurate and 
make the related disease claims likely to be legitimate. 
 In many cases the scientific model in question is only a first speculative attempt to 
describe the functions and malfunctions of the system giving rise to the signs and 
symptoms suspected of being a disease. In these cases the answer is indeterminate and 
must await further work and more analysis. Often the observable signs and symptoms 
being described may be controversial, or already the subject of widely accepted 
conventional judgments. Whether masturbation, alcoholism, or an extremely large nose 
are signs or symptoms of a disease is controversial and any model of biological 
abnormality will compete and coexist with conventional judgments about the abnormality 
of these behaviors and attributes. In such cases the controversy is not merely about how 
accurate the scientific model is, but about whether science can or should replace, 
compete, or legitimate social judgments or naïve folk-theories about such signs and 
symptoms. Here, if the science being offered is only tentative or incomplete, the 
temptation will have to be fought to jump to the conclusion that an objective, descriptive 
divide between biological normality and abnormality has been established, particularly if 
the divide was previously just a conventional judgment about normality. 
 Ultimately the question of the legitimacy of the claim about disease is answered 
by assessing the accuracy and other epistemic virtues of the scientific model being 
appealed to in the disease claim. If the claim about disease cannot provide a reliable 
scientific model to back its case, then it is not yet a legitimate disease. If the model 
appealed to is not a legitimate and unproblematic scientific model, then it is not a 
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legitimate disease (although it may be a hypothesis or first approximation awaiting 
further research). This does not mean the physician cannot address symptoms and 
alleviate suffering in such indiscriminate cases, only that she may or may not be treating 
disease when doing so. This does not mean that the physician cannot address symptoms 
and alleviate suffering in such indeterminate cases, only that she may or may not be 
treating a disease when doing so. 
 
2.2 GIERE 
 Ronald Giere (1985, 1999) argues for a ‘middle way’ between critics and 
defenders of science. He believes that both camps have internalized certain unsatisfactory 
assumptions of what science produces and how it does it. Giere calls this flawed vision 
the Enlightenment picture of science17. Aspects of this picture include a belief in laws of 
nature (understood as universal generalizations), an a priori commitment to realism and 
naturalism, and a belief in a special kind of scientific rationality. Giere recommends 
moving beyond both criticizing and justifying this vision of science. Giere wants to retain 
the idea that scientific models and theories are representational, but move past the ideas 
that representation in science has to be linguistic in nature. “The winning combination, I 
suggest, is one that gives up the search for criteria of scientific rationality, abandons the 
attempt to separate the content and methods of science from the psychological and 
sociological reality, but preserves the view that science is a representational activity 
(Giere, 1999, p.44).” 
                                                 
17 A recent example of this Enlightenment picture and its assumptions can be found in 
much of the thinking of a school of thought Giere calls ‘Logical Empiricism.’ Giere says: 
“Within the English speaking world, the Logical Empiricist image of science, and the 
projects it generates, dominated philosophical though about science for a generation 
following World War II. Two fundamental aspects of this image are relevant here. First, 
scientific knowledge consists primarily of what is encapsulated in scientific theories, and 
theories are ideally to be thought of as interpreted axiomatic systems. It follows that the 
primary mode of representation in science is linguistic representation. Second, the 
reasoning which legitimates the claims of a particular theory as genuine knowledge has 
the general character of a logic. That is, there are rules which operate on linguistic 
entities, yielding a ‘conclusion’ or some other linguistic entity, such as a probability 
assignment (Giere, 1999, p. 119).” 
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 For Giere, understanding how science works, or should work, does not require a 
special kind of rationality or logic of confirmation, and he calls this position ‘scientific 
judgment without rationality.’ He says: 
Of course scientists make judgments regarding the fit between particular models 
and aspects of reality. And of course I do not claim that scientists’ judgments in 
these matters are ‘irrational.’ It is the conception of rationality that is at issue. The 
original Enlightenment dream was of universal, categorical principles of 
rationality that could guarantee the truth of natural laws meeting their conditions. 
By the twentieth century, this dream was generally reduced to a desire for 
universal principles that yielded the probable truth of natural laws. My view is 
that there are no such principles. One can have scientific judgment without 
rationality. Coming to hold that one model holds better than others is not a matter 
of pure reasoning or logical inference. Rather, it is a matter of making a decision. 
Effective decision making requires strategies for reaching desired goals. This 
applies to business and military decisions as well as to scientific decisions. If one 
wishes to talk of rationality here, it is a conditional or instrumental rationality, a 
matter of using effective means for reaching desired goals (Giere, 1999, p. 7). 
 
Giere sees science as utilizing normal human cognitive abilities—cognitive capacities 
evolved for ‘mapping’ and manipulating our complex environment. Science proceeds by 
the same everyday human cognitive abilities involved in other complex social activities, 
and particularly, by developing and evolving special methods and practices that extend 
these ‘everyday’ cognitive abilities. Giere recommends an empirical study of how 
humans generally, and scientists in particular, go about creating scientific models and 
deciding which models to endorse, which to refine, which to abandon18. He believes that 
science has already shown itself successful regarding such decisions, and has itself been 
developing the tools to study scientific decision making. “[W]e know that our capacities 
for operating in the world are highly adapted to that world. The skeptic asks us to set all 
this aside in favor of a project that denies our conclusion. And he does so on the basis of 
                                                 
18 Although Giere doesn’t explicitly discuss it, I believe he would want this empirical 
study to encompass both individual decision and the dynamic social phenomena involved 
in how groups of scientist, whether through formal institutions and practices or more 
informal means, shape which models are supported, sanctioned, and ultimately survive 
and which are modified, rejected, overlooked, etc. Later in this section I discuss Giere’s 
endorsement of building an explanatory model for ‘the scientific method’ utilizing 
evolution and selection as a metaphor instead of using a developmental stage metaphor. 
Surely such a process of scientific ‘evolution’ involves some of the dynamic social 
phenomena I have in mind. 
 26 
what we claim to be an outmoded and mistaken theory about how knowledge is, in fact, 
acquired (Giere, 1985, p. 340).”  
 Even though Giere believes science does not use a special logic of decision, he 
still believes that science produces legitimate knowledge, and that this is knowledge of 
phenomena operating independent of our theorizing.  
 
…there exists much genuine scientific knowledge. Moreover, I firmly believe 
there have been dramatic increases in scientific knowledge during the twentieth 
century... We have learned for example that inheritance is carried by DNA 
molecules with a two-strand helical structure. And even the continents have not 
always been where they now are. In stating these convictions I am not merely 
playing games with the meaning of expressions like ‘scientific knowledge.’ I 
intend such expressions in the relatively ordinary sense that scientific knowledge 
is knowledge of the world and that there is a difference between knowledge and 
mere opinion, even widespread opinion (Giere, 1999, p. 3). 
 
Science is not merely the discovery of already categorized objects and relations. 
The categories we use are to some extent constructed by us. Nevertheless, 
scientists can sometimes legitimately claim genuine similarities between their 
logical constructs and aspects of reality. That makes me some kind of a realist 
rather than a social constructivist (Giere, 1999, p. 150). 
 
Scientific models and theories do, more or less, represent aspects of reality. Disease 
categorization systems are constructed by humans but can with refinement represent 
aspects and patterns of the natural phenomena being represented. Giere calls to mind the 
American pragmatist school of thought, particularly on matters of science and naturalism, 
and in particular the work of John Dewey. “There was, for Dewey, no special sort of 
philosophical knowledge, particularly none that could provide any sort of foundation or 
ultimate legitimization for the sciences (Giere, 1999, p. 12).” Giere takes the current best 
science, its methods and results, as being paradigm examples of naturalistic explanation 
and knowledge.  
Giere discusses naturalism as not only a commitment to avoid supernatural 
explanations and appeals, but also to avoid a priori ones. No transcendental or a priori 
arguments can be given for naturalism. This commitment to naturalism is more 
methodological then metaphysical, and Giere ultimately sees his own work as empirical. 
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One must be careful, however, how one characterizes naturalism. Presented as 
theses, it invites self-defeating attempts to construct transcendental arguments in 
its favor. Vigilance is required to keep arguments for naturalism within 
naturalistic limitations. A better strategy, I have suggested, is to focus on 
naturalism as a set of methodological rules for developing a comprehensive 
naturalistic picture of the world. Success in applying these rules gives comfort to 
those pursuing the program and encourages others to join the effort. Positively, 
that is the most a consistent naturalist can do (Giere, 1999, p. 83). 
 
What the naturalist should be satisfied with is continuing to investigate the world by the 
best methods available, and building on the best models so far produced, knowing full 
well that these are fallible but also revisable. Belief that there is one, independent, 
describable world is one of many methodological assumptions that the naturalist 
perspective has operated under and should continue to do. But to argue over the truth or 
justification of these assumptions is a waste of time. 
Another improvement over the Enlightenment picture is a more modest, but more 
sophisticated, realism. Giere believes that scientific models represent reality, but that the 
manner in which they represent needs to be reconceived. He describes his realism as 
constructive, perspectival, and a ‘realism without truth.’ 
 
[We should] reject the usefulness of the notion of truth in understanding scientific 
realism. I do not mean that we cannot use an everyday notion of truth, as when 
asserting that it is indeed true that the earth is round. Here truth may be 
understood as no more than a device for affirmation. Rather, it is the analysis of 
truth developed in the foundations of logic and mathematics, and used in formal 
semantics, that we should reject in our attempts to understand modern science. 
But if we reject the standard analyses of truth and reference, what resources have 
we left with which to formulate claims of realism for science? The answer is that 
the notion of linguistic truth is but one form of the more general notion of 
representation. What realism requires is only that our theories well represent the 
world, not that they be true in some technical sense. So we need a notion of 
representation for science that does not rest on the usual analyses of truth for 
linguistic entities. What might that be? A first step is to reject the analysis of 
scientific theories as sets of statements in favor of a model-based account which 
makes nonlinguistic models the main vehicles for representing the world, and 
places language in a supporting role. We may, of course, use language to 
characterize our models, and what we say of the models is true. But this is merely 
the truth of definition, and requires little analysis. The important representational 
relationship is something like fit between model and the world. Unlike truth, fit is 
a more quantitative relationship, as clothes may be said to fit a person more or 
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less well. Of course we can say it is true that the clothes fit, but this is again 
merely the everyday use of the notion of truth. Here I can offer no general 
analysis of the notion of fit, only a further analogy—maps. There are many 
different kinds of maps: road maps, topological maps, subway maps, plate maps, 
etc. And it can hardly be denied that maps do generally represent at least some 
aspects of the world… Maps have many of the representational virtues we need 
for understanding how scientists represent the world. There is no such thing as a 
universal map. Neither does it make sense to question whether a map is true or 
false. The representational virtues of maps are different. A map may, for example, 
be more or less accurate, more or less detailed, of smaller or larger scale. Maps 
require a large background of human convention for their production and use. 
Without such they are no more than lines on paper (Giere, 1999, p. 25).  
 
 The proceeding passage contains many points about scientific models and the idea 
that a notion of better and worse ‘fit’ should replace the issue of truth when it comes to 
the virtue of representational accuracy. Scientific models represent phenomena better or 
worse relative to the explanatory goal for which the model was constructed. Different 
models can be constructed for different aspects of a phenomenon and eventually they 
might be combined or otherwise enhance each other, just as different maps of the same 
terrain might each focus on different salient aspects and, combined, give an even richer 
account of the landscape or cityscape being represented. The metaphysics of 
representation no longer need consist in discrete objects grouped into sets and kinds by 
sharing properties and relationships specified by logical conditions. The real phenomena 
may be very complex and have properties that vary subtly and continuously, with the 
simplistic structure and relations of the model being an attempt to capture important and 
interesting patterns and correlations in the phenomena. Whether a model represents 
accurately is an empirical question.19 
                                                 
19 Giere says: “…[I]t is an empirical question whether a particular map successfully 
represents the intended terrain. If it does, we can reasonably claim a form of realism for 
the relationship between the map and the terrain mapped. I call this form of realism 
perspectival realism. Standard analyses of reference and truth suggest a metaphysics in 
which the domain of interest consists of discrete objects grouped into sets defined by 
necessary and sufficient conditions. Likewise, there is a metaphysics suggested by 
perspectival realism. Rather than thinking of the world as packaged into sets of objects 
sharing definite properties, perspectival realism presents it as highly complex and 
exhibiting many qualities that at least appear to vary continuously. One might then 
construct maps that depict this world from various perspectives. In such a world, even a 
fairly successful realistic science might well contain individual concepts and relationships 
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 Perhaps only implicit in Giere’s vision is the point that when individuals dispute 
or question the details concerning some aspect of natural phenomena, they are most 
directly thinking of the available models. Models necessarily simplify and only partially 
represent the phenomena. These more simplistic representations are most often what the 
individual in question has learned and thinks of as the facts of the matter regarding the 
phenomena in question. When asking whether cardiac muscle has the same or different 
lactate dehydrogenase isoenzymes as skeletal muscle, most people will call to mind the 
details of the model as presented in a textbook, and to settle a dispute will go to such a 
text or other repository of expert opinion. Whether the particular model has good ‘fit’ is 
less often at issue. And even if it were at issue, outside a specialized laboratory set up to 
investigate such matters, verifying the accuracy of representation is not a possibility open 
to the average person. Again, the best that most people can do is consult authoritative 
texts and experts about how such things were discovered, how they are verified, and how 
such knowledge is reliably utilized. The same is true for claims about the details of 
normal and abnormal function of any biological system that might be disputed in 
discussion of a particular disease. The disputants will consult the details of the current, 
most authoritative model to determine what is ‘true’ of the model. The issue of whether 
the model accurately represents reality and if so, how well, are much harder and more 
complex issues and are not settled so easily. However, science as a community and even 
individuals often face just such issues of assessing ‘fit.’ More empirical investigation and 
careful analysis about just how such assessments are made, and how such assessment 
should be made, is needed.20 
Models can be nonlinguistic representations. Examples might include physical 
scale models, simplistic diagrammatic representations, textbook descriptions, or idealized 
formula explaining the relations of variables under specific circumstances. Some are 
complex highly detailed sets of interrelated models, such as those explaining the 
operation of the human cardiovascular system or the manner in which intracellular 
                                                 
inspired by various cultural interests. It is possible, therefore, that our currently accepted 
scientific theories embody cultural values and nevertheless possess many genuine 
representational virtues (Giere, 1999, p. 215).” 
 
20 I will return to this topic later in this chapter. 
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trafficking of proteins is accomplished, regulated, or disrupted. Models are whose 
structural elements are more or less similar to aspects of objects and processes in the real 
world.21 Science builds representational models, but the manner in which they represent 
is a matter of better and worse, and depends on the task at hand, and to some degree on 
the cultural values at hand. 22 There is not one proper way to represent the world. 
                                                 
21 About representational scientific models and the idea of ‘fit’ Giere says: “One is 
tempted to ask: How do maps represent physical spaces? Asking the question this way 
suggests that the answer is to be found in some binary relationship between maps and 
places. A better question is: How do we humans manage to use maps to represent 
physical spaces? This way of posing the question makes it less easy to forget that making 
maps is a cognitive and social activity of humans. Part of the answer is that map-making 
and map-using takes advantage of similarities in spatial structure between features of a 
map and features of a terrain. But one cannot understand map-making solely in terms of 
abstract, geometrical relationships. Interpretive relationships are also necessary. One 
must be able to understand that a particular area on a map is intended to represent, for 
example, a neighborhood rather than a political division or corporate ownership. These 
two features of representation using maps, similarity of structure and of interpretation, 
carry over to an understanding of how humans use scientific models to represent aspects 
of the world… Here, then, is a suggestion for better understanding what it means for a 
model to fit the world. The fit between a model and the world may be thought of like the 
fit between a map and the region it represents. How further to understand that sort of fit 
is, unfortunately, not an easy question (Giere, 1999, p. 82).” Giere also discusses the 
possible distinction between hypothesis, theory and model, and advocates trying to stay 
as true to actual usage by practicing scientists as possible. “Claims about real systems, 
then, have the form: the real system is similar to the model. A pendulum with small 
amplitude, for example, is similar to a simple harmonic oscillator. I will call such claims 
‘hypotheses.’ …The typical advanced text, then, presents the student with a cluster of 
models (really a cluster of clusters) together with a number of hypotheses about real 
things claimed to be similar to one or another of the models. For the purposes of 
developing a naturalistic theory of science, I suggest we understand the word ‘theory’ as 
indicating both the cluster of models and a broad range of hypotheses utilizing these 
models. Restricting ‘theory’ either to the models or to the hypotheses produces too great 
a variance with how scientists use the term. For all sorts of reasons, it is best to stick as 
closely to scientific usage as is compatible with developing an overall, adequate theory of 
science (Giere, 1999, p. 168)” 
 
22 Giere says: “The question for a model is how well it ‘fits’ various real-world systems 
one is trying to represent. One can admit that no model fits the world perfectly in all 
respects while insisting that, for specified real-world systems, some models clearly fit 
better than others. The better fitting models may represent more aspects of the real world 
or fit some aspects more accurately, or both. In any case, ‘fit’ is not simply a relationship 
between a model and the world. It requires a specification of which aspects of the world 
are important to represent and, for those aspects, how close a fit is desirable. In this 
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Scientific knowledge, at any given time, consists in a structured set of the best models 
available and these models provide only a limited representation of some aspects of the 
complex, continuously variable qualities of the natural phenomena in question. There are 
grey areas at the frontiers of research where the ‘fit’ between model and the phenomena 
being modeled has not been well assessed yet. The combined biomedical sciences have 
built up a set of models that in sum give an idealized model of normal biological function 
and form of the typical human body. These models also include detailed accounts about 
various possible malfunction and malformation of these systems. 
Giere acknowledges that interests, cultural values, and bias definitely influence 
model selection and the interpretation of theory, etc. “I think we will just have to live 
with the empirical possibility that, at any given time, our best science may nevertheless 
embody all manner of cultural interests and values in their very content. …I also believe 
that particular interests embedded in specific theories can be identified, and sometimes 
eliminated, by creating empirically superior theories (Giere, 1999, p. 18).” Any model 
will always be incomplete and partial—it will always necessarily be a simplification. This 
is the best we can do, but this sort of underdetermination or lack of completeness doesn’t 
yield an unacceptable relativism. Models are still tied to the reality they represent via 
observations and experiment and are always open to revision and supplementation. 
Investigators interact with the world, and their awareness that others can also interact 
with the world and test their model, and that actions and risks might be taken on the basis 
of their work—all these and other factors help constrain the content of scientific models. 
But creativity as well as cultural and personal bias also certainly influence the content of 
                                                 
picture of science, the primary representational relationship is between individual models 
and particular real systems... (Giere, 1999, p. 93)” He also says: “The empirical 
question—the question of realism—is how well the resulting model fits the intended 
aspects of the real world. And here my central claim is that the fit is always partial and 
imperfect. There is no such thing as a perfect model, complete in all details. That does 
not, however, prevent models from providing us with deep and useful insights into the 
workings of the natural world (Giere, 1999, p. 6).” 
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some models. Such influences can be detected and the best policy is careful investigation 
of each particular case.23  
Giere adopts an evolutionary metaphor in his model of both the development of 
scientific disciplines and in explaining how progress occurs (i.e. the selection of better 
models). He says of scientific progress: 
There are several important negative lessons to be learned from the past thirty-
five years of debate about ‘scientific revolutions.’ One is that we should abandon 
the political metaphor now embodied in the very term ‘revolution.’ Thinking of 
scientific changes this way makes them seem more social, and more arbitrary, 
than they in fact are. It unnecessarily encourages the idea that scientific facts 
might be just like social facts. In science, there is not only interaction among 
individuals and social groups, there is also causal interaction with the world. 
Although it cannot be claimed that this causal interaction uniquely determines the 
scientist’s pictures of the world, it does play a major role in the story. The task is 
to explain that role, not to ignore it or deny its existence. A second negative 
lesson is finally to abandon the developmental metaphor that underlies both 
Kuhn’s stage theory of science and its recent philosophical rivals. …Stage 
theories take a biological concept that applies primarily to the development of 
individual organisms and attempts to apply it to social groups. Taking an 
evolutionary analogy more seriously provides an immediate explanation of why 
developmental models do not work very well at the collective level. The variety 
of possibilities for evolution in a population is very great… Rather than trying to 
understand ‘scientific revolutions,’ we should be thinking in terms of ‘the 
evolution of science (Giere, 1999, p. 45). 
  
The evolution of specific scientific fields or disciplines (or even science as a whole) can 
progress by selecting and refining the better models and rejecting and repairing worse 
ones—with part of this process being the detection and minimization of cultural, political 
or personal bias in the models. However, evolution in this sense does not guarantee 
moving forward towards increasing numbers of better and better models. Science, or one 
of its disciplines, can stagnate or actually regress in the sense of having increased 
                                                 
23 Giere says: “The main disagreement would simply be over the extent to which 
decisions about the fit of models to the world are influenced by interests rather than other 
factors, such as the outcomes of experiments. My view is that this balance varies from 
case to case and the actual influences can only be ascertained by examining the particular 
scientific episodes in considerable detail. In some cases experimental data may strongly 
influence theory choice; in other cases political commitments or professional interests 
might be dominant. Most cases are mixed (Giere, 1999, p. 61).” 
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amounts of cultural and personal bias influence models or undergoing a weakening of the 
pressures to be accurate in representation on individual investigators (either formal ones 
or less formal, more conventional pressures). At certain times and places, communities of 
investigators have suffered periods of such stagnation or regression.24 Scientific inquiry, 
however, often does make slow progress and does tend to select for better models over 
time. Such progress slowly ‘evolves’ and is achieved by certain pressures that emerge 
from the collective inquiry, examination, and competition within a community of 
inquirers. There is no guarantee that things will continue to progress. Stagnation and 
regression (from whatever perspective this is judged) are possibilities on the evolutionary 
model of scientific development. Contingency about which direction development takes, 
and the inertia of any path once chosen are also issues to consider on an evolutionary 
model. 
 Giere is also interested in families of models and theories, and their overall 
structure. He suggests that the structure of many families of models may be importantly 
similar to the hierarchical and webbed relations hypothesized by some psychologists to 
organize natural kind concepts. “Families of models may be ‘mapped’ as an array with 
‘horizontal’ graded structures, multiple hierarchical ‘vertical’ structures, and local 
‘radial’ structures. These structures offer the promise of important implications for 
understanding how scientific theories are learned and used in actual scientific practice 
(Giere, 1999, p. 117).” 
 The structure of sets of models can change across disciplines. Giere comments 
that many advanced textbooks for particular specialties present ‘clusters of clusters’ of 
models. I would call certain of these clusters the core of these disciplines, and suggest 
that different disciplines have a core cluster of models with different characteristics. This 
includes differences both in the qualities of the models that are within the core and 
differences in the interrelations between the models in the core. Giere seems to recognize 
that different disciplines have core clusters with very different qualities and interrelations. 
                                                 
24 The Lysenko affair and the atmosphere of respect for evidence within the scientific 
community in the early communist period in Russia is an example of such a period of 
regression. The success of eugenics in scientific and political communities in pre-WWII 
United States might be another example. 
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And these differences may require very different ways of understanding and studying 
different scientific disciplines or projects. 
 
The model-based account of theories permits a theory of science which avoids 
one of the major methodological defects of much of social science—the demand 
for universality. If the empiricist model does not fit molecular biology, that does 
not mean it is worthless as part of a theory of science. The question is whether 
there are any major sciences, or long periods in the life of some major sciences, 
that fit the empiricist model [as described by van Fraassen and other strict 
empiricists]. It seems hard to deny that there are. Greek astronomy, 
thermodynamics in the late nineteenth century, and quantum theory in the 
twentieth century are obvious candidates. It may be more than coincidence that 
quantum physics is the science van Fraassen knows best. On the other hand, many 
contemporary sciences, including chemistry, molecular biology, and geology, 
seem decidedly realistic. Of course, many disagreements remain. For example, is 
empiricism or realism the dominant mode in contemporary science? I would 
guess that realism is dominant. Empiricism is the mode of sciences lacking a solid 
theoretical tradition, e.g., many of the social sciences, or of the sciences whose 
models are difficult to understand in spite of much empirical success, e.g., 
quantum theory. Another issue is whether having realistic goals tends to make 
scientists, or even science fields, more successful in discovering new results. 
Again, I would suggest that realism is scientifically more fruitful. Though 
difficult to resolve, these issues, happily, are more empirical than theoretical 
(Giere, 1999, p. 198). 
 
 Disciplines within natural and social science develop very differently regarding 
their methodologies and regarding the organization, success, and the characteristics and 
interrelations of their best models. This point is worth keeping in mind when considering 
scientific models that purport to distinguish normal structure and function from abnormal. 
The models that form the core of the basic biological sciences, the majority of what is 
reviewed in the first two years of medical school, usually deliver this distinction without 
any controversy. No one disputes that the normal function of the thyroid gland is to 
produce thyroid hormone. However, the psychological and behavioral sciences that are 
reviewed in the first two years of medical school are not as uncontroversial. Even the best 
available models of the normal sexual behavior of a human or the normal personality 
traits of a human (or even the range of normal personality traits) are not subjects accepted 
as obvious facts, even by medical students who are being presented the information as if 
it were on par with the models of the normal human thyroid. Part of the reason is that the 
 35 
sciences of psychology and psychiatry have developed differently, had differing degrees 
and kinds of success, and have never fully developed stable core methodologies and 
models to the extent the other biological sciences have.25 Even non-experts in these fields 
have an intuitive hunch that the models of human psychology do not provide a 
description of normal human function as reliable as those of endocrinology. Part of the 
intuitive hunch probably has to do with the perceived reputation of these different fields, 
and part of the intuitive hunch comes from the fact that human behavior is observable, 
open to folk-theories and assessment via conventional norms and values and thus the 
explanation of such behavior has to compete with these in ways that the operation of the 
thyroid gland or immune system do not. 
 I agree with most of Giere’s alternative to the Enlightenment conceptions of 
science. I think that he is correct that scientific models are partial, perspectival, and often 
involve substantial non-linguistic and non-truth-theoretic means of representation. 
Something like a notion of better or worse ‘fit’ should replace the all-or-nothing 
assessment of true or false. Models are attempts to represent phenomena and those that 
are accurate are constrained by observation and experiments with the phenomena in 
question. I agree with Giere that science utilizes and extends general human cognitive 
abilities to map, represent, and model. Science uses pragmatic decision making. The 
rationality of science, if it can be generally described at all, is one of instrumentalism. 
This is not to deny that certain statistical methods for evaluating and weighing evidence 
have not been cultivated and encouraged within scientific communities. 
 I agree with Giere’s suggestion to discard the ‘political revolution’ metaphor and 
adopt the evolutionary metaphor regarding how science and its different branches 
develop over time. One issue that I believe Giere does not address adequately is the 
pressure that can be exerted by communities of investigators to retain and refine the 
better models while abandoning or correcting those that are inaccurate, poorly conceived, 
                                                 
25 Even within the non-psychological biological sciences there are important differences. 
For example many models in physiology are old and have been passed down over several 
generations, where as immunology is a relatively young science whose core 
methodologies and models have only recently (in the past 20 years) become stable. 
Students understand that the models of biological function being offered in physiology or 
anatomy compared with immunology are more reliable and unlikely to change much over 
the course of their career in medicine.  
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etc. I do believe that in the right circumstances there are such positive pressures and that 
part of what constitutes ‘science’ (and distinguishes it from other social institutions) is 
that, as a community of inquirers, certain pressures, methodological assumptions, 
techniques, etc. are perpetuated and attempts are made to verify, correct, adjust and in 
general increase the fit and accuracy of scientific models over time. How these pressures 
get balanced with opposing ones, such as individual career aspirations, political climate 
and pressures, etc. and how ‘science’ (hopefully) is able, over long periods of time, to 
self correct, are interesting and important topics. Certainly part of this discussion will 
involve how certain fields have at places and times done better or worse than other fields 
and how periods of doing a poor job regarding these matters can sometimes cause 
problems for future development in such fields. Another part of this discussion would be 
to try and determine what aspects of certain scientific projects or fields of study make 
them more susceptible to bias or to lack of regard for representational accuracy. This sort 
of investigation could shed light on whether disease claims from fields such as 
psychology and sociology should be treated with greater suspicion than disease claims 
backed by scientific models from fields such as physiology. 
 
2.3 HAACK 
 Susan Haack has also presented a view about the nature of science that seeks a 
middle ground between extreme positions. Haack believes that science has had success 
explaining how the natural world works—it has produced legitimate knowledge.26 
However, the way that science actually succeeds is complex, messy, and heterogeneous. 
Haack claims, there is no special epistemological strategy employed by successful 
scientists. There is not a special scientific method per se, just excellent and refined use of 
                                                 
26 Haack says: “The natural sciences have accumulated a vast and ever-growing body of 
knowledge about the natural world and how it works, patchy and incomplete to be sure, 
but increasingly well anchored in experience and increasingly integrated internally. 
…plenty of the knowledge scientific work has produced is trivial, boring, unimportant 
even from a scientific point of view. Nevertheless, some of the knowledge the natural 
sciences have produced is stunning; and the way it all fits together is extraordinary. In 
fact, the body of scientific knowledge accumulated even thus far is so extensive, and its 
internal interconnectedness so dense and complex, that I am a little at a loss to know how 
to illustrate the point at modest length (Haack, 2003, p. 301).” 
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the same cognitive skills that make for any good investigation or honest attempt to 
understand. She says: 
 
The core standards of good evidence and well-conducted inquiry are not internal 
to the sciences, but common to empirical inquiry of every kind. In judging where 
science has succeeded and where it has failed, in what areas and at what times it 
has done better and worse, we are appealing to the standards by which we judge 
the solidity of empirical beliefs, or the rigor and thoroughness of empirical 
inquiry, generally. Often, to be sure, only a specialist can judge the weight of 
evidence or the thoroughness of precautions against experiential error, etc.; for 
such judgments require a broad and detailed knowledge of background theory, 
and a familiarity with technical vocabulary, not easily available to the lay person. 
Nevertheless, respect for evidence, care in weighing it, and persistence in seeking 
it out, so far from being exclusively scientific desiderata, are standards by which 
we judge all inquirers, detectives, historians, investigative journalists, etc. as well 
as scientists (Haack, 2003, p. 21). 
 
 Haack points out that part of what has made the sciences epistemologically 
distinguished is the development of ‘helps’ that extend our senses and our ability to 
gather evidence, stretch our imagination, and help increase respect for seeking out and 
carefully weighing evidence. Such ‘helps’ include experimental instruments, but also 
things like metaphors, statistical techniques, peer reviewed journals, etc. Furthermore, the 
success of science, with increased use of specialized tools and specialized vocabulary, 
make weighing the evidence difficult for the non-expert even though the underlying 
virtues of inquiry are not distinctly scientific. Specialized tools, methods and vocabulary 
have allowed investigations into areas that, on their face, seem anything but everyday 
empirical investigations. Consider experiments using the large hadron collider near 
Geneva. Nonetheless, science does not necessarily require a special epistemology to 
evaluate or understand the knowledge it produces. 
 Although Haack denies that the epistemology of scientific beliefs is different from 
other sorts of empirical reasoning, she is a career epistemologist and offers a theory of 
degrees of warrant based on the evidence available. For Haack, warrant is an objective 
relationship based on certain qualities (and the degrees of such qualities) of the evidence 
in question. By objective she means only that it is independent of whether anybody 
and/or everybody believes it to be warranted. Although the relation of a claim to 
evidence is objective, the judgment of an individual or group about such warrant is 
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perspectival and limited and depends on background beliefs specific to the context. 
Haack explains her position as follows: 
 
Complex and diffuse as it is, evidence is a real constraint on science. And though 
the degree of warrant of a claim at a time depends on the quality of some person’s 
or some group’s evidence at that time, the quality of evidence is not subjective or 
community-relative, but objective. However, it doesn’t follow that the objectivity 
of evidential quality is transparent to us. In fact, judgments of the quality of 
evidence depend on the background beliefs of the person making the judgment; 
they are perspectival. …When there are serious differences in background beliefs 
between one group of scientists and another, there will be disagreement even 
about what evidence is relevant to what, and about what constitutes an 
explanation—disagreements that will be resolved only if and when the underlying 
questions are resolved (or which may, as Max Plank famously observed, just fade 
away as the supporters of one side to the dispute retire or die off). What has been 
taken for paradigm-relativity of evidential quality is a kind of epistemological 
illusion; again as in the graphology example, whether evidence is relevant, 
whether this is a good explanation of that, how strong or weak this evidence really 
is, how well or poorly warranted this claim actually is, is an objective matter. 
Sometimes scientists know that they don’t have all the evidence relevant to a 
question; and sometimes they have a pretty shrewd idea what the evidence is that 
they need but don’t have. But sometimes, given the evidence they have, they may 
be unable to judge, or may misjudge, whether or what additional evidence is 
needed. They can’t always know what it is that they don’t know; they may not, at 
a given time, even have the vocabulary to ask the questions answers to which 
would be relevant evidence. Nor can they always envision alternative hypotheses 
which, if they did occur to them, would prompt them to revise their estimates of 
the supportiveness of their evidence. And so on. Since evidential quality is not 
transparent, and scientists can only do the best they can do, a scientist may be 
reasonable in giving a claim a degree of credence which is disproportionate to the 
real, objective quality of his evidence, if the real quality is inaccessible to him. 
Reasonableness, so understood, is perspectival (Haack, 2003, p. 77). 
 
Haack is distinguishing the objective relationships that establish warranted explanation, 
and which are determined by the quantity and qualities of the available evidence. An 
expert in a field may evaluate and weigh this evidence and determine just how warranted 
an empirical explanation or model is at a current point in time. This would be the 
subjective (and perspectival) assessment of one expert. However, non-experts also might 
try to assess the value of the evidence and produce their own subjective judgment. Haack 
mentions some clues that might be used regarding such subjective assessments of the 
qualities of evidence for a particular explanation. Haack mentions, among others, degree 
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of supportiveness, degree of explanatory integration, comprehensiveness, security and 
independence, etc. I shall leave it to the interested reader to look into the details of 
Haack’s theory. Basically, individual scientists, as well as average citizens, are more or 
less aware of the sorts of qualities that make for more accurate, more virtuous models, 
but their perspective is limited and sometimes their interests are not purely focused on 
honest inquiry and accurate explanation. For any individual confronted with a model or 
‘fact’ delivered as part of scientific research, there will be some process of evaluation that 
takes place. The intuitive process of evaluation will balance many factors, and for the 
scientist who is actively working in the research area in question, the process will involve 
very subtle points concerning the actual data available, the competing explanatory models 
available, and also knowledge of the reputation and honesty of the group producing the 
current model, etc. For those non-experts who are being asked to learn about the model or 
use it for a practical application, or even those needing to make policy decisions upon 
which the model’s findings are relevant, the evaluation will not be as subtle, and will 
involve trust of expert opinion. But even for such non-experts, reliance on the authority 
of scientists and definitive textbooks in the field are not the only factors available. 
Common sense intuitions about good explanation, relations to other tested and reliable 
models, etc. can be used by the non-expert. Furthermore, the ultimate evaluative process 
occurs over longer stretches of time, is carried out by a complex community of inquirers 
and the process stretches across space and time. 
For Haack, certain qualities make certain explanations better. Scope, breadth of 
explanatory power, the capacity to unify apparently diverse phenomena along with 
positing specific causal mechanisms when possible, all, when properly combined, make 
for better explanations. Looking over the history of explaining the link between smoking 
and lung cancer Haack points out how the qualities of the explanation have improved 
over time. “Now there is a unifying explanation, combining specificity and scope in 
exactly the right way: an account of the damage caused by cigarette smoke, firmly 
embedded in our knowledge of the physiology of the cell and molecular biology, and 
tightly interwoven with what we know about heredity, evolution, etc. The present 
evidence is much more supportive of the claim than earlier evidence was (Haack, 2003, 
p. 131).” 
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 Haack makes much use of a particular analogy to illustrate her points about the 
nature of scientific discovery, change and progress. She asks the reader to think about the 
process of working on a crossword puzzle that already has some entries filled in27. Some 
of these previous entries are in areas well worked out and in which many of the entries 
are believed to be correct, while other areas of the puzzle are tentative and await further 
work and development. 
Like crossword entries, reasons ramify in all directions. How reasonable a 
crossword entry is depends on how well it is supported by clues and any already-
completed intersecting entries; on how reasonable those other entries are, 
independent of the entry in question; and on how much of the crossword has been 
completed. Similarly, what makes evidence stronger or weaker, a claim more or 
less warranted, depends on how supportive the evidence is; on how secure it is, 
independent of the claim in question; and on how much of the relevant evidence it 
includes. While judgments of evidential quality are perspectival, dependent on 
background beliefs about, for instance, what evidence is relevant to what, 
evidential quality itself is objective... [S]cientific claims are better and worse 
warranted, and there is a large grey area where opinions may reasonably differ 
about whether a claim is yet sufficiently warranted to put in the textbooks, or 
should be subjected to further tests, assessed more carefully relative to an 
alternative, or what. There can no more be rules for when a theory should be 
accepted and when rejected than there could be rules for when to ink in a 
                                                 
27 Haack says: “Picture a scientist as working on part of an enormous crossword puzzle: 
making an informed guess about some entry, checking and double-checking its fit with 
the clue and already-completed intersecting entries, of those with their clues and yet other 
entries, weighing the likelihood that some of them might be mistaken, trying new entries 
in light of this one, and so on. Much of the crossword is blank, but many entries are 
already completed, some in almost-indelible ink, some in regular ink, some in pencil, 
some heavily, some faintly. …In some areas many long entries are firmly inked in, in 
others few or none. Some entries were completed hundred of years ago by scientists long 
dead, some only last week. …Rival teams squabble over some entries, penciled or inked 
in and then rubbed out, perhaps in a dozen languages and a score of times… Someone 
claims to notice a detail in this or that clue that no one else has seen… From time to time 
accusations are heard of altered clues or blacked-out spaces. Sometimes there are 
complaints from those working on one part of the puzzle that their view of what’s going 
on in some other part is blocked. Now and then a long entry, intersecting with numerous 
others which intersect with numerous others, gets erased by a gang of young turks 
insisting that the whole of this area of the puzzle must be re-worked…I don’t mean to fob 
you off with a metaphor instead of an argument. But I do mean my word-picture to 
suggest, what I believe is true, that scientific inquiry is far messier, far less tidy, than the 
Old Deferentialists imagined; and yet far more constrained by the demands of evidence 
than the New Cynics dream (Haack, 2003, p. 93).”  
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crossword entry and when to rub it out; “the” best procedure is for different 
scientists, some bolder, some more cautious, to proceed differently (Haack, 2003, 
p. 24). 
 
For the experts working on filling in parts of the puzzle, or for individuals merely 
learning or utilizing the entries already placed, there is the issue of how to asses the 
reliability of a particular entry. Some areas have been extensively filled in and the entries 
here have not changed much for long periods and have had many intersecting entries 
build up on top of them, while other areas are new and experimental. There are clues one 
can use to try and assess the reliability and representational accuracy of scientific models, 
and depending on which area of the puzzle one selects there may be more or less clues. 
When all else fails, then either the consensus of experts must be trusted, or a healthy 
skepticism adopted for the time being. This is the situation faced by anyone seeking to 
asses the legitimacy of a particular disease claim—such a person will have to assess the 
legitimacy and reliability of the specifications of abnormality and normality of biological 
function and structure found in the scientific models backing the disease attribution. 
 The crossword puzzle analogy also serves to reiterate that the progress of science 
is not simple or linear. Certain areas or inquiry experience periods of success and 
establish an entrenched core of models that are taken to be reliable representations of the 
phenomena being explained. Other areas do not achieve such rapid or sustained success. 
These areas tend to undergo periods of revision or ‘paradigm shift’ as new methodologies 
are adopted or new models displace older ways of thinking. When assessing a putative 
disease claim an individual (or even a panel of experts) will rely on the reputation and 
past track record of a field of inquiry. This is part of the reason why certain disease 
claims concerning behavior or personality are usually more controversial and considered 
less reliable (and more open to accusations of social construction) than those backed by 
models from scientific fields with entrenched models and methods, like physiology. 
 Although not a major point, Haack does discuss some of the issues surrounding 
the question of what to make of the behavioral and social sciences. Haack sees no reason 
why the study of behavior and social phenomena cannot be done in a way that embodies 
the respect for evidence and other values she believes constitute any good scientific 
inquiry. Furthermore, Haack sees the division between social and natural sciences as 
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artificial. However, she also concedes that there appears to have been less progress or 
success in the social sciences. “Why don’t the intentional social sciences seem to have 
made anything like the impressive progress of the natural sciences? For a host of reasons, 
among them that the ideal of respect for evidence is even harder to achieve in social-
scientific than in natural-scientific inquiry, and that borrowing mathematical and other 
methodological ‘helps’ from physics in hopes of looking ‘scientific’ has sometimes 
proven counter-productive (Haack, 2003, p. 152).”  
There are other reasons too. To stick with the crossword puzzle metaphor, the 
social sciences don’t have as many areas of previously well-worked out entries to build 
upon. Haack also points to the preoccupation in the social sciences with methodological 
matters, and this often covers-up the over-simplification of the concepts and 
categorization schemes being used.28 The categorizations in the natural sciences tend to 
be more robust. The more that human behavior is involved, the less well clustered and 
recurring are the properties being cited and the harder it is to pick out robustly recurring 
patterns characteristic of the phenomena being modeled. Social kinds are often very loose 
congeries of properties whose structure and organization does not reoccur with the 
frequency or generality that would make meaningful categorization easier. “The 
looseness of social kinds, and the local, contingent character of social institutions, is the 
source of some notorious pitfalls of social-scientific inquiry: taking the local and 
culturally specific… for something universal and inevitable; assuming whatever is true  
of one variant of a social kind… is bound to hold for other forms as well (Haack, 2003, p. 
165).” Haack also points out that social phenomena are harder to study because social 
phenomena often involve intentional states like beliefs and desires. Haack is critical of 
the sociology of science also.29 
                                                 
28 I will discuss some problems with categorizing people later in this chapter. 
29 Haack believes there is a role for the sociology of science in studying scientific inquiry, 
but she is critical of much of the current work in the field. Radical sociologists of science 
often run together two kinds of relativity. An anthropological (or empirical) relativism 
claims that different communities and cultures have different epistemic standards. A 
philosophical (or conceptual) issue of relativity claims that it makes sense to talk of 
justification (or better or worse warrant) only relative to some culture. But a 
philosophical relativism, making objective cases of knowledge impossible, does not 
follow from the empirical fact of anthropological relativism. Besides this slip in 
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I agree with Haack that science uses souped-up versions of the same basic 
epistemological criteria, and often assesses the same virtues and vices, as does any 
empirical investigation or inquiry. Science, where it has been successful, is set apart 
mostly in the fact that it has a very impressive track record and that it has retained, 
refined and perpetuated specialized methods of inquiry, evaluation, and explanation 
peculiarly well suited to the disciplines or areas of study in question. I tend to think there 
could be objective relations between models and the appropriate evidence along the lines 
that Haack suggests, but I am also skeptical that we could have anything better than a 
good empirical model of what these might be, and that this model would be open to 
refinement and changes, and these relations would probably turn out to be context 
dependent. Judgments about how well supported a model is by the available evidence 
will always be perspectival and subjective as will judgments about such judgments. 
Basically I am less enthusiastic than Haack about the possibility of specifying just what 
are the objective relations that constitute being well supported by the evidence, although I 
do believe that with attention and practice people become very good at making judgments 
that do assess such relations, and other factors that go into claiming that a model is an 
accurate representation and is well supported by evidence. Such individuals constitute 
experts, but even non-experts regarding some field of inquiry can develop a sense of what 
makes for more and less reliable explanatory models in science. At the very least they 
might use clues that safely identify clear cases on either side of the uncertain middle 
                                                 
reasoning, Haack finds too many thinkers in sociology of science succumbing to what she 
calls “the passes-for fallacy.” She says: “Perhaps it is because the social sciences are 
especially susceptible to the influence of political prejudice and bias that sociologists of 
science seem especially susceptible to a dreadful argument ubiquitous among New 
Cynics—the “Passes-for Fallacy: what passes for, i.e., what has been accepted by 
scientists as, known fact or objective evidence or honest inquiry, etc., has sometimes 
turned out to be no such thing; therefore the notions of known fact, objective evidence, 
honest inquiry etc., are ideological humbug. The premise is true; but the conclusion 
obviously doesn’t follow. Indeed, this argument is not only fallacious, but also self-
undermining: for if the conclusion were true, the premise could not be a known fact for 
which objective evidence has been discovered by honest inquiry (Haack, 2003, p. 28).”  
Thus while conceding that the sociological study of science can be done well and yield 
useful knowledge, Haack concludes that too much current work in that discipline is 
conceptually sloppy and has unfortunate assumptions at its foundations. 
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ground. Also, I disagree with Haack concerning the need to continue talking about ‘truth’ 
and ‘natural laws,’ and agree with Giere that these are misleading. 
 Haack’s account is also lacking sufficient discussion of the practices and 
pressures that develop within the community of scientific inquirers (whether this is large 
scale or is on a smaller scale with investigators working on some narrowly defined 
problem). These are the pressures that somehow, over periods of time, select for models 
that represent more accurately, select for circumstances were respect for evidence and 
respect for honest inquiry are kept high. Ideally such pressures would also tend over time 
to discourage the production of models that are grossly inaccurate or biased, or are even 
mere formalization of some dogma. These are the pressures that would operate at 
differing levels in the evolutionary metaphor that Giere discussed as a model explaining 
the diversity of scientific developments and its tendency for progress. These emergent 
pressures and the procedures that communities of inquirers develop to try and keep 
inquiry honest and to ensure the quality of the explanations and models produced—these 
are components of what constitute ‘the scientific method’ or ‘the scientific spirit’ of 
inquiry for some particular community at some time and place. 
 I find most of Haack’s crossword puzzle analogy useful, particularly the ideas that 
science works piecemeal, that both the objective evidence and subjective confidence 
backing each model comes in degrees of better and worse. Judgments of such evidence 
depends not only on the data or clues from experiment, but also other minor clues 
including the reputation of the researchers producing the model, the reputation of the 
field producing the model, and how the model integrates with other models regarded as 
reliable and accurate. Success often breeds more success, and a core of useful models and 
useful methodologies can become entrenched. Other areas are more tentative, and/or 
more isolated, at any one time, form the most successful areas of research. I also tend to 
agree with Haack’s ideas about why social sciences have appeared to achieve less success 
than some of the natural sciences. Such differences in the reputations and perceived track 
records of success for different areas of science explain some of why psychological and 
sociological models that offer descriptions of normal and abnormal human biological 
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function and form are usually not as uncontroversial as models in molecular biology or 
physiology.30 
 
2.4 BROWN 
  Ted Brown, in a book entitled Making Truth: Metaphors in Science, agrees that to 
understand what scientists do, and the nature of the knowledge that they create, one must 
come to see that scientific thinking is inherently metaphorical. Much of the knowledge 
that scientists learn when being educated and the concepts and knowledge they use when 
observing, forming hypotheses, experimenting, and communicating their ideas, etc. 
involves metaphorical understandings of the phenomena in question. Metaphor has been 
neglected as an issue of investigation in traditional philosophy of science. Brown 
encourages those interested in science to pay more attention to the metaphorical nature of 
its models and the type of cognitive skills it takes to create and manipulate these models. 
He says: 
…[M]etaphorical reasoning is at the very core of what scientists do when they 
design experiments, make discoveries, formulate theories and models, and 
describe their results to others—in short, when they do science and communicate 
about it. Metaphor is a tool of great conceptual power. It enables the scientist to 
interpret the natural world in wonderful and provocative ways… My intent in this 
book is to show that metaphor is essential to every aspect of science. It lies at the 
heart of what we think of as creative science: the interactive coupling between 
model, theory, and observation that characterizes the formation and testing of 
hypotheses and theories. None of the scientist’s brilliant ideas for new 
experiments, no inspired interpretations of observations, nor any communications 
of those ideas and results to others occur without the use of metaphor (Brown, 
2003, p. 15). 
 
                                                 
30 There are other problems as well, and in the next chapter I shall discuss the difficulty 
that arises when science attempts to model behavior or sociological phenomena. Often 
these phenomena are open to non-scientific, non-controlled observation (in ways that the 
physiology of the thyroid or the details of cellular traffic of glycosolated proteins is not) 
and thus individuals and communities will develop folk-theories, norms and conventional 
ideas about what is normal and what abnormal for such observable functionality. The 
interaction, competition, or even the possible attempted merger of these conventional 
ideas with more formal scientific models purporting to describe what is normal and 
abnormal for humans is a major source of difficulty.  
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But science, as Brown sees it, is not special in this—most cognizing about abstract and 
complex theoretical matters involves the use of metaphors. The use of metaphor is 
particularly important to the kind of models that attempt to draw distinctions between 
normal and abnormal function. Specifically metaphors are often chosen that allow a 
rough usable notion of normal dynamics as well as suggests possible ways that a system 
might be perturbed.31 
When Brown speaks of metaphor, he intends a manner of conceptualizing, not 
merely a linguistic devise. In particular, metaphorical understandings are involved in the 
grasping of abstract concepts, such as love, time, inflation, etc. He cites Lakoff and the 
idea that we give content to such abstract notions by understanding them in terms of more 
familiar embodied experiences of the observable, macroscopic physical world.  Humans 
understand new aspects of phenomena in terms of bodily and social experiences that 
become ingrained from interacting with the social and natural world on a daily basis. 
Another source of metaphors becomes available when certain areas of science achieve 
sustained success. Metaphors and structural models at work in the successful areas can be 
borrowed in part or in whole to model newer phenomena in other areas. For example, 
during the late nineteenth century and into the twentieth, the theoretical hypothesis of 
‘hormones’ as chemical messages that communicate the need to initiate or terminate 
certain biological processes was developed. Later theoretical systems and actions for 
specific hormones were proposed and tokens were eventually isolated, first adrenal 
hormones and then pancreatic ones. The basic metaphors (i.e. messengers, keys, and 
locks) involved with creating the model for the concept of hormones has been borrowed 
many times in the twentieth century for activity within cells and at even more distant 
levels of analysis. 
This borrowing of conceptions from one source in order to describe and organize 
other phenomena, is the sense of ‘metaphorical’ at issue. In the sciences, such a means of 
conceptualizing is especially important for describing and organizing phenomena and 
systems not grossly or directly observable. This is usually because our observational 
                                                 
31 For example, conceptualizing the cell membrane as a porous wall, or a boarder 
between countries, imports ideas about its normal structure and function and also ideas 
about how it might malfunction. 
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capacities are limited in various ways—the phenomena are too small, too large, or too 
complex, etc. Brown suggests thinking about the use of metaphorical conceptualizations 
of natural phenomena as mappings or borrowings from a source domain to a target 
domain. 
In the process of such mappings a model is created for the phenomena in question 
by organizing the observations or data in question based on structure and/or the qualities 
of the source domain. The creation of a model is constrained by the evidence and data 
available, and also by what is already well known about related phenomena, but the 
scientist has some room to be creative in selecting a target domain by which to give order 
and structure to the observations. The normal function and structure of certain proteins 
manufactured in certain cells is modeled using the metaphor of ‘channels’ within ‘walls.’ 
The metaphorical model accounts for the observations in a way that makes the 
phenomena capable of being understood and questioned—i.e. capable of being mentally 
manipulated—in ways that are productive of further speculations, and possible 
experimental tests. It colors how further evidence is understood. It also suggests certain 
ways in which malfunction or malformation may occur. Brown illustrates the basic idea 
with the example of a ‘channel’ proteins that allow passage of ions or other molecules 
across lipid membranes: 
 
During a long period in which many studies of channels were carried out, 
scientists could not see channels in cell walls, even with high-powered electron 
microscopes. The observations that formed the target domain included data on the 
rates at which ions pass into or out of cells under various conditions and 
correlations with the presence in the cell walls of various proteins that are thought 
to form the “walls” of the channels. These and other observations are 
complemented by models of what the cell wall proteins are like in terms of shape 
and other properties. Scientists then constructed a model of ion passage that 
captures as many characteristics of the observation domain as possible. A 
successful model must have structure, and relationships between its parts must 
map onto the corresponding elements in the observation domain. The model is a 
way for us to understand the observation domain in terms of more directly 
accessible experience in the macroscopic, everyday world. When we give the 
name ‘channel’ to the model, the word is being used metaphorically. The model 
itself is also metaphorical; it maps the properties of channels as we know them in 
the macroscopic domain onto a microscopic entity to which we do not have the 
same level of access as far as sensory data are concerned. Note that it is not just 
because the “channels” in cell walls are tiny and thus not directly visible that we 
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have a metaphorical connection. It is true, as we will see in later chapters, that our 
only access to the structure of matter at the atomic and molecular levels is via 
models that are themselves metaphorical. Thus, we do not have access to 
something we could call a literal representation of a channel in a cell wall. But, 
more fundamentally, the use of “channel” here is metaphorical in the sense that 
we use our literal knowledge and experience of channel in the macroscopic world 
to characterize not only structures but also functions and relationships between 
entities in the microscopic domain (Brown, 2003, p. 21). 
 
 For Brown the typical spark of creativity involves selecting a particularly 
productive metaphor that highlights crucial similarities. Naïve metaphors eventually 
develop into what are considered respectable models as more structure and detail are 
specified and as observational data tend to enrich and verify the usefulness of the 
developing model. Other scientists realize the strengths of the model and eventually add 
to its development, sometimes by criticism. Eventually quite specific hypotheses and 
predictions about experimental results and future observations can be made. The details 
of the model can be made more formal and mathematical equations can often be used to 
describe the structure and relations in the model. 
 
…a particular channel model may have the features that ions of the presumed size 
and charge of calcium ions move preferentially through the channel under the 
influence of an electrical potential. This feature of the model maps onto 
observations of calcium ion transport into and out of [actual] cells. The model and 
the story of how it matches, or accounts for, the observed measurements of ion 
movement in and out of cells constitutes a theory of ion transport. The theory 
might be made quantitative with mathematics. If it were, the terms of the 
mathematical expressions, such as diffusion rates, channel diameter, and 
interactions between charged species would match elements of the model. The 
values of adjustable terms would be chosen to afford the best match of theory 
prediction with experiment. In other words, the mathematical representation, 
which some would call a theory [instead of a model] of ion transport across 
membranes, is not really distinct from the model; it is an expression of it in 
mathematical language. The theory is just as thoroughly metaphorical as the 
model (Brown, 2003, p. 29, my emphasis). 
 
So, even as a creative vision moves into a more structured attempt to account for the data, 
and possibly into mathematical or other formal descriptions of relations and dynamics, 
the evolving models remain metaphorical in nature. 
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This conception of scientific models highlights many important features of 
scientific activity and knowledge. Models (and the metaphorical structure that they rely 
upon) are always partial explanations. “Elements of the model map onto selected aspects 
of the observation domain. They are never complete descriptions of reality. In practice, 
no one model is sufficient to capture all the various observations that might be made. 
Thus, for example, we use distinctly different atomic metaphors to account for the 
physical and chemical attributes of matter (Brown, 2003, p. 73).” In particle physics 
differing metaphors, such as particulate versus wave-like, are often simultaneously 
deployed about the same phenomenon. In biology the heart can function within several 
metaphorical models—it can be a ‘pump’ in one model, or a ‘gland’ producing hormone 
signals in another model.32 
Metaphorical models, like linguistic metaphors, are flexible and multivalent—
always open to reinterpretation or recycling. Metaphorical models develop and evolve 
over time. Most models are often of isolated phenomena but can be combined with others 
to create more elaborate models. Eventually very complex sets of models for the same 
and related phenomena can be combined into even larger metaphorical schemes, and this 
is illustrated very well by examples in molecular biology, such as the cell as a city with 
production lines, regular consumption, policing of traffic, control of possible invaders, 
contingency plans for suspected invasion, import, export, communications and 
coordination with neighbors, remodeling, decay, etc. Metaphors are needed to create a 
descriptive framework in which model building and data interpretation can take place 
productively—they operate, says Brown, in many of the ways that Kuhn stressed were 
important features of paradigms. Even data or observations, especially if interpreted in 
light of prevailing metaphors, are rarely if ever purely literal statements of the properties 
in question. 
                                                 
32 The example with the heart here shows that the heart can be conceived of as part of 
multiple interrelated systems, each one represented in an accurate scientific model and 
each one assigning a different normal function to the heart within that system. What is 
‘the’ function of the heart? It depends on how one isolates a particular biological system 
in order to represent the overall normal functioning of that isolated system. Different 
models may include the heart, and within different systems the heart may play different 
roles.  
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As the phenomena under consideration becomes more complex and especially 
when there are numerous diverse elements yielding emergent properties not easily 
described by simplistic mechanical or other familiar physical interactions, the metaphors 
needed to organize and structure explanatory models are often taken from social 
experience. Brown writes of ‘experiential gestalts,’ to designate these more complex, 
richer metaphorical schemas that contain numerous element and relations (often 
including as parts many simpler metaphors of the embodied and experiential variety).33 
Just one of the examples in Brown’s book is the use of the complex metaphorical schema 
of human language to organize and structure models of DNA directed protein synthesis. 
34 Another example is the metaphors used to conceptualize the structure and dynamic 
functioning of cells: 
 
Understanding the whole in terms of the multitude of parts can be achieved only if 
we have a way of conceptualizing the whole. The many individual sets of 
information can make sense only in terms of a mental model of the cell as an 
organized entity. For such models the scientist draws on experience with 
multifarious entities in the macroscopic world. The cell has inputs and outputs, in 
the form of substances that diffuse through the cell’s outer wall. It has budgets of 
various kinds; for example, the amount of matter entering and leaving must be 
kept in balance. Energy inputs in the form of food substances that provide energy 
sources must balance the cellular processes that consume energy. Metaphorical 
representations that reflect these cellular properties are drawn from the social 
domain, in which many agents with differing characteristics and goals go about 
                                                 
33 Brown says: “To conceptualize complex systems composed of multiple parts that 
interact with one another, with interdependences based on transports of matter, chemical 
conversions, and energy consumption and production, the scientist must draw on 
experiences in the macroscopic world that have those characteristics. Those experiences 
occur in the social domains of life (Brown, 2003, p. 158).” 
34 Brown says: “The gestalts that consist of the complex of associations and ideas that 
make up our understanding and use of written language maps onto the molecular domain 
of protein sequence. Notice that this mapping does not involve a directly emergent 
physical experience but rather a human artifact in the social domain. This is an early 
example of an important and interesting aspect of metaphors in science: As the scientist 
attempts to understand systems of increasing complexity, metaphors based solely on 
embodied physical experience no longer suffice. In more complex systems, typically 
there are interactions between the components of the system. To deal with these 
interactions, which can be thought of as ‘transactions’ between components, the 
appropriate mappings increasingly derive from social constructs, with their attendant 
greater complexities (Brown, 2003, p. 126).” 
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their business, sometimes in competition, sometimes cooperatively, creating in the 
process a stable entity (Brown, 2003, p. 149). 
 
The cell is conceived as a city with a complex, vibrant economy. The idea of normal 
functional capacities and tasks as well as ideas for malfunction and mistakes are often 
suggested by the metaphors. 
One important feature to notice about the import of ‘experiential gestalts’ from 
the social domain is that it is one source of the transfer of teleological understandings and 
explanations into the sciences, particularly biology. Discussions of cells as factories or 
cities, the heart as a pump, the endomembrane system (i.e. the Golgi, endoplasmic 
reticulum, lysosomes, membrane receptor coated pits, etc.) as a manufacturing complex 
and import and export transportation hub, all involve just this sort of teleology. Paying 
attention to the metaphors involved in such models makes it easier to understand where 
some teleological thinking comes from and why. Even as scientists often realize that such 
descriptions and attributions are not literal representations of the phenomena, they are 
nevertheless indispensable for understanding and communicating the kind of science in 
question.  
In a time in which biology has become relentlessly reductionist from an 
experimental perspective, metaphor has become a common tool in understanding 
observational data and communicating about them… Of course, no one literally 
ascribes purpose and human-like intent to molecules and cells. Teleological 
ascriptions of the kind exemplified here are simply metaphorical ways of 
conceptualizing complex systems in terms that correspond to human experiences. 
The important point is that such metaphors are a necessary part of the scientist’s 
understanding of the world under study (Brown, 2003, p. 158).  
 
These sorts of metaphorical models lead easily to the ‘as-if-designed’ approach to 
investigating and understanding complex organic entities and their activity. This 
approach explains much about how functional and teleological explanation gets a 
foothold in scientific explanation. What Brown highlights, that is often overlooked, is 
that such teleology is widespread, important, and a necessary part of the content of 
models in the so-called ‘hard sciences’ just as much as in the social, psychological or the 
so-called ‘soft sciences.’ The reputation of various fields does not correlate with the use 
of metaphor or teleology. If anything, what attracts attention to the metaphors in some 
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social sciences is that they tend to undergo widespread change more frequently than, for 
example, in biological sciences. 
Brown’s description of science is one based on how scientists actually work and 
communicate their results. He has no doubt about the existence of a reality that is 
structured and for which we can construct reliable knowledge. Scientific models are 
anchored to reality by their relation to experimental observations and confirmatory 
predictions. His concern over traditional philosophical debates about the nature of 
scientific knowledge, truth and realism is mild. The models that science creates, and 
refines are constructs, and they are a product, ultimately, of a community of scientists. 
However, they are the best we can do given the cognitive and sensory capacities that 
evolution has provided. He says this about truth: “In this way of looking at things, truth is 
the product of human reasoning. It follows that science does not proceed by discovering 
preexisting truths about the world. Rather, it consists in observing the world and 
formulating truths about it. …much of what we regard as scientific truth is metaphorical 
representation. This does not mean that science is capable of yielding only subjective 
results of uncertain reliability (Brown, 2003, p. 51).” One important feature that underlies 
the ability to have intersubjectively relevant representations, in addition to honestly 
produced observation and data, is that we all develop largely the same set of embodied, 
implicit knowledge of the physical and social worlds that we grow up in and occupy, and 
this is the common source upon which scientist (and non-scientists) draw to help 
understand, model, and explain more difficult-to-interact with phenomena. 
I agree with Brown the metaphor is crucial to understanding the creation and 
success of many scientific models. Models are necessarily simplifications and partial, 
perspectival representations of aspects of the natural world. The observations of the 
macroscopic natural world and of the complex social, political and human world provide 
very rich sources from which to borrow organizing ideas to model the dynamics of 
phenomena harder to observe. Concerning my thesis on the nature of disease claims, 
Brown’s vision of science highlights that it is humans that attempt to understand patterns 
and structure within natural phenomena, by the best means at their disposal. The 
scientific models that specify biological normality and abnormality, and back disease 
claims, are in this sense social constructions. However, this is not to concede that they are 
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not also legitimate examples of empirical knowledge (i.e. accurate representations). In 
chapter 3 (on claims of normality in science) I shall examine the claim that the products 
of science are social constructions.  
 
2.5 A BROAD SKETCH OF SCIENCE: COMBINING SOME OF THE POINTS 
MADE SO FAR 
 
 Science is a human endeavor and employs the same basic cognitive features that a 
person might use to investigate and describe any phenomena in their surroundings. It can 
be flawed for many of the same reasons a criminal investigation might be flawed, but the 
possibility of getting it right (more or less) also exists. Science has become a specialized 
type of inquiry due to the tools it has developed allowing phenomena to be isolated, 
controlled, and data to be collected even when the phenomena are distant from everyday 
human perception. It has also developed or incorporated special tools and procedures for 
analyzing data and evaluating its own models. Likewise a culture of respect for honest 
inquiry and a system of rewards and penalties has emerged and is perpetuated amongst 
inquirers. There are a series of pressures that the community of inquirers exerts on itself, 
and over time this has allowed better and more accurate models to be sifted from those 
that were flawed or inaccurate. At any one time, the products of science are of unequal 
reliability and accuracy, and furthermore, the processes which the scientific community 
uses to sort out the better from the worse often take time to yield results. Nonetheless, the 
results (i.e. current best scientific models) must often be assessed and relied upon by non-
experts. For example, both physicians and grade school officials currently must assess 
and work with the scientific models that set the boundary between the normal and 
abnormal functioning of the neural systems that allow for concentration and attention. 
Presumably malfunction of these systems gives rise to the symptoms of ADHD. 
 In previous philosophical work on the concept of disease, the assumptions about 
the nature of science were often simplistic. A significant part of this oversimplification 
has come from the desire to situate scientific knowledge into larger epistemological 
projects. It is worth trying to move past the positivist vision of science as delivering a 
structured set of true statements about the physical world, but also recognizing that this 
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does not mean that scientific theory is totally adrift—merely interpretation without any 
mooring to natural phenomena. 
 My own position is that science is complex and delivers products of varying 
accuracy, and objectivity35 and at any one time it may not be possible to adequately 
assess all of the models that science currently offers. The implication for the status of the 
disease categorization scheme used by physicians is that it too is also a work in progress. 
Some diseases are supported by accurate scientific models accepted as reliable, objective 
and unproblematic by the community in question and for which the possibility of major 
revision seems unlikely. Historically we can also look back and see that the science 
involved in certain disease claims was clearly flawed or inadequate. In hindsight we 
realize these claims rested on flawed models of biological phenomena and were 
illegitimate disease claims. The most interesting cases, however, are disease claims 
supported by models that are obviously works in progress. Often such claims are based 
only on a few clues available about the malfunction or malformation involved, and even 
less is known about the normal functioning of the system in question. Schizophrenia 
might be an example. The behavior and cognitive function of people diagnosed with 
schizophrenia is clearly taken to be abnormal by most societies, even when the 
explanation involves demonic or spiritual possession, etc.  Current work has yielded 
evidence that the dopamine neurotransmitter system of the brain is malfunctioning. But 
the scientific models of how this system works, and what its normal functions are, are 
still being worked out. For medical students and physicians and even for non-experts, the 
available model is accepted as somewhat reliable even while also understanding that 
future research could change our view of what is going on and change our view of the 
real nature of the malfunction involved. In such cases, where the details of the biological 
system in question are less clear, it is easier to imagine how new evidence or a better 
model might substantially change our view of the nature of the disease. When dealing 
with such putative disease claims, policy makers, physicians, and average citizens must 
use intuition and also a great deal of trust when it comes to deciding the accuracy of 
                                                 
35 By objective I just mean that the matter might be settled by investigation of the 
phenomena in question (not merely investigation of the communities views about the 
subject—i.e. that the possibility exists that the entire community could be wrong and the 
answer discovered eventually).  
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science’s claims about biological normality and abnormality. Concerns about the 
‘legitimacy’ of such claims about biological abnormality are possible, especially from 
those skeptical or suspicious of science at the outset. 
 In some instances the best that can be done is to remain skeptical and await 
further developments. Historically, some communities have decided to ‘legitimize’ 
claims when caution would have been better. At any point in time, for any given 
community, there will exist a number of putative disease claims that cannot be accurately 
assessed and for which future inquiry and scientific work will be needed to establish or 
deny ‘legitimacy.’ But the existence of these putative cases does not necessarily call into 
question all scientific models of biological normality and abnormality. 
 Although I do not endorse the specifics of Haack’s theory of warrant, I do think 
her point about remembering the difference between subjective judgments of warrant 
versus objective relations between evidence is a good one. Legitimacy for a disease claim 
is similar. Models possess certain properties having to do with their accuracy and 
reliability as representations of natural phenomena. However, what users of such models 
deal with at any one time are there best judgments concerning the qualities of the model 
in question. If these scientific models back up claims about the legitimacy of a disease, 
then the legitimacy is directly related to the quality of the scientific models backing the 
claim. Legitimacy in this sense is at any moment going to be subjective, although, it too 
can be based on a set of objective relations. 
 A disease is a biological malfunction. A legitimate disease claim involves a set of 
signs or symptoms (or at least some detectable effects) explainable in a model as arising 
from the malfunction of some circumscribed biological system that otherwise has a 
normal function. My position transfers the burden of legitimacy onto the scientific model 
backing up the claim. A legitimate disease claim is one backed by good scientific 
explanation. This explains the obvious ‘legitimate’ cases (e.g. Hashimoto’s thyroiditis) 
while also explaining why many controversial historical cases are not ‘legitimate.’ 
However, a significant feature of my position is that it allows many cases of putative 
disease claims for which there is not currently a well worked out scientific model backing 
the claim, or the model does not carry the virtues needed to be accepted as an 
unproblematic explanation of the phenomena. My position does not provide the solution 
 56 
to these controversies. However, it does suggest how they need to be resolved. Science 
needs to be allowed to build up the descriptive model of the phenomena to the point that 
the descriptions within the scientific models regarding normal and abnormal function are 
taken to be uncontroversial by the community. Virtuous scientific models yielding 
uncontroversial descriptions of normal and abnormal biological form and function allow 
legitimate disease claims based on such models. 
  
2.5.1 Fit Is an Important Objective Quality That Makes Some Models Better   
 I believe something like the notion of ‘fit36,’ suggested by Giere, is the 
appropriate37 virtue to seek in scientific models being assessed for ‘objectivity’ and 
accuracy in representation. This quality is one of better or worse—a quantitative value—
and not a dichotomous evaluation like true or false. Assuming that ‘fit’ could be 
quantified in some intercomparable units, models might be ordered as to better and worse 
fit.38 A model’s ‘fit’ is as an objective relationship (or set of relationships) that hold 
between a model and the phenomena in question, which is to say that it is possible that 
someone’s (or everyone’s) subjective assessment might be mistaken regarding the ‘fit’ 
some model has to the phenomena in question. The relationship of ‘fit’ holds (or fails to) 
independent of assessment of the relationship. I doubt, however, there is anything like a 
God’s eye view from which to accurately assess such objective relationships and the best 
we have are the evaluations, at any one moment in time, of careful and thoughtful 
individuals and groups. I believe individuals can and sometimes do make subjective 
evaluations of a models ‘fit’ that approximates the objective relation. 
                                                 
36 The notion of fit may actually be a combination of other relationships that hold 
between the model and the phenomena in question, and not a singular relationship in any 
simplistic way. However, for my thesis about disease, even if ‘fit’ is a shorthand for a 
more complex set of relation, it is specific enough. 
37 I believe that ‘fit’ is the epistemological virtue of most importance regarding scientific 
models. Models are intended to represent accurately—that is their purpose and the reason 
scientific models are held by most to be knowledge about the physical world. I also 
believe this is ultimately the virtue most often being referred to when people claim a 
particular model is good or better than another. 
38 For reasons beyond the scope of this essay I am skeptical such an intercomparable 
assessment and ordering could be made. 
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 Even though fit is best determined over time by a complex selection process that I 
will discuss in the next section, individuals must assess scientific models over shorter 
periods of time. To assess whether a new model ‘fits’ the phenomena in question is 
probably rarely done by anyone except experts in a field of study, and even then 
consensus of committees or a group of experts is probably sought. This assessment would 
require expert knowledge of the phenomena in question, as well as related types of 
phenomena, and would require knowledge of competing models, the latest experimental 
data regarding the phenomena, the potential difficulties with past models and the 
unanswered questions most in need of explanation by any model of the phenomena in 
question. But even assessing older models—those for which the selective pressures of the 
‘scientific method’ have been refining and verifying—is not an easy assessment. Such 
models would still have to be tested in some way in order to directly address the issue of 
fit to the phenomena in question. There are certain clues, however, about which models 
might have better fit that can be used by both experts and non-experts outside a 
specialized laboratory. Some examples of the kind of clues I have in mind would be 
whether or not the model has been around for a long length of time, and survived being 
tested with newer experimental equipment, and continued to make sense as newer data 
was gathered. This might be called a record of verification and survival. The model 
might integrate well with other models both within its own field and even with those in 
other fields. We could call this coherence or mutual support. If a model made predictions 
about future data or about the character of other models, and if the model’s predictions 
and description allowed successful technology to be implemented, this might be a clue to 
its representational accuracy. We could call this reliability. The more that a model was 
adopted by others, especially those outside the field of origin, outside the country or even 
the culture of origin—the more useful and accurate the model was found to be by diverse 
individuals and across space and even across generations—provides more evidence that 
its structure and details had represented certain aspects of the phenomena accurately. This 
along with directly surviving and overcoming challenges about being biased or limited in 
perspective, might be clues that the model was unbiased and had elements of accurate 
representation. A model might be more or less biased depending on relationships that 
hold between the model and certain cultural views held by those constructing or 
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interpreting the model. Interestingly, it might be the case the a model is simultaneously 
both biased based on its relations to prevailing cultural attitudes, but also a model with 
good fit based on its relation to the phenomena it explains. Current models of the genetic 
factors effecting human cognitive performance (i.e. intelligence) may be an example. 
 A model with more explanatory scope and capacity to explain multiple, 
previously unrelated phenomena with an elegant underlying causal mechanism will be 
attractive and intuitively seem likely to be verified and retained, especially assuming that 
the prior work it integrates and unifies is also held to be accurate. Another clue is that the 
model is complex and multifaceted enough to explain a phenomenon from multiple 
perspectives, or one that has multiple and diverse applications in technology. A model 
that is testable or makes testable predictions or claims can reasonably be assumed to be 
one that will be verified or rejected eventually. There are surely many other clues that are 
used in making evaluations of the relative reliability and accuracy of a scientific model. 
 These are only a few possible elements that might be clues used by people (in lieu 
of direct verification by experiment and interaction with the phenomena being 
represented) when assessing whether some model has a good ‘fit’ with the phenomena 
being modeled. Such assessments would be subjective, might be made with ‘gut 
intuition,’ and with limited perspective, especially if made by non-experts. But people are 
forced to make such assessments constantly. Better empirical sociological models are 
needed concerning how both experts and non-experts make such decisions concerning 
which scientific models to trust and which they decide to be wary of. As mentioned, the 
process of survival and selection of certain models over time, and the rejection or 
revision of others, is likely to be more accurate than the assessment, even of experts, 
given at a single moment in time. This process of selection will be the next topic.  
 
2.5.2 The Scientific Process 
 Part of what people mean when they use the honorific term ‘science,’ is a body of 
models that are judged to have achieved a sufficient degree of ‘fit.’ ‘Science’ is 
sometimes considered to be the body of accurate representations about the physical, 
biological, and social world. However, ‘science’ can also refer to the spirit of inquiry and 
the process by which such models are developed, disseminated, critiqued, refined and 
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sometimes rejected. This evaluative process tends over time to select for those models 
with greater fit and select against those with poor fit. Such a selection process often 
occurs over large periods of time and the evolutionary metaphor suggested by Giere is 
insightful. Like evolution, such complex pressures emerge from the dynamic interaction 
of many individuals and the research ‘environment’ they operate within. The interactions 
influence the trajectory of research. However, unlike evolution via natural selection, the 
process of model selection can be greatly influenced by the good or bad intentions of 
individuals or groups, and by better and worse guidance from human regulators. It can be 
and is managed. 
 Another metaphor that offers insight into the selection of certain models over 
others is the selection process for successful businesses in a modern market economy. 
Many models may co-exist and develop, with occasional direct competition. There is also 
a certain level of external regulation and supervision of the activity of those monitoring 
the market.  Both direct pressures, set by regulators, and emergent pressures, created by 
the market process itself, select for certain businesses over others. Over time, if the 
system is well managed, businesses are selected for having more efficiency regarding 
delivery of desired goods and services to discriminating buyers. Scientific models are 
selected for providing sufficient explanation of aspects of certain phenomena. When there 
is disagreement or competition the selective pressures for better explanations become 
particularly strong and models are more carefully scrutinized. Science makes progress by 
a complex process of many investigators working towards better explanations. It is the 
emergent community pressures and restraints as well as emergent incentives that help 
keep ‘science’ as a community of inquirers committed to accurate and honest 
explanation. Ideally these positive emergent pressures, as well as some amount of overall 
regulation and policing, help minimize the influences of cultural and political agendas on 
scientific explanation. Just as with business, at different times and places things may 
work better and worse as far as the propagation of the factors favoring the selection of the 
better from the worse. Also like business, science tends to preserve those techniques, 
methods, and arrangements that have yielded good results in the past, while also valuing 
and rewarding innovation. 
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 It is important to reiterate that these pressures and constraints that help sift the 
better from the worse are a result of science being a highly social and competitive 
endeavor. A model that has survived much criticism and has survived the trial of time and 
the pressures of continued inquiry, and particularly one that also resides within the core 
set of models of a well established line of research, has a kind of authority—not the 
traditional appeal to some particular expert who gives his or her opinion, but rather the 
approval of the entire community that drives inquiry and perpetuates scientific 
knowledge. Science is a human activity. Scientific explanations are more like everyday 
reasoning, investigation, and explanation than they are like the formally reconstructed 
logical systems sometimes offered by philosophers to explain how science, at its best, 
possibly could and should operate. There is no special scientific method in the sense of a 
special logic or decision procedure. Scientific practice and progress emerge from creative 
human insights and constructs and from the inherently social aspects of scientific 
research, and not from any particular methods employed alike by all individuals engaging 
in ‘science.’ This is one area where the sociologists and historians of science have much 
insight to offer to the epistemologists of science. And it is an area where the pragmatist 
school of thought on science often has more insight than the positivist camp. 
 Science has become a special and honorific type of inquiry because of its ability 
to build on and to institutionalize behavior that leads over time to success and to the 
building of accurate and useful models. Peer review is one example. However, peer 
review cannot become too burdensome and should not be used as a means of protecting 
the status quo. This too must be balanced and continuously refined. Hopefully it will 
remain a positive force in the self-correcting system that has worked so well in developed 
societies for the past few hundred years. The pressures mentioned here and the level of 
institutionalization of the best practices and procedures will be different across 
disciplines and across cultures and research groups. Therefore the emergent properties in 
question, those properties that over time help guide the retention of the best scientific 
work, will also differ across time, from place to place, and between disciplines. 
 Fit should be the virtue that is sought in models of natural phenomena. The 
complex processes that allow the selection of models with better fit takes time—it is slow 
and not an orderly process. Even though it can be managed, just as in the case of large 
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economies, the management is difficult and often involves good fortune as much as 
careful calculation. Other virtues may also be selected for in certain times and places. 
Certain communities may value things other than the accuracy of representation. The 
Lysenko affair in Soviet Russia is an example of management (or mismanagement) of the 
scientific system such that qualities other than representational accuracy were sought. 
 
 
2.5.3 The Evolution and Divergence of Scientific Disciplines: Social and Psychological  
Sciences 
 
 In this section I will give a general sketch of some factors involved in the 
development of different fields of scientific inquiry. This development produces fields of 
inquiry with different qualities. Specifically I am interested in differences between the 
psychological sciences and the more traditional biological sciences. The reason for 
interest is the issue of whether diseases in psychiatry are the same as diseases in the more 
traditional fields of medicine. Are disease claims backed by psychological sciences on 
the whole less legitimate than those for the biological sciences? I do not think they are. 
The claims are not fundamentally different. However, the qualities of certain scientific 
fields compared to others can influence the controversy or legitimacy a disease claim has. 
My sketch will be broad and brief. 
 I have suggested a model of scientific progress involving selective pressures and 
corrective mechanisms that emerge from the complex interaction of a community of 
researchers. At different times and places the conditions influencing selection are 
different, and the extent and attempts at management of the system are varied. 
Historically certain areas of exploration achieve success, and this success breeds more 
success and greater activity. The fields of anatomy in the sixteenth century, physiology in 
the nineteenth century, and molecular biology in the second half of the twentieth century 
are such examples in the biological sciences. 
 Areas that experience progress and increasing activity tend over time to collect a 
core of models that have survived and have been verified by continued investigation and 
scrutiny. These core areas are the well worked out, confidently inked-in portions of the 
crossword puzzle that Haack mentioned in her analogy. These productive areas of 
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research often develop well established methodologies and specialized tools. Successful 
areas of research can take their successful refined models and methodologies and 
perpetuate these to newer generations of researchers and learners in textbooks. The 
scientific work that forms the curriculum of the first year of medical school39 forms the 
core of empirical knowledge about the normal biological form and function of the human 
body. These fields share models, work across disciplines on larger sets of integrated 
models, and tend to produce mutual support and increase the likelihood of fit for the 
models involved. In these areas the claims about normal biological function do not raise 
suspicion or seem controversial. They do not appear ripe for being exposed as social 
constructions. It is the diseases of these systems that are detailed in the second year 
curriculum of medical school that are the uncontroversial cases of biological abnormality. 
 The evolutionary metaphor is an insightful one concerning the branching off into 
specialized disciplines and the differential rates of change, growth, and progress that 
disciplines achieve. While some areas thrive, some areas of inquiry proceed slowly or 
advance only in fits and starts. Some are popular or successful only for a period. Some 
types of research seem to be investigating phenomena that, so far, defy satisfying 
scientific explanations. Without a period of sustained success areas of inquiry cannot 
build up a core of well-established results and models. Without this core there is not a 
nucleus to build around. Models from such fields are often presumed to be less likely to 
have achieved as much fit as the models at the core of those fields having periods of 
sustained success. This problem usually accompanies the lack of a well-established 
methodologies and or techniques. Without shared methodology models may not get 
retested and refined as they would otherwise.40 In the worst case, each new generation of 
researchers may decide on its own preferred models and methods, only to have these 
                                                 
39 These include physiology, molecular biology, behavioral sciences, neuroscience, 
anatomy, embryology, histology, immunology, genetics, etc. Microbiology explains the 
normal form and function of microbes, whether these be pathogens or so-called normal 
flora of the human body. 
40 Models developed with novel methods are often harder to initially evaluate. Models 
developed in disciplines that do not have a well established methodology are also harder 
to evaluate initially. Perhaps this is because the researchers in the discipline are not as 
closely tied together as those where a common, entrenched methodology exists and 
makes for more constructive criticism. 
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pushed aside by the next generation of researchers. Textbooks in such disciplines can not 
draw on a well established core of results nor a common methodology and set of 
techniques. Such fields instead have to organize textbooks on the theme of historical 
development or on the central challenges or problems addressed by the field. Disciplines 
with such problems might attempt borrowing methodologies from others disciplines 
perceived to have established cores of successful models. Progress in these disciplines 
might even come to be thought of as the establishment of newer methodologies. This also 
creates opportunity for development of opposing camps along methodological lines, and 
in the worst cases opposing camps each work with non-overlapping models and methods. 
Groups of researchers or entire disciplines can be more isolated. The work in these 
disciplines does not relate well nor seem relevant to other disciplines. There is less 
exchange of ideas. In such disciplines there is often little sharing of models with 
neighboring fields. The isolation tends to breed a sense that the discipline is special and 
has very narrowly defined goals and objectives. 
 The social and psychological sciences appear to have suffered from various of 
these problems more than the so-called natural or ‘hard’ sciences. These fields have not 
tended to develop and retain a large core set of uncontroversial models or methodologies, 
and tend to undergo something like Kuhn’s ‘paradigm shifts’ more often. Psychiatry has, 
more or less, undergone shifts from physics inspired mechanistic models, through a 
period influenced heavily by psycho-analysis, and now is influenced by models from 
cell-biology driven mostly by the relative success of newer pharmaceutical interventions. 
Part of the difficulties these fields face is the complexity of the subjects being studied and 
the difficulty with isolating easily manipulated aspects of the phenomena being modeled. 
The basic point for disease claims is that the models involved in specifying normal 
human biology and behavior in these fields tend to be less well worked out, less well 
tested over time, and less well integrated with models from other disciplines. 
 Some of the clues used by evaluators to attempt to assess whether a model is a 
good description involve the reputation of the field in question. Some clues that a model 
is likely to be retained and verified in the long run are that it comes from a field with an 
established methodology and established, well-entrenched core body of results instead of 
from a less successful, less well-established line of inquiry. A model from an isolated, 
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specialized field of inquiry is a more risky bet than one from a integrated discipline with 
models that have grown larger by having new aspects added through continued use and 
development. However, these are just clues and each model or hypothesis deserves 
careful assessment for its own virtues and merits as a representational model. 
 
2.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 I have offered a broad brief sketch of science, what it produces, and how it selects 
better products from worse. I have very briefly alluded to the sorts of qualities I believe 
are involved in this selection process and also the sorts of qualities people use in making 
judgments about the virtues of particular scientific models. The reason for attempting 
such an ambitious task is because these qualities and these sorts of judgment are at root 
what determine better from worse disease claims and the amount of legitimacy that 
people judge particular disease claims to have. In the next chapter I shall turn towards 
discussing the notion of normal and abnormal generated by virtuous biological models 
and how this theoretical notion of normal differs from other possible notions of normal. 
In the final chapter of this project I shall turn directly to discussing what being a disease 
means and reiterate what makes for a legitimate versus an illegitimate disease claim. I 
shall also discuss controversial and interesting disease claims in light of my account. 
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CHAPTER 3 
NORMALITY 
 
3.1 NORMALITY 
 My main thesis is that, for certain signs or symptoms—certain human problems— 
to be the observable consequences41 of a legitimate disease, there must be a scientific 
model that explains how these observable problems are caused by abnormalities of a 
biological (or psychological) system. The model must also provide details of the normal 
function of that system. The legitimacy of the disease claim depends on the legitimacy 
and virtues of the scientific model. Ideally this model is an accurate unbiased 
representation of the biological system. In this chapter, I shall discuss possible 
equivocations across three different senses of normality. Biological models often specify 
a theoretical sense of normal and abnormal function or structure. However, conventional 
wisdom and mere measurement might also generate senses of normality. Equivocation 
about abnormality is especially likely when the signs and symptoms of a putative disease 
are open to non-scientific senses. Failure to recognize these different senses, and failure 
to recognize the different ways a judgment of normality might be generated, can lead to 
significant controversy surrounding certain putative disease claims. In this chapter I shall 
distinguish three importantly different senses of abnormality. I shall explain how the 
charge of ‘medicalizing’ certain problems can best be understood in terms of these 
differing senses of abnormality. I will also discuss an argument by Ron Amundson that 
the concept of abnormality ought to be avoided in biology. Finally, I shall consider the 
charge of ‘social construction’ of disease claims, and argue that it can be best understood 
in terms of differing senses of abnormality. 
 
 
                                                 
41 There are actually cases, on my account, where a disease process is occurring (an 
abnormally functioning biological system) but no observable signs or symptoms are 
present. It is possible to have a disease and not be outwardly ill or suffering. It is even 
possible that this disease persists chronically without any consequences perceived as 
adverse to the patient or members of her community. There is no necessary connection 
between being a disease and being a disadvantage or source of suffering to the person 
affected by the disease. I shall return to this topic and discuss examples in chapter 4. 
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3.2 HACKING ON NORMALITY 
 How any concept emerges and gets shaped over time is fascinating. Georges 
Canguilheim (1978) and Ian Hacking (1990) both discuss the emergence of the concept 
of ‘normal.’ The word ‘normal’ originates in European languages as a synonym for 
perpendicular or orthogonal. The Latin root refers to a builder’s T-square—a device for 
measuring right angles—and the Greek root refers to a surveyor’s rod. But even at that 
stage, notes Hacking, there was an ambiguity in the term. 
 
On the one hand the words are descriptive. A line may be orthogonal or normal 
(at right angles to the tangent of a circle, say) or not. This is a description of a 
line. But the evaluative ‘right’ lurks in the background of right angles. It is just a 
fact that an angle is a right angle, but it is also a ‘right’ angle, a good one. 
Orthodontists straighten the teeth of children; they make the crooked straight. But 
they also put the teeth right, make them better. Orthopedic surgeons straighten 
bones. Orthopsychiatry is the study of mental disorders chiefly of children. It aims 
at making the child—normal. The orthodox conform to certain standards, which 
used to be a good thing (Hacking, 1990, p. 163). 
 
Hacking traces the first usages of ‘normal’ in English back to the 1820s, when it was 
borrowed to describe French advances in physiology and medicine.42  
 The notion of the ‘normal state’ grew out of attempts by French physiologists to 
understand pathology and disease. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, newer 
concepts of health were being superimposed on older ones. Older notions utilized the 
metaphor of health as a mean, or balance of elements within the organism, while 
pathology was an imbalance (see Garrison, 1929). Disease was increasingly being 
understood as a process occurring not at the level of the whole body, but at the level of 
body systems and organs. Physiologists were engaging in the decomposition of the 
organism into subsystems. Pathologists and physiologists were explaining disease as 
malfunction in specific subsystems. They were working on explaining the mechanisms by 
which the body controlled and regulated its internal systems in the face of external 
                                                 
42 Hacking says: “The first meaning of ‘normal’ given in any current English dictionary is 
something like ‘usual, regular, common, typical.’ The OED dictionary says that this 
usage became current after 1840, and gives 1828 for its first citation of ‘normal or 
typical’. That was in a work of natural history alluding to the French writers (Hacking, 
1990, p. 162).” 
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perturbations. The terminology of normality and abnormality (in English) had these 
specialized medical usages first, and only then expanded into more general usages. But 
even from the beginning this specialized terminology contained the possibility for 
equivocation and misunderstandings. Hacking, rather poetically, calls attention to this 
problem: 
As a word, ‘normal’ …acquired its present most common meaning only in the 
1820s… The normal was one of a pair. Its opposite was the pathological and for a 
short time its domain was chiefly medical. Then it moved into the sphere of—
almost everything. People, behavior, states of affairs, diplomatic relations, 
molecules: all these may be normal or abnormal. The word became indispensable 
because it created a way to be ‘objective’ about human beings. The word is also 
like a faithful retainer, a voice from the past. It uses a power as old as Aristotle to 
bridge the fact/value distinction, whispering in your ear that what is normal is also 
all right. But also… it is a soothsayer, teller of the future, of progress and ends 
(Hacking, 1990, p. 160). 
  
 It was during the birth of what we recognize now as modern physiology that the 
term ‘normal’ was developed. The notion that a disease was a malfunction of a biological 
abnormality, however, was not new. Rather, what was new during this period were 
advances in our understanding of both organic and inorganic chemistry—and the 
dissolving of the organic-inorganic dualism. It was discovered that the chemical 
processes that allowed living beings to function were the same as those that could be 
carried out in a flask. This allowed different kinds of models to be built—different kinds 
of explanations concerning how systems functioned. It also made decomposition of larger 
complex systems into smaller simpler systems a fruitful strategy.  
 During the nineteenth century formal statistics was also being developed. The 
concepts of determinism and of mechanistic laws of nature were increasingly displaced 
by ideas of variation about a mean, and the mathematics of chance. Things once seen as 
unmeasurable and outside the scope of science were now fair game for the new 
techniques of measurement and analysis. There was an explosion of measurement and 
quantification in nineteenth century biology. The concept of ‘normality’ that we inherit 
from the nineteenth century involves elements of both its statistical and physiological 
heritage. 
 These themes of variation about a mean, along with increasing efforts to 
functionally decompose and measure complex processes, were picked-up and exploited 
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creatively by intellectuals outside physiology. Thinkers like Comte and Durkheim sought 
to expand the notion of normality into the analysis of the complex ‘organism’ called 
society. Such efforts re-ordered the priority of investigation. Whereas in physiology, 
malfunction had taken center stage and normal function was often defined as the absence 
of such perturbations, social thinkers increasingly focused on fleshing out the normal. 
Hacking says: 
 
Something was normal when it was not associated with a pathological organ. 
Thus far the normal would be secondary, defined as the opposite of the primary 
notion, the pathological. But then what Comte called the great ‘principle’ of 
Broussais turned this around. The pathological was defined as deviation from the 
normal. All variation was characterized in terms of variation from the normal 
state. …Note the two parts of this ‘principle’: (a) pathology is not different in 
kind than the normal; ‘nature makes no jumps’ but passes from the normal to the 
pathological continuously. (b) The normal is the centre from which deviation 
departs. …The idea of continuous deviation from the normal came from 
pathology, as interpreted by August Comte. …He made it a basis for his social 
science and it became part of his political agenda. …Broussais’s ‘normal state’ 
might have made its way into language unattached, but it was the enthusiasm of 
Comte that gave it elevation and status. The idea that the pathological is not 
radically different from the normal, but only an extension of the variation proper 
to a ‘normal organism,’ was, he wrote, an ‘eminently philosophical principle 
whose definitive establishment we owe to the bold and persevering genius of our 
illustrious fellow citizen, Broussais.’ The important point was that all the 
characteristics of a thing were defined relative to the normal state. Explicitly: 
‘The law of Broussais subordinates all modifications to the normal state.’ 
Broussais wrote of physiology, but his principles must be extended to ‘intellectual 
and moral functions’—and then, as my epigraph continues, to the whole study of 
society (Hacking, 1990, p. 166). 
 
The concept of normality, expanded to do work in areas such as psychology, 
sociology, statistics and politics, was something to be discovered independently of any 
particular pathology. As its usage expanded a tension between two conceptions of 
‘normal’ was growing—a tension that continues to cause problems, inspire rhetoric, and 
cause misunderstandings. Pulling in one direction were conceptions of ‘normal’ as the 
typical, average, even mediocre—something to improve upon if possible. Pulling in 
another direction were conceptions of ‘normal’ that stress it as a balance, equilibrium, or 
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a preferred state of affairs—the ‘natural state of affairs’ lacking perturbation or 
disruption. Hacking discusses how such tension became solidified: 
 
Comte thus expresses and to some extent invented a fundamental tension in the 
idea of the normal—the normal as existing average, and the normal as figure of 
perfection to which we may progress. This is an even richer source of hidden 
power than the fact/value ambiguity that had always been present in the idea of 
the normal. The tension makes itself felt in different ways. If we think ahead to 
sociology and to statistics, in the modern comprehension of those terms—that is, 
if we think ahead to the work encrusted around names such as Durkheim and 
Galton—we feel the tension acutely. On the one hand there is the thought that the 
normal is what is right, so that talk of the normal is a splendid way of preserving 
or returning to the status quo. That’s ‘Durkheim’. On the other hand is the idea 
that the normal is only average, and so is something to be improved upon. That’s 
‘Galton.’…The tension in these aspects of the normal will not dissolve just by 
noting that there are two ideas, one of preservation, one of amelioration. The 
former carries within it fondness for origins, youthful good health, an ideal 
condition to which we should be restored. The latter lusts after teleology, of ends 
that we may choose for the perfection of ourselves or of the race. Two kinds of 
progress (Hacking, 1990, p. 169). 
 
This unresolved tension between amelioration and perfection remains under the surface 
in controversies about using biotechnology for altering or effecting human appearance 
and performance. This same tension continues to be felt today in debates about the 
concept of health.  
 The concept of ‘normality’ is currently ubiquitous, and has continued to cause 
confusion and controversy as science attempts to describe aspects of human life and 
behavior that were previously the domain of politics, religion or morality. Each of these 
perspectives on human events and behavior (science, politics, religion, etc.) are capable 
of describing what is normal and what is abnormal. It is possible to use the concepts of 
normal and abnormal with primarily either physiological, sociological or statistical senses 
in mind. However, the meaning behind such uses, as well as the intention and authority to 
credibly make such claims, are importantly different across different notions.  
 
3.3 VACHA ON NORMALITY 
 Jiri Vacha (1978, 1985) has written on the ambiguity in the term ‘normal’ as it is 
used in biological science. He says:  
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At first sight, its meaning is clear to everyone, but a quite superficial attempt to 
define normality will suffice to reveal its deceptive polysemy. Normality is the 
elusive Proteus whose countenance changes according to biological branch and 
philosophical conviction of authors. The universality of this term suggests that it 
can hardly be dispensed with in biology, or at least that the majority of biologists 
are convinced of this; yet one would in vain look for the elucidation of what is 
meant by the word ‘normal’ in standard textbooks of ‘normal’ anatomy and 
physiology (Vacha, 1978, p. 823).  
 
Vacha provides seven slightly different conceptions of the term ‘normal’ used in 
biological science. He offers these on a spectrum which moves from the less intricate and 
less value laden, to the most intricate and value laden. This spectrum also moves roughly 
from statistical conceptions43 through functional and into ideal conceptions. 
 The least complex notion on the spectrum is normality as commonness or the run-
of-the mill. Next is normality as maximum frequency or as the mean. Then comes 
normality understood as typicality—as the defining features of some type. The catalogue 
continues through normality as adequacy (being within some defined interval or range), 
normality as optimality, and normality as ideal performance. Finally, Vacha considers 
the possibility that one concept might capture all these aspects of normality. He says of 
this super-conception that it requires a presupposition “that the various meanings of the 
word ‘normal’ have a common basis, that some sort of normality exists in a general 
sense, combining the aspects of frequency, functionality and normativity (1978, p. 843).” 
Vacha is skeptical that the various meanings can be reconciled, and ultimately advises 
that scientists drop its usage for more precise terms. 
 I agree that there are importantly different notions of normality. Careful 
examination of these different senses of normality allows them to be distinguished and 
untangled in particular cases where there is ambiguity or overlap. Furthermore, science 
usually utilizes a sense of normal that is importantly different both from the 
predominately statistical notions describing the average or typical, and from an overtly 
                                                 
43 Vacha (1985) has also discussed the changing ideas about disease in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. The integration of mathematical conceptions for measuring 
variation caused various problems for scientific categorization. As an example he 
discusses the development in the 1920’s and 1930’s in Germany of constitutional 
theory—or how to define gross anatomical normality for human beings and how to 
catalogue abnormalities. 
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normative sense that equates normality with what is preferred or correct. Science creates 
models that attempt to describe how things actually operate and function, not describe 
what we value or how we wish the system would operate. Nor are these models merely 
reports of the average performance on some measure. They are more complex and often 
present the system as goal-directed and as-if-designed, even while ignoring or being 
agnostic about the origin of this appearance of design or purpose. 
 The statistical notion of normality was mixed with the physiological notions of 
normal function in the nineteenth century. The expansion of the concept into explaining 
social arrangements and cultural phenomena added further complexity. Currently there 
are many contributing currents running in the concept of normality. I will argue that out 
of these influences it is possible to separate three importantly different but easily 
confused conceptions. Keeping track of these separable conceptions of normality, 
especially when they are mixed together in putative disease claims, can clarify some 
points of controversy. Furthermore, being clear about what is meant by normality in 
certain contexts allows more fruitful debate about utilizing biotechnology for non-
therapeutic changes to human biological systems (i.e. medical interventions not meant 
primarily to treat disease). 
 
3.4 THREE NOTIONS OF NORMALITY 
 I agree with Hacking and Vacha that the concept of normality is filled with 
tensions and ambiguity. I believe this ambiguity perpetuates the hope that descriptions of 
the physical world can inform our judgments about what is and is not of value. Some are 
hopeful about finding an objective guide to human endeavor, and find the richness of the 
concept of normality encouraging.44 Such hopes also drive philosophical exploration of 
the notion of function and whether this notion creates a natural teleology (see Wright, 
1973, 1976). Others are suspicious of claims of normality (see Dreger, 2004 and 
                                                 
44 I am not a proponent of a fact/value dichotomy, although I do believe talking of facts 
and values, or descriptions versus value judgments is sometimes appropriate or useful. 
Even our best simple observations, not to mention our best theoretical descriptions of the 
world, are infected with being made from a perspective, and these perspectives involve 
background beliefs and judgments involving epistemic and other values. Likewise value 
judgments cannot be made in a vacuum completely uninfected by beliefs about how the 
world or people in it are constituted.  
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Amundson, 2000). If we focus less on the historical roots of this tension and more on the 
current configuration, especially in regard to the issue of disease and health, I think we 
find three largely separable notions of normality.45 These would be (a) conventional 
normality, (b) statistical normality and (c) theoretical normality. Distinguishing the three 
and looking for entanglements of these notions in particular cases can be helpful in 
understanding why many putative disease claims are controversial. Such a distinction will 
also offer insight into what is really being claimed in charges of ‘medicalizing’ people’s 
problems or when a disease is described as merely a ‘social construction.’ 
 One notion of normality is the conventional. This is the main sense of normal 
appealed to in the claim that the marriage of two adults of opposite sex is normal. It is 
what is meant when someone says that it’s abnormal for women to wear men’s clothes, or 
cut their hair short. It relies on reference to a social norm or convention within a 
particular community or group. Claims about something being normal in this sense are 
claims about human preferences or practices. To observe that something is normal in this 
sense is to observe that it is in accord with the preferences or practices of some specific 
group or culture. The phrases normal and abnormal in these uses can often be replaced by 
the phrases ‘proper’ or ‘expected.’ This sense captures the side of Hacking’s tension that 
has to do with expectations of the way things should be—to correct the abnormality is to 
go back to how things ought to be, were expected to be, or were legislated to be. 
Different actions can be achieved by claiming something is normal in this sense. The 
statement can be purely a description of the preferences, norms, or standards of a group. 
It can be intended as merely an observation without any implied endorsement or 
criticism. It could even be part of a scientific explanation of certain social practices, 
customs, and preferences at some place and time. However, the statement that something 
is normal in this conventional sense is more often intended to have evaluative force as 
                                                 
45 After writing the first draft of this chapter I became aware of the article by Wachbroit 
(1994) which also makes a three-part distinction somewhat similar to the one I am 
making. However, Wachbroit’s article focuses on arguing that one notion is special to the 
biological sciences (as opposed to the physical) and also that it is conceptually prior to 
the notion of function (in that notions of function, to be understood, must already assume 
the sense of normality in question). Wachbroit doesn’t give a very detailed idea of what 
this third kind of ‘biological normality’ amounts to except to say that it is relied on in 
allowing the distinction between function and malfunction. 
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well. People often cite something as normal, in this sense, in order to express their 
preference for the standard or norm, or to endorse it, and to criticize those falling outside 
what is normal. Putative disease claims that depend on or involve this sense of normal 
and abnormal often arouse suspicion that those making the diagnosis are also expressing 
approval or disapproval as well.46 
 The second sense of normal is the statistical. It is the sense of normal captured in 
the claim that it is normal for humans to have 10 fingers or one heart, or that the normal 
height for an adult male in the U.S. is between 4’10’’ and 5’10’’. This is the sense in 
which it is abnormal to weigh 480lbs or to have 36 teeth. But it is also the sense in which 
a normal RBC is between 6-8 microns in diameter or a normal water molecule is 25 
Angstroms. The phrase normal in this usage can almost always be replaced by the phrase 
‘average.’ This notion of normal does not carry with it an underlying notion of things 
being the way that they are for a reason or purpose. States of affair are merely found to be 
this way. This sense of normal rarely carries with it a strong sense of teleology. However 
it often does carry with it a sense of being natural—of being the way that nature is, 
regardless of how any community might like it or want it. Normal in such contexts can 
acquire a sense of being a balance or mean along a ‘naturally’ ordered (i.e. merely found 
in the world) spectrum of variation. This sense of normal is closely tied to techniques in 
the field of statistics. This sense can come to be applied to anything that can be quantified 
and measured. This includes not only macroscopically observable things but also things 
that can only be characterized by using data—both things so large scale and complex that 
they cannot be directly observed or things too small to directly observe. Statistics and 
other formalized techniques of analyzing variation do ultimately apply human judgments. 
For example, humans decide how to measure where to set the cutoff for the ‘normal’ 
range. 
 The third sense of normal is particularly important to debates about disease. It is 
the sense captured in the claim that it is normal for the heart to pump blood and produce a 
                                                 
46 An example might be those claiming the behavior diagnosable as ADHD is a biological 
abnormality. Those critical of these sorts of disease claims might suspect that what is 
really being claimed is that such behavior is not valued or preferred by the community in 
question at the time in question. Perhaps in a largely agrarian economy in the past such 
behavior would not have been conventionally abnormal.  
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particular wave pattern on a standard 12-lead EKG machine. It is the sense in which 
having type I diabetes (i.e. autoimmune destruction of beta cells of the pancreas) is 
abnormal, while having a pancreas that secretes insulin in response to elevated serum 
glucose and/or elevated levels of certain amino acids is normal. The phrase abnormal (in 
biology) can almost always be replaced by ‘diseased,’ or ‘pathological.’ This sense of 
normality is an inherently theoretical notion. It is an integral part of the scientific model 
that generates the notion. The postulation of normal and pathological states is built into 
the scientific model of the system in question. The designation of, and details of, the 
system’s function and the various possibilities and mechanisms of dysfunction are a 
crucial and central part of the explanation of many models in biology and psychology. 
Claims of theoretical normal function are made in reference to a scientific model. This 
sense of normal captures something different than merely a measured mean or a 
conventional norm. It is not something that just gets ‘read’ into or onto the model by 
interpreters or by ‘loose’ and imprecise discussion. It is not merely a scaffold or aid to the 
creation of the model. The specification of the normal function of the pancreas is central 
to what the model is describing. 
 Some might argue that this theoretical sense of normality (or something like it) is 
special to the biological sciences. I doubt that such a sense of normality or the type of 
models that generate it are particular only to biology, although I do admit biology has 
made conspicuous usage of these kinds of models and that this probably has to do with 
the fact that the phenomena in question seem well suited for this type of explanation and 
that ultimately this type of explanation has delivered satisfying results.47 Part of what 
                                                 
47 Not the only, but the most important result, would be that these types of models have 
good fit with the phenomena. Do the phenomena being modeled actually and ‘really’ 
have normal and pathological states (as opposed to being merely our interpretation)? In 
considering how one might determine the ‘real’ structure, character, or function of certain 
biological systems, the only means to do so is our best available scientific investigations 
of these systems. This makes me a proponent of some variety of naturalized 
epistemology. These are complex philosophical issues, but what I can say here is that to 
the extent that our best and most virtuous, well fitting, models explain that these 
phenomena have built-in goals or states that are arranged or designed, to maintain or 
achieve, then, to that extent, such claims to normality are natural and objective. The issue 
about bias and social or political preferences or opinions influencing the determination of 
the normal or proper state of affairs is an important issue. But the model can be assessed 
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makes these types of explanations seem special or different is that they generally take a 
broad metaphorical stance towards the phenomena being modeled, namely the ‘as-if-
designed’ stance.48 Phenomena are approached as if they were machine-like in their 
operations, and models are created that incorporate this understanding.49 This approach 
often generates, as part of the explanation, the specification of states of normal function 
(the accomplishment of some goal or task) and the specification of pathological states 
(where the goal in mind is not accomplished as well). Furthermore such models are often 
part of even larger models or groups of models, with a hierarchy, explicit or assumed, of 
lower-level normal functions or goals contributing to the attainment of the functions of 
higher-level systems. Think of the example of the human thyroid from the last chapter. It 
is difficult in many cases to specify the ultimate goals or functions of the system as a 
whole,50 or even sometimes to determine just what constitutes the final or ultimate system 
                                                 
and investigated for evidence of its fit and virtue as an objective and accurate 
representation of the phenomena and also as a model whose design, features or claims 
may be biased or influenced by conventional norms of some kind. It is possible for a 
model to be both accurate as a representation and biased. This fact may often be 
overlooked due to the relatively greater attention given historical examples of model that 
were very poor regarding fit or accuracy and clearly biased or based on conventional 
norms. Less attention is given models that are infected with bias and conventional 
thinking, but also have some degree or accuracy and good fit. Such biased but relatively 
accurate models usually get refined and improved without much notice to the original 
bias or conventionality with which they were at first infected. The cases in which such 
things are overlooked, but then revealed by careful historical scholarship are very 
interesting.  
48 This is just one of many broad metaphorical stances that might be adopted—to 
approach the system as if it were a designed artifact. Another one would be to approach 
complex dynamic phenomena as being like complex social or economic phenomena.  
49 This metaphorical approach to modeling has been described sometimes as ‘reverse 
engineering’ or ‘functional decomposition.’ It is a common and widely used technique 
employed in modeling complex phenomena. Depending on the context, however, there 
are different understandings of why and how something has come to be such that it 
behaves like a designed artifact. 
50 Sometimes goals such as survival or homeostasis are appealed to. But the ultimate 
goals of such hierarchies of functional systems are often vague or poorly defined. One 
can appeal to some other line of inquiry, such as evolutionary theory or theology to 
provide the content and the explanation of how and why the system is machine-like or 
was in some sense designed. The reason for this vagueness has to do with the fact that 
when deploying the decomposition-into-integrated-systems approach it is not crucial to 
know or define exactly what the highest order goals of the system in question are, or 
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at the top of the hierarchy. Furthermore, it is a controversial whether each system has one 
specific and dominant function, or can have many functions. A closely related 
controversy is the creation of a sense of teleology in these hierarchies of specified 
functions.51 
 Take the example of schizophrenia to highlight the three concepts of normality. 
Certain patterns of behavior are characterized as abnormal and become the criteria for 
making the diagnosis.52 Such behavior can be seen as a statistical abnormality in that 
approximately one percent of humans (across nationality and cultures) behave and have 
experiences in ways consistent with the DSM criteria (APA, 2000). Because the DSM 
criteria are in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, the numbers meeting the 
criteria (and those not meeting the criteria) can be measured. Being normal in the 
statistical sense means only that one does not meet the criteria. The behavior of those 
diagnosable as schizophrenics is also a conventional abnormality in that most people 
don’t expect or prefer humans to act that way. Relative to my culture (and many others), 
with its standards and norms for behavior, schizophrenics are abnormal. However, even if 
                                                 
whether the system was actually designed or is even best approached as machine-like. All 
that is needed is a hypothesis of the circumscribed purpose of the system being 
decomposed, and an assumption that when and if higher order functions for the overall 
system are given, the circumscribed purpose being offered will fit in. Part of the problem 
has to do with the incomplete nature of the overall model of human biological function—
there are many missing explanations and this is particularly true as one broadens scope or 
moves to higher levels of explanation, namely those having to do with the function of 
gross anatomical features, observable behavior, social traits and arrangements, etc. 
51 Again, to the extent that our best scientific descriptions of the world create a sense of 
teleology or purpose for some systems, this is acceptable. The crux of the issue here is 
whether a specified system has one dominant function or main purpose that explains why 
the system exists, or whether the function has any relationship to survival. What is clear 
is that science describes what already exists, and in many cases it assigns function 
without much information on ultimate ends or the origins of the systems it models. 
Science builds models of locally specified functions with the goals being determined by 
the investigator creating the model. There is a branch of biology that seeks to understand 
how systems that look as-if-designed came to exist, but many models in physiology and 
medicine are constructed without any input regarding evolution. 
52 This is actually by design in psychiatry. The DSM is a scheme for diagnosing mental 
disorders based on signs and symptoms alone without any necessary reference to the 
underlying scientific (or non-scientific) explanations of the cause of the behavior. The 
advantage is a relatively theory-neutral means of diagnosis that members of different 
theoretical camps can agree upon.  
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diverse cultures find schizophrenic type behavior abnormal, the content of the contrasting 
notion of conventionally normal behavior is most likely different across different 
communities.53 
 The behavior of schizophrenics, however, can also be seen as a consequence of 
underlying malfunction. This is what it means for schizophrenia to be a putative disease, 
namely for the behavior to be conceived of as caused by the malfunction of a biological 
system. It can be understood as a malfunction of neural circuitry, or dysregulation of 
certain neurotransmitters or of populations of specific receptors. These circuits (and the 
cells, neurotransmitters, and receptors instantiating them) all have normal functions 
specified (or potentially specified) in theoretical scientific models. It is these models that 
characterize what is normal, and what constitutes malfunction. Normal and abnormal, 
here, only make sense in reference to some particular model of some biological system. It 
is the model—admittedly a model constructed for human purposes and with an eye on 
explaining what may also be a conventional or statistical abnormality—that creates this 
additional sense of normal and abnormal function.54 Whether the models are speculative 
and not yet well worked out, or are well tested, reliable, and uncontroversial, will 
determine whether the community in question accepts the disease claim as a putative or 
speculative one, or a legitimate and unproblematic one. 
 Interestingly, those models implicated in schizophrenia, and that explain the 
functions of various dopaminergic neural pathways in the brain, are still being developed. 
An accurate model of their normal functions is being sought, even though most experts 
and psychiatrists are confident these pathways are the ones malfunctioning in the disease, 
and are the ones most affected by partially successful chemical intervention (see 
Eisenberg, 2010). On my explanation, schizophrenia is still a putative disease. The 
models detailing the biological systems being disrupted are still being worked out. 
However, the observable consequences are so strongly perceived to be conventionally 
                                                 
53 Some cultures may find the behavior of schizophrenia not pathological but exceptional, 
perhaps elevating those exhibiting the typical behavior to the position of high priest or 
spiritual advisor. 
54 The theoretical abnormality explains the observed conventional abnormality in 
behavior. The disease explains why someone suffers the signs of symptoms that can be 
grossly observed. 
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abnormal, and there has been so much progress in the last 20 years understanding the 
systems believed to be malfunctioning that it is a rather uncontroversial putative disease 
claim. It is interesting to compare the situation with the putative disease claims of ADHD 
or fibromyalgia, whose observable signs and symptoms are not so clearly perceived as 
conventional abnormalities. Even as some researchers attempt to build models of the 
underlying systems being disrupted the general perception is that having aches and pains 
all the time or being hyperactive at school are not all that abnormal. Public opinion is not 
unanimous on perceiving these as abnormalities or on treating such problems medically. 
 In summary, I do believe there are three senses of normal that can be separated 
from each other. One sense is relative to measurement, one is relative to conventions or 
preference, and one is relative to theoretical scientific models. These senses of 
abnormality can in various ways overlap, support, or interact with each other. In actual 
scientific theorizing, investigators often start out by taking a conventional or statistical 
abnormality and building a theoretical model that explains (in mechanistic details) why 
we observe the conventional aberrations or statistical distributions. The received wisdom 
a community perpetuates about some conventional abnormality can have important 
consequences for how the attempt to offer a theoretical explanation is viewed. 
Conservatives might view attempts to offer biological models of malfunction as the 
‘medicalization’ of a non-medical, even a moral, problem. Progressives might push for a 
medical perspective to be adopted on what were previously thought of as character flaws, 
moral weakness, or social ills. Progressives might push for a medical solution to 
problems previously considered merely the natural or normal course of life—such as the 
slow deterioration of function with advancing age. 
 
3.5 OVERLAPPING SENSES OF NORMAL AND MEDICALIZATION 
 The intermingling of the three senses of abnormality is often involved in 
controversies concerning putative disease claims. Figure 3.1 is a simple Venn diagram of 
the overlap of the three sense of abnormality. I have placed certain putative disease 
claims on the diagram to demonstrate both the difficulties and benefits of trying to 
untangle the three senses. I do not intend the assignment of cases to regions of the 
diagram to be taken too seriously. The point is to see how certain human conditions or 
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behaviors can draw on different senses of being abnormal, and to see how intuitions 
about being a disease versus another sort of abnormality might fluctuate as these senses 
become tangled. Failure to recognize the different senses of abnormality simultaneously 
at work creates many of the puzzles and controversies concerning whether or not a 
condition should be considered a ‘disease’ versus some other sort of problem. Note also 
that this diagram does not offer any assessment of the virtue and accuracy of the 
scientific models generating the purported theoretical sense of abnormality.  
 
FIGURE 3.1: Overlapping sense of abnormal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Focusing on the overlap between statistical abnormality and theoretical 
abnormality one might consider type I diabetes, AIDS, as well as other infectious and 
autoimmune diseases. Both have been statistically rare, but AIDS is growing in both 
prevalence, and could move out of the statistical circle as it becomes more prevalent. 
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Currently both enjoy a synergy between being abnormal in the sense of being a well-
worked out and accurately modeled pathology and being uncommon. This area will 
contain many uncontroversial classic diseases—theoretical abnormalities that are 
uncommon and, importantly, don’t have to compete with conventional wisdom in the 
same way that many behavioral or anatomical abnormalities do.55 
 Coronary artery disease (CAD) and atherosclerosis have been and continue to be 
epidemic in the wealthy developed world. These conditions affect many people and 
produce much morbidity and mortality. There is pressure to find ways to intervene and 
influence the outcome for as many people as possible. Accurate scientific models are 
being developed to explain these as theoretical abnormalities of human physiology and 
metabolism. They can result in abnormal, even catastrophic disruptions of function (i.e. 
MI or heart attack). These scientific models also explain much about the normal function 
of many metabolic and physiological processes involved. Phenomena in this area of 
Figure 3.1 (i.e. in the theoretical abnormality circle alone) are not rare and often develop 
slowly over time. These phenomena often require that the scientific models of 
abnormality, at least originally, rely on multifactorial explanations. Epidemiological data 
on genetic, environmental and behavioral risk factors are gathered and used to guide and 
stimulate model building.56  Often these models involve the additive and interacting 
                                                 
55 There are a small and dwindling group of people who believe AIDS is not caused by 
HIV and thus reject the idea that this is an accurate theoretical model. Some people 
believe AIDS is just a ‘social construction’ and as such is merely a conventional sense of 
abnormal being used to segregate people for political or economic reasons. I do not know 
of anyone who claims that the model for type 1 diabetes is inaccurate or that the science 
offered is just a way to legitimize social and political power relations, however it would 
not be surprising to find these sorts of claims becoming a ‘hot’ topic as concern and 
publicity increase about the epidemic of type 2 diabetes in racial minority populations 
(African Americans and Hispanics) in the U.S. 
56 This is not the whole story—in many cases there are also isolated genetic metabolic 
defects that produce early onset and aggressive versions of the disorder in question. 
These isolated varieties draw attention and often allow accurate models of the systems in 
question to be produced. These serve as important parts of explaining the normal 
functions and possible routes of abnormality in those physiological and metabolic 
systems that govern the more general, more multifactorial versions of the disorder. For 
atherosclerosis and heart disease the discovery of patients with a mutation in their LDL 
receptors causing these to malfunction, and causing these patients to die of heart disease 
in their teens, was a crucial part of the ongoing processes of developing the broader 
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contributions of many components that are hard to isolate and control completely, even in 
experimental animal models. Essential hypertension is another example. Acne and tooth 
decay fit in this area as well, although one might argue these conditions are considered 
conventional abnormalities for which theoretical explanations are being sought.  
The fact that a condition is not rare may lead some to believe that it is not a 
disease. If most people have these conditions, are they not part of the normal behavior of 
the biological systems in question? This problem arises from conflating statistical and 
theoretical abnormality. Many diseases that effect lots of people involve issues 
surrounding what constitutes normal vs. abnormal aging and the decline in function in 
most biological systems with age. Some rate of deterioration, and some rate of 
atherosclerotic plaque formation, as well as some amount of acne and tooth decay, is 
probably part of normal development and aging. However, certain cases are not normal.57 
The issue is just how much deterioration in function at any given age is in accord with 
normal aging. Finding this balance point produces controversy and unique issues 
generally for many abnormalities in these areas of Figure 3.1. 
 In situations where the normal state or function is difficult to distinguish from 
normal aging and deterioration, there is a propensity to confuse the ‘ideal’ with the 
‘normal.’ Recall the example from chapter 1 concerning testosterone levels. In the case of 
atherosclerosis and heart disease this confusion can be seen in issues about what level of 
serum cholesterol is normal. There surely is a ‘normal’ value that science could 
determine if it had a very well worked out model of human aging and deterioration in 
function with age. However, medical advice and intervention seems aimed at an ideal 
level of serum cholesterol, especially now that means to technologically alter this value 
are available. There is controversy about defining the ideal, although scientific 
investigation of the systems and phenomena in question could yield an answer on this as 
well. Ultimately, the ideal might be the lowest amount of serum cholesterol (and cellular 
stores) that an otherwise normal adult could tolerate. But there is a difference between the 
ideal level and the normal level of serum cholesterol for a male or female of a particular 
                                                 
multifactorial explanations of what goes wrong for the more run-of-the mill person who 
develops heart disease. 
57 Some cases are clear cut diseases. They are extremes. They are malfunctions of the 
system that otherwise functions normally. 
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age, just as there is a difference between the normal and ideal amount of atherosclerosis 
(or acne) for an otherwise healthy human given gender and age. The theoretical normal 
amount has nothing to do with our preferences while the theoretical ideal amount 
necessarily requires human preference to determine. 
 Science can handle these challenges. An accurate and authoritative, although 
complex, model of human aging (with specification of normal functional and structural 
changes and abnormalities) is possible, and certainly some models and details are already 
available. Ultimately science and its models can become as complex as necessary to 
handle such issues. Currently, however, theoretical models of human aging are not well 
worked out or extensive. This void where a satisfying theoretical explanation of normal 
aging could function is filled by explanation or speculation from other sources, like 
religion, politics, culture, etc—i.e. conventional senses of normal aging. Tooth decay and 
acne also run into problems due to the fact that scientific models of normal aging are not 
well worked out. It is all too easy for notions of conventional normality or even ideality 
to slip into the void. Some amount of acne as an adolescent is normal, but how much is 
not well worked out yet. 
 Currently masturbation is a pure conventional abnormality—there is no current 
scientific theory about it being a behavioral malfunction, nor do we currently believe it is 
statistically rare. It is only abnormal relative to norms of behavior for particular 
communities at particular times.58 There are other examples in the literature such as 
drapetomania—the disease ascribed to antebellum southern slaves who repeatedly ran 
away from their masters (see Cartwright, 1851). Even at the time of its introduction as a 
possible diagnosis, the abnormality should have been recognized as merely 
conventional.59 There are perhaps some abnormalities that tend towards purely statistical, 
like rare eye color.  
                                                 
58 There is a rather embarrassing history of medical treatment of the disease of 
masturbation, especially when diagnosed in adolescence. See Engelhardt (1986). 
59 There are some historical examples that were conventional abnormalities, and covered 
a broad group of individuals with similar appearance, behavior, etc. but among this 
overly broad group of ‘abnormals’ were subgroups of sufferers of what we currently 
recognize as legitimate diseases. This is probably particularly true of many historical 
cases of putative psychological diseases. 
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 On Figure 3.1 the abnormal behavior of a schizophrenic might be placed in the 
middle, as it can be interpreted as an abnormality in all three senses. Certain anatomical 
‘defects’ that are held to be undesirable by the culture in question, are statistically rare, 
and also have a well established, respected, and accurate model explaining how such 
malformations occur, could also be placed in this area of triple overlap. Some of the 
various types of cleft palette serve as an example. Being born with either one less or one 
more finger than the average of five per hand, may be included in this group, although the 
embryological malfunctions that cause such cases are less well worked out than for many 
cases of cleft palate.  There are potentially a large number of anatomical features of 
people that we can establish as statistical abnormalities and which our community 
considers abnormal. Whether there is a reasonable model explaining them as arising from 
the malfunction of a biological system determines if they make it into the area of triple 
overlap or stay in the area of double overlap to the right on Figure 3.1.  
 This area of double overlap containing statistical abnormalities that are also 
conventionally abnormal produces many problematic putative diseases claims. 
Homosexuality, shyness, chronic fatigue syndrome, abnormally large or small breasts, 
feeling certain that one is actually the opposite gender than what one’s external genitalia 
might testify to the world, etc. could all be examples. The phenomena being examined in 
this overlap are often prone to becoming medicalized. Some doctors and their abnormal 
patients begin to look for scientific theories that explain the problem in question. They 
seek explanations that will allow the misfortune to move into (or at least closer to) the 
area of triple overlap. Medicalization is the search for a theoretical, scientific explanation 
for an abnormality, and is particularly controversial when the abnormality is already 
clearly perceived to be a conventional and statistical abnormality. The most pejorative 
accusations of medicalization also contain the assumption that the problem being 
medicalized should not be understood as a disease, or handled by the intervention of 
medical practitioners. 
 It may be that part or all of the cases of conventional and rare abnormalities have, 
forthcoming, accurate explanation as malfunctions of otherwise normally operating 
biological systems. However, during the period in which scientific research is ongoing, it 
is still an open question whether the behavior or shapes of bodies in question can be 
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explained as a scientifically respectable biological malfunction or malformation. The 
behaviors that we now recognize as signs of the disease of schizophrenia had to make this 
move from conventional abnormality towards theoretical—and it is still making the 
move—and there are probably still some people who consider such behavior a sign of 
moral weakness or spiritual unrest instead of a legitimate, medical disease. 
 If one looks at the many putative disease cases that could be placed in this area of 
double overlap, another common feature emerges. Many of these abnormalities, or the 
symptoms of the abnormality, are themselves grossly observable.60 Because fields like 
psychiatry and psychology deal with problematic human behavior and are searching for 
theoretical models that explain the difference between the pathological and the normal, 
these fields are particularly prone to criticisms of medicalizing problems.61 ADHD has 
proven a controversial example regarding searching for a scientific model to explain 
conventionally problematic behavior as a result of a theoretical pathology. Such 
pathology should be contrasted with a theoretically normal state of cognition and brain 
function. The fact that certain medications seem able to ameliorate the problematic 
behavior helps direct the search for the desired scientific explanations, and ultimately the 
search for legitimacy as a disease claim. Culturally disreputable or odd behavior tempts 
psychiatrists (amateur or otherwise) to medicalize. Similarly, rare anatomical variations 
that society finds abnormal are also tempting targets for medicalization. When it comes to 
anatomical variation, the scientific fields of research that are called upon to explain 
normality versus abnormality are those of human development and performance, 
including embryology, some developmental pediatrics, endocrinology, kinesiology, etc. 
Science has models of normal human variation concerning gross anatomical structures 
and internal organs, etc. but these are incomplete and their detail only extends so far. The 
                                                 
60 Many of the problematic cases of purported diseases in the overlap between statistical 
and conventional abnormality consist of grossly observable behavior or anatomical 
variations. This is no surprise because conventional judgments about what is normal and 
abnormal (unlike theoretical or even statistical claims) usually only apply to what 
members of the culture can and do observe. 
61 In psychiatry the DSM is constructed to be atheoretical and lists disease diagnosis 
merely as sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. But much debate and research 
occurs in the background and concerns attempts to legitimize certain diagnosis and 
determine which will get added and which dropped from each DSM revision. 
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situation is similar to scientific models of normal human aging and its lack of extensive 
satisfactory explanation. In many ways the definitive model of normal human aging 
(along with possible abnormalities) and the model of normal human development from a 
zygote to a adult would just be parts of the same overall theory of normal development, 
normal shape and function, and normal decline. But various parts of this complex model 
are not yet well worked out.  
 Figure 3.2 shows another speculative, but interesting exercise in trying to 
organize along a spectrum of anatomical variations judged to be conventional 
abnormalities by most cultures. The upper end of the spectrum represents development in 
accord with normal variation as determined by some model of embryological 
development and for which there is not a specific model of pathology. The bottom end 
represents those whose development is a theoretically abnormal variation—a 
malfunction—backed by some model of pathology of embryological development, 
endocrinology, etc. These cases tend to blend together and present real problems for 
determining what is a disease versus what is merely a medicalized bias against certain 
variations. The point I want to highlight is that a strong influence on intuitions about 
whether these cases are diseases or not is the belief in (if not the actual existence of) 
unbiased and accurate explanations of the condition as a theoretical biological 
abnormality. 
 Height is a grossly observable anatomical variation and extreme shortness is an 
example of a culturally undesirable statistical abnormality. Certain cases of shortness 
(like certain cases of atherosclerosis) have successfully been supported by a molecular 
biological explanation of its cause—for example, the lack of human growth hormone or 
malformation of some receptor or component in the hormone’s signaling cascade (see 
Rosenfeld, 2002 and Kamboj, 2005). Such cases of shortness have been made 
consequences of theoretical abnormalities of endocrine function.62 These cases of 
pathology causing short stature are cases of the successful move from the right-hand area 
of double overlap to the triple overlap area on Figure 3.1. Other cases of shortness have 
                                                 
62 Shortness is just a symptom of the disease, but it is the reason that the scientific model 
in question was worked on and elaborated, and it is ultimately the reason for medical 
intervention. 
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no theoretical explanatory models and tend to remain merely statistical abnormalities. 
Such abnormally short people are considered healthy and merely at the lower end of the 
distribution of heights. That some individuals will be labeled as suffering from a disease 
due to their height and medically treated, while others of the same height will be labeled 
normal and not helped, is controversial and prima facie unjust.63 
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Increasing availability of the means to alter biological systems and especially to 
alter gross anatomical structure, function, and behavior, will create even more pressure to 
                                                 
63 See Buchanan, et. al., 2000. My own interpretation of this would be that for some cases 
the theoretical model of malfunction and normal function is well worked out and for 
other cases it is not yet available. The boundary between theoretically normal and 
abnormal usually has a significant area of indeterminacy. It also seems to me that not all 
cases of short stature can be symptoms of a theoretical abnormality. The decision to treat 
short stature should be made, however, on more than the fact that it is or is not a 
symptom of a legitimate disease. 
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medicalize certain problems. Often these cases will involve claims about normality and 
abnormality—often claims in reference to statistical and conventional conceptions—and 
a search for a theoretical explanation that legitimizes medical intervention. Being aware 
of the possible equivocation across the concepts of normal and abnormal, and about the 
pressure to create a theoretical abnormality out of conventional ones, is an important part 
of analyzing these controversies, especially during periods where a consensus regarding 
the accuracy or reliability of the scientific models appealed to is still unavailable. 
 
3.6 LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
 The medicalization of problems and the social construction of diseases are more 
likely in cases involving certain mixtures of the three senses of abnormality. I noted 
above that claims about anatomical variation or behavior are particularly problematic in 
these regards. It is no coincidence that scientific models in fields of research that deal 
with such grossly observable phenomena often arouse more controversy. At certain 
‘higher levels’ of analysis there is more intermingling and competition between the 
different senses of normal. 
 In biology differences might exist in explanations and models as phenomena are 
described at different levels—ascending from the atomic and molecular, to the cellular, 
tissue level, organ level, organism level and finally community and population levels. 
Different methodologies are involved in investigations at different levels. In evolutionary 
theory one might talk about selection occurring at the molecular level of genes and 
proteins, at the level of whole organisms, or at the level of populations of organisms. In 
the hey-day of support for ‘functionalism’ in cognitive science, research was 
distinguished by whether it described cognitive operations at the experiential/ behavioral 
level, the functional level, or the instantiation level (see Pylyshyn, 1984). Different 
vocabulary and different sorts of explanation, as well as different sorts of criticism, were 
appropriate at different levels of abstraction. Talk of ‘levels of analysis’ arranged from 
those phenomena closest to those farthest from simple human observation is somewhat 
crude, but helps highlight that certain phenomena at one level of analysis might require 
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quite different kinds of scientific explanation than phenomena at a higher or lower level 
of analysis.64  
 As one moves ‘up’ and out of physiology, and into either gross structural and 
functional anatomy of the entire organism, or into human behavior, cognition, or social 
structures, the three senses of abnormal often become entangled. At these higher levels, 
even when science does offer virtuous models, the phenomena are observable and 
scientific models frequently have to compete with folk theories. At these higher levels 
there are also direct influences on scientific modeling from conventional notions of what 
is normal for human anatomy, function, behavior, and cognition.   
 On the other hand, as one moves ‘down’ in levels of analysis, increasingly 
towards molecular interactions and particle physics, the postulation that there are 
pathological states becomes less prevalent in model building. At these lower levels the 
as-if-designed metaphor is employed less frequently. Some phenomena don’t seem 
appropriately explained as having a normal function that can be disrupted in various 
ways. For these systems, aberrations in the behavior of the system don’t seem so much 
pathological as they seem merely other possible states of operation consistent with 
different conditions. Such models often postulate large numbers of random interactions, 
governed by general rules, giving rise to mathematically predictable emergent states of 
affair. At these lower levels of analysis the statistical sense of normality is the dominant 
one. Even when some states are called normal—such as equilibrium states—this 
designation does not carry the same sort of teleology that we observe when a biological 
system is classified as functioning normally in opposition to states that are abnormal.  
 There is speculation and debate about whether functional analysis is only 
applicable to certain kinds of phenomena or at certain levels of analysis. Furthermore, 
some argue that biology is a special field with special kinds of explanation due to its 
                                                 
64 Rather than placing the phenomena observable by biologically endowed human 
sensory capabilities at the top end of the spectrum, it is more accurate to make it the 
middle. There are all sorts of large-scale phenomena (both large scale in space and time) 
incapable of being directly observed by normal human sensory capabilities. For example, 
levels of analysis ‘above’ those of gross human observation are required for economics 
and weather forecasting. These are, like very small scale phenomena, more difficult to 
gather information about or to control experimentally. 
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functional decomposition.65 Perhaps there is a middle level of abstraction where 
functional ascription is most appropriate and theoretical normality is least problematic. 
These are very interesting and complex issues. There is not a line where one passes from 
models that create a robust functional sense of normality to those that rely mostly on a 
statistical sense. Likewise there is no clear-cut boundary where conventional senses of 
abnormality stop having influence. I would defer to examples of our best theoretical 
models to help resolve these issues. 
 In assessing the concept of normality, Jiri Vacha, points out both the ubiquity of 
the concept and its vagueness. I agree that there are different broad senses of normalcy 
and abnormality, and many subtly different variants of theoretical abnormality across 
scientific contexts. Different kinds of theoretical normality are generated by different 
kinds of models in science. Vacha advocates dropping usage of the term ‘normal.’ The 
situation is not as hopeless as Vacha and others indicate. Evaluating particular cases 
carefully can clarify what is being claimed and why certain problems are occurring. 
Points to keep in mind when evaluating individual usages of normality in biology 
are: a) the three broad senses of normal specified above; b) that these senses are often 
intermingled; c) that the level of analysis at which a model is operating at can influence 
this intermingling; d) that the statistical sense of normality often does not generate as 
strong a normative force as the other senses; e) that the accuracy and objectivity (as well 
as the character of theoretical normality being generated) is related to the quality and 
details of the scientific models making those claims—accurate well verified models, in 
agreement with other core results in that field, and in a field that has a well entrenched 
and respected core of results and established methodologies, will often generate senses of 
theoretical normality that are unproblematic and unquestioned; f) that particular cases of 
theoretical normality can be different as they are relative to the model generating it and 
the details of how the model explains the phenomena it is representing; and g) that the 
politically or ethically controversial aspects of certain claims of normality often involve 
the conventional sense and that these are often cases of grossly observable behavior or 
                                                 
65 I believe this is actually a reasonable explanation of why teleology seems more or less 
prevalent in certain areas of science, namely whether the predominant sense of normal at 
work is statistical versus functional.  
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anatomical variation. In order to demonstrate how easy it is to overlook these 
considerations, I will discuss an article by Ron Amundson (2000), entitled Against 
Normal Function.  
 
3.7 AMUNDSON ON NORMAL FUNCTION 
 Ron Amundson is a well-respected philosopher of biology, who has written on 
both the history and theory of evolution and developmental biology. His essay, Against 
Normal Function, argues against labeling individuals as ‘abnormal’ because doing so 
unfairly marginalizes them by “use of a falsely objective criterion.” He argues that the 
concept of ‘normal function’ does not reflect a ‘biological reality’ in the same way that 
concepts like species or sexual phenotype (male/female) do. Normal function is more like 
the concept of race—a categorizing concept that represents the social practices and 
conventions of the community more than it represents naturally occurring patterns. 66 
Thus ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ function are social constructs.67 Amundson argues that 
biological research makes the notion of ‘biological normality’ look very suspect. 
Moreover, it playing a role in justifying discriminatory practices against those with 
variant modes of function (i.e. the disabled). Regardless of being ubiquitous in scientific 
model building, debates about the nature of disease, and debates about the distribution of 
health care, he argues we should avoid the term in biomedical science. 
 The details of Amundson’s argument are as follows. If one looks closely at 
biological phenomena, whether evolutionary biology, developmental, or examples from 
anatomy or physiology—not to mention studies of human performance—one finds that, 
for many given functions, there is much variation in both the mode68 of functionality and 
                                                 
66 There are people who argue that both the concepts of species and sexual phenotype are 
not objective, scientific concepts—that they too are importantly similar to the concept of 
race. I believe that both the concept of species and sexual phenotype are complex but that 
our best current scientific models explain these as objective categorizations, even though 
(according to these models) borderline cases exist and processes occurs that work on 
small variations and produce new species.  
67 Later in this chapter I shall explain what I think the charge of social construction, 
especially as it relates to diseases, amounts to and in terms of the different senses of 
normality. 
68 Amundson distinguishes the level of functional performance that might be 
accomplished from variant modes of function. Two individuals might transport 
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the level of functional performance. These empirical biological facts are counter to any 
theory of significant uniformity of human biological functions. There is no evidence for 
species typical functions or normal functions for the species. The notion that variant 
functionality is abnormal is also counter to the facts of biology. Normality and 
abnormality are not objective biological categories. They are social constructs like race or 
religious sect. Because they have been used to justify discrimination against variant 
modes of function (e.g. preferring lip reading and attempts at verbalization over sign 
language use) they should be avoided in careful scientific explanation.69  
 The formal notion of normality that Amundson has in mind he calls ‘functional 
determinism.’ He identifies this theory with Christopher Boorse (1997). Functional 
determinism implies that each species has a sufficiently narrow distribution of 
performance on certain species-defining functions to justify a dichotomy between normal 
and abnormal species members.70 In other words, labeling a subset of species members as 
                                                 
themselves down the street with equal speed and dexterity but they might accomplish this 
with different modes (walking versus using a wheelchair). He believes that talk of 
biological normality is often just a cover for the prejudicial favoring of certain modes of 
function over others, regardless of the level of performance. He argues that if not for such 
prejudice against the variant modes of function, more people categorized as biologically 
‘abnormal’ could avail themselves of environmental and technological compensations to 
significantly increase their level of functionality. Amundson cites discrimination against 
sign language, wheelchair usage, and against environmental and behavioral 
accommodations for autistic persons as examples. “Mainstream concerns with normality 
are directed at typicality of functional mode, and are antagonistic to the functional 
performance of atypical people (Amundson, 2000, p. 50).” 
69 Amundson is a normativist, and not a naturalist, about the concept of normality. He 
says: “The topic of biological normality is related to a philosophical debate on the 
concept of disease. Naturalists consider disease to be a straight-forward, non-evaluative, 
theoretical concept within the sciences of medicine and physiology. Normativists 
consider disease concepts to embody evaluative judgments of the conditions designated 
as diseases. Much of the present paper is an argument for the normativity of the concept 
of functional normality, at least as the concept is currently used… My purpose is to show 
that the normative taint is not avoided in current discussions of biological normality 
(Amundson, 2000, p. 34).” 
70 Amundson says: “Boorse’s two definitions imply that natural species have a certain 
statistical characteristic: the variations in function among their members is sufficiently 
narrow to justify a dichotomy between normality and abnormality based on the 
distribution alone. Obviously not all species members function in exactly the same way. 
We can treat them as if they do by labeling as abnormal any non-conforming species 
members. This labeling is statistically justified only if the bell curve of functional design 
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‘normal’ will only be justified if the Gaussian distribution of performance for the 
pertinent set of functions is a narrow one—i.e. “that there are many uniformly designed 
individuals and only a few scattered individuals with novel functional design.” This is a 
statistical claim that species tend to have minimal variation in the performance of some 
set of pertinent biological functions. Being biologically normal is to be within the narrow 
limits on these pertinent measures. Add that this statistical claim represents some 
objective fact about biology and we have the target of Amundson’s criticism. He says: 
“…[F]unctional determinism states that functions take place in a uniform mode at a 
relatively uniform performance level71 by statistically distinctive portion of the members 
of a species. These are the normals (Amundson, 2000, p. 36).” 
 To support the premise that actual biological phenomena do not provide evidence 
for the doctrine of ‘functional determinism,’ Amundson gives examples. He argues that 
variation is the norm among members of a species. It arises not just from genetic 
variation, but also in variations due to developmental plasticity—i.e. the interaction of 
genetic predispositions and environmental factors as complex organisms develop form 
zygotes to adults. Amundson reminds us that evolution could (and probably does) create 
species whose members grow to be as alike as machine-made paperclips. It also allows 
for more complex multi-tissue organisms whose adult members have great variation in 
functionality due to built-in options allowing development to mold structure and function 
so as to meet the demands not only of the environment, but also the demands created by 
the interaction of widely variant co-functions mixed together. “…[F]unctioning adults 
can develop in an indefinitely large number of ways. The goal directedness seen in 
developmental plasticity renders the concept of species design highly suspect. 
Development yields adults that function, but not adults that function identically. 
                                                 
is very steep, i.e. there are many uniformly designed individuals and only a few scattered 
individuals with novel functional designs. I will refer to this statistical claim about 
functional diversity within species as functional determinism. I will challenge the claim, 
and argue that the facts of functional variation do not support functional determinism 
(Amundson, 2000, p. 35).” 
71 Amundson makes a distinction between mode of performance and level of 
performance. Functional determinism requires lack of variation in both. For example, 
assuming vision is one of the pertinent functions humans perform, particular humans 
would need the same level of performance in visual acuity and need to accomplish this 
via the same mechanisms.  
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Functional diversity is a product of developmental plasticity (Amundson, 2000, p. 39).”  
He also says: “Biological ‘types’ are unified not by the functional identity of their 
eventual phenotypes, or the common blueprint from which they were built. Rather they 
are unified by their shared developmental processes. These processes generate 
phenotypes that are functionally diverse, both between and within species (Amundson, 
2000, p. 40).” Amundson admits that ultimately this is an empirical question about 
evolution and speciation, but he believes there is already enough evidence to make 
functional determinism not the case for many species, and especially not for complex 
organisms like humans.  
 He cites an example of a goat born without its two front limbs, and with several 
other, apparently compensating, anatomical variations, such as an atypically broad neck, 
S-shaped spine, and atypically positioned and developed musculature. This goat could 
walk bipedally and had adapted other functions to allow it to operate in its environment. 
He also discusses patients with hydrocephaly whose brains only develop one hemisphere, 
or are greatly reduced in size, but which function quite well due to neural plasticity. 
Amundson discusses the fact that nerves in primates can be grafted onto new target 
muscles and adapt to function quite well after such transpositioning. He also cites the 
functional diversity of disabled wheelchair basketball players. Even players with what 
appear to medical experts to have the same level of disability often display quite different 
levels of performance and talents on the court. He recalls the history of how expert 
medical assessment of ‘handicapping’ had to give way to actual performance based 
‘handicapping’ of players. Sign language as a functional variation on spoken language is 
also discussed. Amundson sums up these examples by saying: “…the goal directed 
processes of biological development are not finely tuned towards the production of 
functionally identical species members. Their inherent flexibility can be expected to 
generate a rich diversity of functional modes (Amundson, 2000, p. 43).” 
 For my purposes, examples from anatomy and physiology are of particular 
interest. Amundson says: 
 
In fact there is a multidimensional continuum of states of health. The 
health/illness and normal/abnormal dichotomies are illusions. A high degree of 
variability exists among individuals on any physiological measurement, with even 
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the most extreme values found within healthy individuals. Extreme values of 
physiological parameters, associated with disease in some individuals, are 
compensated for in others. Indeed, the constellation of other parameters in an 
individual may directly require the extremeness of a particular character for good 
health. …Functional integration at the physiological level gives rise to a range of 
differently functioning, but comparably successful physiological systems. …One 
would expect the large variability of muscle and tendon positioning in the hand, 
for example, to correlate with the level of strength or dexterity in certain kinds of 
manual tasks. Do better violin players tend to have a common configuration of 
hand musculature, or one that is unusual? Do people with the best and worst 
penmanship tend to have certain configurations? These questions seem 
meaningful, but they do not draw us towards a robust concept of ‘normality.’ We 
always knew that people varied in their manual abilities, and now we know that 
they differ in musculature as well. …Skills in penmanship and musicianship are 
so various that no one seriously thinks there are ‘normal’ ranges here. There is no 
reason that discovering a biological explanation for variations in functional 
performance should cause us to declare certain performances abnormal. …If 
medical textbooks emphasize average or typical cases, there may well be 
pragmatic reasons to do so. It would be a mistake to infer from this that diversity 
constitutes abnormality (Amundson, 2000, p. 45).   
 
He further illustrates his points by drawing attention to a very interesting internet based 
project that documents human anatomical variation called the Illustrated Encyclopedia of 
Human Anatomic Variation.72 This is basically a repository of reported variations in the 
anatomical origins and insertions of muscles, and also in the course, branching and 
targets of nerves, arteries, and veins. 
 Of note, in the quote above, Amundson implicitly endorses an older, Aristotelian 
notion of health as a balance of parameters. Of more importance, Amundson discusses 
what is essentially a statistical notion of normality and abnormality—a notion based on 
the variation of measured parameters or performances. Amundson argues that variation 
is so ubiquitous that selecting some individuals for the label ‘abnormal’ doesn’t 
accurately represent biological phenomena as much as represent human judgments of 
approval and disapproval. He also mentions the possibility that basic sets of functional 
elements at lower levels of analysis might combine in different ways to achieve similar 
levels of performance at higher levels. Amundson advises we abandon the terms 
                                                 
72 See http://www.anatomyatlases.org/AnatomicVariants/AnatomyHP.shtml. Last 
accessed 10/26/11. 
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normal/abnormal and health/illness in precise discourse and talk of variation of function 
instead. 
 
3.8 RESPONSE TO AMUNDSON 
 I disagree with Amundson that the science of biology should do away with the 
concept of normality. For example, I see no possibility that the model of the thyroid 
could do without distinguishing between normal and abnormal thyroid functions. The fact 
that the gland has a normal function and structure is precisely what the model of the 
thyroid is explaining. The model abstracts away from the infinite amount of detail that 
could be described and generalizes to a stable representation of basic function. This 
includes normal ranges of functional performance. My main thesis is that the content of 
the concept of disease (taken broadly to include pathology and trauma) is basically 
theoretically specified abnormal form or function. The legitimacy of disease claims rests 
on the accuracy and reliability of the model (or rather the judgment, by the community in 
question, of the model’s virtues). Are we mistaken that ‘normal function’ is a concept 
essential to explaining biological systems? Presently the concept of theoretical normality 
is both ubiquitous and seemingly indispensable to medicine and biological science. It is 
taught in medical schools, discussed with patients, and appealed to in policy debates. 
Regarding empirical and practical issues, the model of thyroid function works well in 
medical clinics, hospital wards, and research labs. It is difficult to even imagine what 
biomedical science would be like without use of the concepts of biological normality and 
abnormality. The burden is on those who believe science could do without the concepts. 
 Amundson fails to properly take account of the different possible senses of 
normality. At times, he seems to understand that there is room for slippage between 
different senses of normality. He says: 
In this paper I will use the term ‘typical’ not as a synonym for ‘normal,’ but in the 
colloquial sense of common, usual, or frequent. On my usage a ‘typical’ trait may 
be merely the least unusual, and an atypical trait need not be abnormal. This 
convention allows the discussion of typical and atypical traits without assuming 
that they are respectively normal and abnormal. It should also be noted that, as 
with other quasi-statistical uses of the concept of normality, abnormality is 
usually to be read as subnormality. Better-than-average function is not usually 
labeled as abnormal even though it is statistically atypical (Amundson, 2000, p. 
35).”    
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Here Amundson seems to be aware that there is a statistical sense of ‘typicality’ that does 
not carry the same amount of normative force. However, he takes particular aim at a 
formalized statistical conception he calls ‘functional determinism,’ and which he finds in 
the work of Boorse and other philosophers in the naturalist camp. When he begins 
describing the discriminatory practices associated with the labeling of some individuals 
as normal, and when comparing the concept of normality with race, it appears the target 
is more of a conventional notion of ‘normal persons.’ This failure to carefully disentangle 
at least the three senses I have outlined produces equivocation.73 That ‘functional 
determinism’ is not true of biological phenomena does not necessarily mean other notions 
of normality are problematic or poor representations. Likewise, just because some 
conventional senses of abnormality are discriminatory, or poor representations of 
biological phenomena, does not mean that all (or any) theoretical senses of abnormality 
are suspect. The thyroid gland and pancreas have normal and abnormal functions and 
these are described in excellent scientific models with little bias. These models are not 
used to discriminate against those with atypical modes or levels of performance. 
 In the philosophy of medicine the biostatistical model of disease (Boorse, 1977) is 
the most widely discussed conception of biological normality and abnormality. However, 
this does not mean that there is one conception of normality in biomedical sciences. The 
sense (or senses) of normal generated by the models in question must be analyzed on a 
case-by-case basis—just as they must be examined individually when assessing 
                                                 
73 Amundson could grant the three senses I outlined, and could argue that there is no 
theoretical sense of abnormality, but only various conventional senses, and that science is 
better off by abandoning the concept in favor of talk of differing levels of variation or 
uniformity. The issue of how to distinguish theoretical senses of abnormality form merely 
conventional ones is difficult, but would involve appeal to the scientific method and the 
process of sifting out those models with little bias and with accurate representations (i.e. 
that have good fit). Theoretical senses of normality are produced in scientific models with 
the purpose of describing natural phenomena objectively, and there is a process of 
evaluation that attempts to assure their accuracy. This issue is one of the main points of 
contention involved in disputes about the extent of social construction in medicine. 
Strong claims about global social construction in medicine hold that there is nothing but 
conventional senses of normality. In the next section I shall discuss the charge that a 
putative disease is merely a social construction. Here it is enough to realize Amundson 
does not fully acknowledge the different possible senses of normality. 
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representational accuracy. A theoretical model specifying normality can involve varying 
degrees of statistical normality—in some models, as part of the explanation of the 
phenomena, normal parameters are determined, often so that normal function can be 
assessed by proxy.74 My point is that not only are there broadly different senses of 
normality as discussed in the previous sub-sections, there are also many different types of 
theoretical normality depending on the details of the model. Selecting one definition of 
biological normality and criticizing it does not necessarily implicate any others. 
 The fact that there can be significantly different notions of normality across 
different modeling contexts in biological and psychological science, also answers the 
challenge posed by Jiri Vacha earlier in this chapter. Vacha assumed that because there 
were differing uses across contexts in the sciences, that the term out to be dropped. The 
broad conception of theoretical normality in biology is flexible and will reflect the needs 
of a particular model in describing a normal state of function or form for a system.  
 By attacking ‘functional determinism,’ Amundson is attacking a particular 
statistical notion of normalcy. His argument is that biological phenomena demonstrate 
too much variability of function to allow this statistical sense of normality. He makes 
normalcy dependent on a lack of diversity in both mode and level of performance. His 
examples are meant to show that such a lack of diversity does not exist. It is a difficult 
issue deciding how much diversity and variation in function amongst species members 
(or anything for that matter) constitutes too much to prevent a claim of statistical 
normality. Just how narrow must the distribution be? How many outliers are too many? 
Does a bimodal distribution, even if the component means are close, rule out the 
possibility that everything within 2 standard deviations of the composite mean is normal? 
Why 2 standard deviations and not 1? Ultimately these decisions are determined by those 
doing or applying the research. Boundaries of what to consider normal and abnormal, 
even in a statistical sense are determined by the interplay of researchers, the reasons for 
examining the phenomena, and the process of model building and model refinement. 
                                                 
74 There are countless examples in clinical medicine—many of them involve looking for 
levels of certain proteins, sugars, or electrolytes in the blood. One example is the use of 
so called ‘liver function tests.’  
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Different contexts are allowed to have more or less variation.75 But even if Amundson is 
correct that ‘functional determinism’ is unlikely because of his examples, this is just one 
sense of statistical normality from the philosophical literature and its refutation does not 
affect other notions of statistical normality that might be more complex. The success of 
Amundson’s argument has no impact on the majority of uses of theoretical functional 
normality created by scientific models in biology and elsewhere.76 
 Amundson examines variation in the actual phenomena. He discusses variation in 
measurable aspects of the phenomena. Theoretical normality is in reference to the 
simplified model. The model is an abstraction and often a simplification of the many 
aspects of the phenomena that might be described—it is perspectival. This is a subtle 
point, but an important one. Statistical normality more directly refers to measurable 
aspects of the phenomena. Variation in the phenomena may prove too much for a 
statistical sense of normality to be plausible, but scientific models abstract and simplify, 
or expand and become complex, to accommodate variation. 
 Science can handle variation. Sometimes variation is noted, explained away as 
largely unimportant, and the model simplifies over this variation. In other cases, models 
account for the fact that several variants of ‘normal function’ are possible, perhaps with 
each variant predisposed to malfunction in different ways or with each variant at risk for 
specific malfunctions to different degrees. The negotiation between generalizing across 
or cataloguing variation is a tension felt in most models of complex biological systems, 
but negotiating this tension successfully is part of what allows scientific models to 
organize complexity and serve as useful explanations. There is a series of models 
                                                 
75 Similar situations arise in determining diagnostic parameters in clinical medicine—
controversy sometimes exists about whether a biomarker’s variation can be demarcated 
into levels or ranges that are ‘normal’ or correlate with the absence of underlying 
pathology. Prostate specific antigen is one recent controversial example. 
76 This is a similar point to one made in the last chapter and a general point I will make 
again in the chapter 4, namely that oversimplifying a crucial concept for the sake of an 
easy definition, and for a definition that allows clear boundaries to be set, is tempting in 
philosophical analysis because it appears to solve some philosophical puzzles. However, 
the drawback is that the analysis is usually irrelevant when one turns to the much richer 
concepts actually being employed by practitioners or those dealing directly with the 
phenomena in question. 
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explaining red blood cell (RBC) structure and function.77 Some of these models handle 
variation by giving several normal possibilities—such as for the different ABO blood 
types, or even the hundreds of other rarer or less medically relevant blood types.78 There 
is also a theory to explain the variation—a theory of how these different blood types have 
originated in an immunological arms race with bacteria attempting to mimic the RBC 
surface proteins and thus evade immune detection.79 These different blood types may 
actually be distinct regarding immune function, yet still considered by the model to be 
normal variants. Currently, regarding these surface proteins there is no sense of normal 
blood type only more and less rare,80 but there are normal and abnormal types of 
hemoglobin and other enzymes in RBCs—the presence of abnormal hemoglobins leads 
to diseases such as sickle cell anemia. Eye color may be another example that is handled 
                                                 
77 There are statistical measures of the average size and other average properties of 
human RBCs and some of these statistical parameters can be measured in a CBC 
(complete blood count). This test is used routinely. Combinations of values outside the 
normal range, along with other abnormal tests or symptoms can lead to the diagnosis of 
underlying malfunctions (i.e. anemias). 
78 As of 2008 the International Society of Blood Types recognized 30 different blood type 
systems of which the familiar ABO system is the most widely known and used (because 
it is involved in the explanation and prevention of the most dangerous transfusion 
reactions). See: http://www.isbtweb.org/working-parties/red-cell-immunogenetics-and-
terminology/members-only/ 
79 But even if this microevolutionary model were inaccurate, it would not change the 
details of models explaining the normal antigens found on the surface of human RBCs.  
80 Things get very complicated. A number of pathologies (i.e. diseases) can occur when 
the wrong blood type is transfused into a person who cannot tolerate that blood type. The 
theoretical abnormality here is not the structure of the RBCs or the antigens on RBCs that 
elicit the reaction, but rather the contextual fact that the wrong type of RBCs entered the 
body of a person primed against these antigens. The antigens that are actually recognized 
as problematic by the immune system are normal. Furthermore the immunological 
reactions that cause the pathology are operating normally (i.e. as if a foreign invader was 
trying to contaminate the blood). What is abnormal is the fact that this immune reaction 
occurs in an attempted transfusion—it is an abnormality in reference to the model of how 
blood transfusions work (a mistake often on the part of the blood bank or physicians 
involved). Hemolytic disease of the newborn would be a variant of this same complex 
kind of abnormality, only here there is no human error—no context of transfusion—but 
one arranged by nature. Even in this setting, the abnormality involves normally operating 
immune reactions against normally structured RBCs—it just that the context for the 
reactions and the target of the reaction are abnormal according to the models of normal 
human childbirth. 
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by allowing variation without any sense of normal and abnormal, only more and less 
common. 
 Humans tend to grow and develop in remarkably similar ways, but also with 
variation. Medicine and biology abstract from this to create a series of integrated, 
hierarchically ordered set of models that specify normal and abnormal functions for the 
human body. This allows the models and theories of medicine to apply generally to all 
people.  But medical students and physicians know that these models are abstractions and 
are perhaps even aware that the sense of normal and abnormal is generated by the 
models. Practitioners of medicine gain a feel for whether the models have good fit or 
need refinement, both globally but also in particular cases. Humans sometimes vary in 
form and function. On my theory this is no problem, and is even to be expected. 
Theoretical models can become as complex as they need to in order to describe the 
pertinent aspects of the phenomena in question. There are many examples in medicine 
where complexities such as this are built into existing models of normal and abnormal 
structure and function. Walking through the library while editing this chapter, I happened 
to see an example—a large text entitled: Atlas Of Normal Roentgen Variants That May 
Simulate Disease, 8th Ed (Keats, 2007). This book actually contains very little text and is 
1200 plus pages of x-rays or CT images. Figure 3-277 shows three examples of 
variability in the size of adult cervical vertebral bodies, and Figure 3-278 shows marked 
variability in the size of the cervical vertebrae of a single individual. Many of these 
images appear to be the radiological evidence of an abnormality, but are created not by 
instances of that specific pathology, but rather by benign conditions. Figure 3-292 shows 
large transverse processes with attempts to form ribs at vertebrae C5 and C7, and Figure 
3-293 shows long transverse processes at C6 simulating a fracture. These benign 
conditions (or at least more benign than the condition that the radiologist might suspect 
but be mistaken about) are often cases where no other known theory about embryological 
development, no theory about trauma or malfunction, makes the finding a pathology or 
an abnormality. In these cases, the findings, by default, are variants of normal. This 
default classification is open to re-interpretation as more information is gathered about 
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just what is causing these radiological findings, and how the biological system in 
question came to be that way.81 
 What is important to gather from this example is that there is a tremendous 
amount of theory and iterated and interrelated scientific models appealed to in 
determining exactly what normal anatomy is, and how that normal anatomy appears on 
an x-ray or CT scan. Even the ability to read an x-ray to determine if it reveals a normal 
anatomy or an abnormal one requires a tremendous amount of theoretical knowledge. 
When the medical student, or even the expert radiologist, pronounces that an x-ray is 
‘normal’ he is referring to a sense of normality that is generated by these theoretical 
models—the sense of normal refers back to these models—the individual patient being 
evaluated is being compared against the theory of normal human anatomy and being 
judged normal or abnormal. This is subtly but importantly different than when I see a 
paraplegic in a wheelchair and, compared against what our society takes to be normal 
modes of ambulation, and normal levels of personal mobility, I judge this individual to be 
abnormal. Because of the complexity of science, our society, and because of the 
difference in qualities of scientific models, there is room for blending of these two types 
of judgments and they can sometimes be difficult to untangle.  
 The frontier of research is always being pushed. New areas are explored and 
models proposed. Similar to the question about how much variation is too much to allow 
a claim of statistical normality, the issues of how much variation is required for 
pathology or theoretical abnormality is also difficult. But these decisions are made on a 
case-by-case basis and models which specify where normal variation ends and pathology 
begins are proposed, tested, and either refined or rejected, over time, by the scientific 
community. These issues often raise difficult challenges for specific notions of theoretical 
normality used in certain models or even used by entire fields. The fields of genetics and 
genomics labor under these difficulties currently. The human genome project is an 
attempt to model the normal human genome—but many questions have arisen about the 
distinctions between normal variation and pathology. This is all the more complex 
                                                 
81 Again, the situation can get very complex as theory about how three dimensional 
energy dispersion is turned into one dimensional pictures becomes involved. But the 
contrast between normal and abnormal remains throughout the escalating complexity.  
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because the genome is a historical repository of older changes, and also a theoretical 
object which undergoes changes slowly over evolutionary time periods. Built into the 
theory of the genome is the idea that variation serves as the building blocks for eventual 
shifts in what is considered the normal character and constituents of the genome itself. 
Furthermore, the model of the genome is an abstract theoretical entity that represents the 
general human genetic make-up, but was actually constructed from the DNA of only a 
small number of donors.82 Ultimately, however, the issues concerning variation in the 
genome will not differ from those already faced by anatomy. 
 The models that constitute human anatomy have many of the virtues that I claim it 
is possible for models and fields of research to have—it has been, and continues to be, 
taught largely unchanged for at least 300 years, and it squares well with practical 
experience in kinesiology, sports medicine, and surgery. It is also hard to imagine how 
the core of scientific models and explanations in anatomy and embryology could be 
altered in the foreseeable future. Examples include mundane facts about how many 
fingers a hand has; the gross structure and function of the heart; the number, shape, 
location, and age of complete ossification of bones; and what basic motions certain 
muscles can accomplish, where these muscles should be located (origin and insertion) 
and what blood supply and enervation they have. The field also deals with the location 
and functional organization of the organs. Anatomy atlases and textbooks illustrate and 
explain the anatomical structure of the theoretically normal human male and female, as 
infant, child and adult. Anatomy gives details about what muscles and nerves are required 
to be working properly if a person where to pick up a pencil off a desk, and it describes 
the effects of nerve, muscle, and tendon damage that would prevent the performance of 
such a task. These details are provided in terms of the range of motion and details about 
extension and flexion at a joint. But the core of the theory does not discuss things such as 
the variation in musculature in the hand or forearm that might make for better violin 
playing—although it potentially could.83 The standard theories of anatomy address 
human performance only at the level of very basic function. 
                                                 
82 See http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/faq/seqfacts.shtml 
83 In recent years study of how maximum athletic performance varies across different 
types of bodies has grown. However, these explanatory models in biophysics make few 
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 Standard theory does record variation, such as innervation of muscles, and in the 
path and branching of blood supply, but such variations usually, more or less, follow one 
of a handful of possibilities—and the theory allows these so called ‘normal variations.’84 
The student learning normal human anatomy by dissecting cadavers is at first troubled by 
such variations. The student finds that each cadaver is not exactly the same. However, as 
the student learns the theory, she increasingly can recognize and demonstrate the normal 
structure and function of parts on all cadavers. Furthermore, as the student begins to be 
able to apply the theory learned in textbooks, the student can identify examples of normal 
variants in actual human bodies being dissected. Eventually, the experienced surgeon 
relies on these theoretical models of normal anatomy (including knowledge of normal 
variants) to carefully dissect through living tissues. The surgeon locates where she 
currently is cutting and where she is going to cut by using landmarks and relationships 
learned as theory and tested by experience. This allows the sacrificing of insignificant 
structures while avoiding damaging crucial nerves or arteries. 
 It is possible to measure certain aspects of human anatomy, functionality, 
development, or cognition and make claims about what is above and below average, but 
this is largely a statistical sense of normality. This is different from developing scientific 
models offering a theoretical sense of normal states of gross human anatomy, normal 
development, performance, and cognition. Of importance is the fact that such models do 
not extend very far into explanations of human aesthetics, functionality, and behavior. It 
is not impossible to imagine that someday scientific models extending into these areas 
might exist and have the virtues discussed in the last chapter. Scientific speculation in 
these areas, however, has not yet produced products good enough to completely displace 
religion, philosophy, politics, or popular culture as the authority in speculating on what is 
normal or proper in human appearance, behavior, cognition, etc. And in some areas, such 
as the normal and the abnormal shape of the human face, it may not be possible to 
develop a theoretical sense of normality completely devoid of conventional senses, even 
                                                 
claims about ‘normality.’ On the contrary, they examine extraordinary performance and 
look to build explanatory models of how such performance occurs.  
84 A classic example is the ‘right dominant’ versus ‘left dominant’ heart, based on which 
coronary arteries predominantly supply the left ventricle. 
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if science develops descriptive explanations for what are the normal conventional views 
we hold and why our minds are designed to hold such views as opposed to others. 
 Most of Amundson’s examples are from higher levels of analysis—from grossly 
observable behavior, abilities, or anatomical structure. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, any scientific model explaining phenomena at these higher levels will have to 
compete with conventional folk wisdom and prevailing social values in explaining what 
is and is not normal. When describing such phenomena one must be careful to untangle 
the differing senses of normal at work. Amundson did not do this with his examples. 
 To highlight some of the particular problems with anatomical senses of 
abnormality or disease consider the example of obesity. There are conventional norms 
about body weight in various cultures and societies. In the past few decades there has also 
been increasing focus by medical professionals about the adverse effects of obesity and 
the correlation between increasing weight and poorer outcomes for a number of diseases 
such as atherosclerosis, type II diabetes, and various kinds of cancer. Medical 
professionals have developed the concept of body mass index as a measurement, and 
certain intervals of this measure have been designated normal and others underweight, 
obese, and morbidly obese. These are basically statistical notions of normality (with the 
boundaries influenced by conventional notions). Research into why some individuals 
seem to be particularly predisposed to obesity has also generated scientific models of the 
hormonal communication between the digestive tract, adipose tissue, and the brain—
communication that when working normally allows a person to feel satiated and no 
longer hungry because a certain amount of food is ingested or energy storage is achieved. 
These models have also detailed certain genetic mutations that disrupt this system (see 
Grimm and Steinle, 2011). There are theoretical models of pathology that result in 
morbid obesity, however there are also many examples of obesity for which there is not a 
scientifically well established explanation. Some people who have attained obese states 
(i.e. achieved a BMI over 30) have also started to view their condition as a disability and 
appealed for accommodation and even filed lawsuits to be protected from discrimination. 
 This case is one where an anatomical feature may be in various lights be 
considered a biological abnormality or related to an abnormality. It could be claimed that 
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having a weight far outside the usual measures is a statistical abnormality.85 Obese 
persons are often judged to have a body habitus less desirable than others, which is to say 
that many considered it an abnormality in a conventional sense.86 It could also be claimed 
that obesity is a treatable disease. What this claim amounts to depends on one’s 
interpretation of the nature of disease, but the intention behind the claim is most likely to 
represent obesity as a theoretical abnormality—an abnormality that is determined in 
reference to a presumed accurate scientific model. The problem with the claim that 
obesity itself is a theoretical abnormality (and not just the symptom of an abnormality) is 
that the scientific model in question would have to be one concerning human anatomy 
and build—a science similar to the ‘constitutional theory’ Vacha discusses being debated 
in Germany in the 1920s and 30s. Human anatomy as a discipline has collected much 
data on measurable qualities of human bodies and has built a basic model of human 
anatomy and function, but one whose level of detail is quite basic and reflects things like 
which muscles are involved in the basic movements of the body. Statistical data could be 
collected and a normal range might be selected (as has been done in the case of BMI), 
however this is not quite the same as creating a theoretical sense of abnormality that 
would make obesity an unproblematic and convincing case of disease in and of itself. 
What is needed is a scientific model that explains the operation and function of some 
circumscribed biological system in terms of normal operations and functions and various 
ways in which dysfunction and poor operation can set in. If all cases of obesity could be 
explained this way, and explained by malfunctions in the same system, then obesity could 
be said to be a disease—or more likely, a consistent, observable sign of a disease. 
However, only a few instances of obesity can be explained as by malfunctions in a known 
biological pathway or system. In these cases, obesity is a sign of disease. However, many 
other cases of obesity do not have such a theoretical explanation with a model denoting 
normal and abnormal function. The charge that a non-medical problem is being 
                                                 
85 However, if more and more people achieved a BMI above 30, the sense in which this 
was a statistical abnormality would be diminished even if we decided as a community of 
health care professionals to retain the theoretical sense in which BMI above 30 was 
unhealthy and an abnormality. 
86 One could easily imagine contexts in which this was not undesirable; a community that 
found obesity a sign of wealth, success, happiness and divine blessing. Consider why 
Buddha is depicted as obese. 
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medicalized is common in such circumstances. The situation is similar to the issues with 
short stature and could exist for tall stature. One difference is that we believe 
(conventionally) that personal choices about diet/exercise can influence weight in ways 
we do not believe influence height. Low body weight is another anatomical condition 
potentially seen as disease or seen as the medicalization of a problem not directly caused 
by biological dysfunction. Anatomical features can be evaluated as statistical, 
conventional, and theoretical abnormalities.                  
 There are also biological and medical sciences that explain theoretically normal 
development from zygote through embryo, fetus, infant, child, adolescent and into 
adulthood. Again the core body of models in this field do not extend very far past 
explaining what is the normal course of basic development, providing statistical data on 
the average or typical milestones and pace of changes, and highlighting processes that are 
disrupted and lead to identifiable syndromes and diseases. There is not a comprehensive 
theory of normal development yet, but slowly science is building on what is known. As 
this work is completed, explanations of what are normal aspects of development, 
including normal or innocuous variations, and details about abnormalities and diseases, 
will be part of these models. It is also not unreasonable to expect that science will slowly 
make progress developing models for normal aging and deterioration of function as one 
ages. The lack of theoretical models for age-appropriate deterioration of biological 
function and form is currently a problem for determinations of disease. Where to draw 
the line between disease and normal aging is difficult. Culture and statistical surveys 
currently have more to say on the matter than biological theory. Therefore, one must be 
careful in examining claims about normal and abnormal functioning regarding aging and 
one should attempt to separate out putative theoretical claims from conventional claims. 
 Another consideration about variation is the possibility of multiple realizability. 
Multiple realizability is sometimes at work in biological systems. Thinking in terms of 
levels of analysis helps keep this in mind. It may be that a higher level system like the 
cardiovascular system in humans can be described according to a general model of 
functionality with standard performance parameters, while at lower levels, details about 
the particular mechanisms that give rise to higher order ‘normal’ performance are 
different. Higher order, emergent phenomena may have little variation (under normal 
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conditions specified by the model) even while there is variation in both mode and level of 
performance across numerous lower level details of instantiation. Perhaps the only 
difference at the higher level between differently instantiated systems is resiliency in the 
face of certain unusual perturbations. Such situations are handled with models that 
account for such complexity and give an appropriate description of normal function as 
emerging from a possible diversity of contributions of subsystems or components. 
Models of blood pressure maintenance in the cardiovascular system are just one example. 
Many examples exist in physiology because the body has redundant mechanisms for 
maintaining homeostasis in the face of different kinds of challenge. 
 The majority of Amundson’s examples involve abilities or gross anatomical 
structures. Amundson states that he is interested in “disabilities, rather than in the 
episodic or life threatening conditions commonly called diseases (Amundson, 2000, 
p.34).” Most judgments of normal and abnormal, about such observable aspects of 
people, are really claims about social convention, or at least are mixtures of conventional 
and theoretical sense of normality. These judgments are often about the individuals who 
instantiate these abilities, behaviors, or gross anatomies rather than about biological parts 
or processes. The community judges as abnormal not the sins, but the sinner.87 This is the 
case for Amundson’s examples concerning discrimination. Individuals were labeled as 
abnormal for using sign language or wheelchairs. The community in question preferred 
that deaf children learn to read lips and speak words. It preferred to see those with 
disabilities of ambulation use modes that most closely resembled legs. It is no different 
than the stories of young left handed school children being physically disciplined until 
they switched to using their right. I would agree this was discrimination, and part of this 
campaign involved using the label of abnormality for those wanting to sign, use a 
wheelchair, or write with their left hands. Furthermore, there were historical attempts to 
pass off these community preferences as being scientific. There were cases of medical 
                                                 
87 It is interesting to consider disease being a subjective state that involves both the 
patient and the community judging some condition to be a particular kind of misfortune 
which permits the adoption of the ‘sick role,’ etc. I believe that one can easily make a 
distinction between theoretical normality as disease and conventional normality as 
perceived disease, and the distinction between abnormal biological function versus 
individuals currently perceived as abnormal. 
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authority being misused to force the preferences and social norms of some onto others in 
ways that clearly caused suffering. But it is better to be clear about exactly what was 
happening in those cases—namely that conventional senses were mistakenly being 
represented as theoretical senses of normal and abnormal. The remedy is not a ban on the 
word ‘abnormal,’ but a careful investigation of why the label is being used and for what 
purposes. When such investigations are done well we see the social construction (in a 
pejorative sense) of a concept of abnormality or disease. 
 I don’t agree that all claims about normality are problematic in these ways, nor 
that ‘normal function’ is always a social construction in this pejorative sense. I disagree 
that medical science should abandon using the concept. The claim that the pancreas of a 
patient who has type 1 diabetes is malfunctioning and is abnormal compared to the 
normal function of a human pancreas (as explained in an endocrinology text) is not 
problematic. It is not problematic in the ways that claiming certain shapes for human ears 
are normal or abnormal. The normal structure, functioning, and possible malfunctions of 
the pancreas are explained by scientific models built, expanded, refined, and verified over 
many decades. These claims about normal and abnormal function accurately represent 
biological phenomena and are not expressing social preferences or justifying 
discrimination. In fact, the study of diabetes as an abnormality of the pancreas eventually 
lead to accommodations that allow diabetics the ability to regulate their serum glucose 
levels (i.e. achieve a good level of performance) via exogenous insulin (i.e. through a 
socially less desirable mode often involving self administered injections). 
 Amundson’s example of the transplantation of nerves in primates and humans 
(and the fact the body has enough plasticity to retain or grow back some functionality) 
does nothing to show that theoretical normality as a concept is suspect. It is not clear 
what this case is supposed to show. The nerves, after being moved to new target muscles, 
and once they re-grow enough connections with muscle fibers, function as, or 
approximate the normal function of, motor nerves as specified by the model of how 
skeletal muscles are innervated. Models have been created to describe such transplants or 
transposition procedures and contain descriptions of pathology that nerves used in such 
procedures may be susceptible to. There is a theoretical sense of normal outcomes (i.e. 
normal function) for nerves in such contexts. The statement that Mr. Smith’s transposed 
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ulnar nerve is ‘working normally’ would make perfect sense to both the surgeon who said 
it and the patient. And even though the patient might not know the details of what 
constitutes normal functioning in this very special situation, and even though both the 
surgeon and patient might be clearly aware that his overall manual abilities are 
conventionally abnormal, they would understand that normality here was in reference to 
the biomedical theories of how nerves should work after such medical procedures. 
 I have been arguing that by looking at the examples in Amundson’s paper it is 
clear that he did not do a good job of separating the different senses of abnormality from 
each other. He also did not consider issues concerning different levels of analysis and 
most of his examples are from one, particularly problematic, level. Furthermore, I have 
suggested that a lot of confusion can be avoided by looking at the actual scientific models 
generating or associated with a claim of abnormality. The particular details and the 
particular virtues and flaws of the model in question are important issues in deciding just 
what is being claimed and whether bias and discrimination are potentially being 
supported. What one finds is a great diversity of conceptions of normality in biology and 
across science, and that each claim of normality needs to be carefully examined and 
unpacked. By actually recognizing the complexity and variety of scientific models one 
realizes that it is very unrealistic to assume there is a universal notion of normality at 
work in biology. However, this is just what Amundson does. Such an assumption 
partially explains why Amundson focuses so much on variation as a problem for 
biological normality and why he believes that once he has shown that there is significant 
variety in human anatomy that the general concept of normality ought to be abandoned. 
 For Amundson, functional determinism is what is meant by biological normality. 
This may be the concept held by some prominent naturalists about diseases (see Boorse, 
1997). Functional determinism is an attempt to give a statistical definition of normal 
function, referenced to members of species with appropriately similar sex and age 
characteristics.88 I agree that it is an empirical question whether functional determinism is 
                                                 
88 One could consider functional determinism to be a theory in evolutionary biology 
concerning the amount of similarity and variation amongst species members or a theory 
in medical sciences concerning the nature of disease. However, on both accounts it is 
largely a statistical notion of normal based on lack of variation in biological structures or 
in the performance of certain biological functions. It is ultimately an empirical question 
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true for tokens of any biological type. But, as mentioned, I do not believe that there is a 
uniform notion of normality at work across biology. At the fine grain level, there are 
many subtle variations in the sense of normal used by biological models. At the course 
level, there are at least three broad and distinct alternate senses of normality. Regarding 
theoretical normality, each biological model is able to generate a sense of normal 
according to how it explains variation and how it determines what is abnormal. 
Determining theoretical normality is more difficult when scientific models are created in 
an attempt to take a conventional norm or preference and create a theory or model to 
explain how the natural world actually produces or endorses the conventional sense of 
normality and abnormality in question. Whenever it appears as if some conventional 
norm or preference is being used as the basis for normality in a scientific model, that 
model should undergo very careful scrutiny.  
 Amundson attacks the view that diversity is abnormal, as well as the converse, 
that lack of variation is normal (i.e. functional determinism). He argues that there is no 
theoretical sense of normal, that empirically a statistical sense of normality is false, and 
all claims of normality are therefore conventional and have no place in science. 
Amundson’s main argument may be restated as a denial of any legitimate sense of 
theoretical normality—any scientific claim about normality is either a statistical claim 
about variation or is merely an attempt to make certain individual preferences and social 
practices seem as if they are unbiased and the natural order of things. As stated above, I 
disagree. Science can handle variation—it is good at telling us how much variation there 
is in some phenomena, and whether this is pathology or just a set of variants of normal. 
The real issue regarding controversial claims in biology is whether the models backing 
such claims of abnormality need rejection, revision, or are relatively sound. It is much 
harder, however, to evaluate individual cases than it is to reject the entire concept. 
Careful evaluation takes time. While the model is being verified and tested we are left in 
a difficult position. The best we can do in such a position is to investigate how the label 
                                                 
whether functional determinism is true for a given species. For such species each would 
be a ‘textbook example.’ But science clearly has a much less regimented, and less 
precise, definition of normal function, and this sense is created by and specified by the 
particular model defining normal function for the system in question. It is relative and 
specific to the model that creates it. 
 111 
of abnormality is being used. Such investigation is the proper role of those who wish to 
point out examples of localized social construction. 
 
 
3.9 OVERLAPPING SENSES OF NORMALITY AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION  
OF DISEASE 
 Many claims about the ‘social construction’ of diseases can best be understood in 
light of the different coarse senses of normality. A strong, global charge of social 
construction in medicine can be understood as the claim that the theoretical sense of 
normal is ultimately no different than the conventional sense. Proponents of such views 
believe that there is no theoretical sense of normality worth talking about. Biological 
models that designate normal states of affair are perpetuating and justifying social 
conventions and political preferences and as such ought to be evaluated in the same 
manner as more clearly recognized value judgments and norms (i.e. politically). On this 
view there is no issue about fit to the phenomena and representational accuracy. 
 A weaker, local version of the charge of social construction in medicine would be 
that some cases of what medical authorities try to pass off as theoretical abnormality (i.e. 
diseases) involves conventional or statistical senses of abnormality. And this weaker 
charge is clearly true both historically and currently. Some claims of disease involve 
naïve misunderstandings of the different senses of normality and some are attempts to 
codify and legitimize discriminatory or other power relations in society. An important 
issue for any claim about disease is whether the models that give rise to purportedly 
theoretical senses of normality are accurate representations—do they have good fit with 
what is being represented. Because this sometimes requires careful study and 
investigation of the available research or even the undertaking of new experimentation or 
data production, it is often convenient to get a sense of how respected and virtuous the 
model seems to be in the eyes of authorities on the subject. This can be a useful shortcut 
to determining if the model is reliable and worth taking at face value, but it can also lead 
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to the situation that critics warn against—namely merely accepting the judgment of those 
in positions of authority.89 
Ian Hacking has written on the issue of the social construction of disease, 
especially mental disease (Hacking, 1999, 1998; 1995).90 Hacking has tried to frame the 
issue fairly and has made some useful distinctions. He stresses that the point of social 
constructionist talk is usually to raise consciousness—not merely to describe how things 
are, but to change perspectives, and possibly to see that what is thought to be inevitable 
or unchangeable, is in fact more contingent and open to modification than we expect. 
Hacking recognizes that a very potent motivator for constructivist claims is the desire to 
deflate the authority and power of science. “There is a strong element of unmasking in 
the work of many constructionists. Their target is not the truth of propositions received in 
the sciences, but the exalted image of what science is up to, of the authority claimed by 
scientists for the work that they do… Constructionists want to unmask metaphysics as a 
bolster for the authority of science. They also want to show that the present state of 
science was not the only inevitable upshot of dedicated inquiry into the material world 
that surrounds us. We achieve a robust fit between theories and apparatus, but the fit that 
we achieve is not the only one we might have arrived at (Hacking, 1999, p. 95).”  
For most constructionists disease models are internally coherent, but they 
represent our own judgments, cultural values and other contingent factors more than 
representing the fabric of reality. To claim that a disease is a social construction (such as 
AIDS) or that the very concept of disease is a social construction is to claim that rather 
than inevitable discoveries about the natural order of things, details about diseases and 
the concept itself are determined by social factors—factors that would have been very 
different if our contingent social environment had been different. 
                                                 
89 It is always possible that, on the one hand, the incentives and reasons to search for a 
model are politically motivated and worthy of criticism, while, on the other hand, the 
actual product has some degree of fit to the phenomena being modeled. The qualities of 
bias and good fit for a scientific model are not necessarily fully exclusive. 
90 Hacking says: “…By constructionism (or social constructionism if we need, on 
occasion, to emphasize the social) I shall mean various sociological, historical and 
philosophical projects that aim at displaying or analyzing actual, historically situated, 
social interactions or causal routes that led to, or were involved in, the coming into being 
or establishment of some present entity or fact (Hacking, 1999, p. 48).” 
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 Hacking offers a crude sketch of what is generally meant by claims that ‘X is 
socially constructed’: 
 
(0) In the present state of affairs, X is taken for granted; X appears to be inevitable 
(1) X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is 
not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable. 
(2) X is quite bad as it is. 
(3) We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at least radically 
transformed (Hacking, 1999, p. 6). 
 
(0) is a precondition. Inevitability is the main “sticking point’ between constructivists and 
their opponents. Certain scientific classification schemes are assumed to be inevitable, or 
at least might converge on an inevitable form eventually, given that the natural world has 
some inherent structure to it. The inevitability of the categorization system for diseases 
implies that we would slowly, but inevitably, build up a description of normal human 
biological function, along with many corresponding malfunctions, very much along the 
lines of the ones we have, because our models are representationally accurate and have 
been guided by interaction with the phenomena being modeled. The inevitability that we 
would discover, with sufficient inquiry, that type 1 diabetes is a human pathology, is an 
example. Constructionists think that if the sociocultural landscape had been different, our 
model of diabetes may have been importantly different. The constructionist thinks that 
the details of the model, even its very existence, are significantly based on very 
contingent aspects of the sociocultural milieu in which it has developed. Hacking points 
out that even though (2) and (3) are often part of the claim about some X, they need not 
be.91 “One may realize that something, which seems inevitable in the present state of 
                                                 
91 A gradation for constructionist commitment can be arranged based on how strongly 
one endorses (2) and (3). The least demanding grade of constructionist, basically just 
committing to (1), is called historical. Things just could have turned out different had 
history taken different turns. The ironist, for Hacking, is committed to (1) but finds it 
ironic that despite clearly realizing that X is not inevitable, people still find it convenient 
to believe or act as if X were inevitable. Hacking has Richard Rorty in mind as an 
example of an ironist. Nietzsche might be another example. The unmasker is much like 
the ironist, but hopes as more people see the lack of inevitability regarding X that it will 
lose some of its hold on people. The unmasker is often committed to (2). The reformist is 
always committed to (2) and is even more optimistic that changes can be made regarding 
X. The constructionist that holds all 3 theses about X is rebellious, while someone who 
not only believes these theses, but tries to achieve change, is revolutionary. 
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things, was not inevitable, and yet is not thereby a bad thing. But most people who use 
the social construction idea enthusiastically want to criticize, change, or destroy some X 
that they dislike in the established order of things (Hacking, 1999, p. 7).” 
 On my view, the contingency that constructionists see in disease claims emerges 
from believing that the sense of abnormality in question is a conventional sense. 
Conventional senses of normality are influenced by the social milieu which gives rise to 
and sustains their existence. The contingency at issues makes sense once one realizes that 
it is conventional senses of abnormality that the advocate has in mind when they are 
attempting to unmask the social construction of a putative disease.  
 Another fruitful distinction Hacking makes concerns what sort of thing is being 
labeled as socially constructed. Hacking distinguishes ideas from objects, and both from 
what he calls ‘elevator words.’92 Trees, rocks, children, genes, quarks, bacteria, etc. are 
all objects (if they actually exist). The Second Law of Thermodynamics, the harm 
principle, the first amendment, etc, are ideas. Groupings, classification schemes and kind 
concepts such as ‘disease’ are ideas, while the actual material entities or events being 
categorized are ‘objects.’ Ideas are not free floating, but part of a community and culture. 
 
Ideas do not exist in a vacuum. They inhabit a social setting. Let us call that the 
matrix within which an idea, a concept or kind, is formed. The matrix in which 
the idea of the woman refugee is formed is a complex of institutions, advocates, 
newspaper articles, lawyers, court decisions, immigration proceedings. Not to 
mention the material infrastructure, barriers, passports, uniforms, counters at 
airports, detention centers, courthouses, holiday camps for refugee 
children….This discussion of ideas and classification takes for granted the 
obvious, namely that they work only in a matrix. But I do want to emphasize what 
in shorthand I call the idea of the woman refugee, that classification, that kind of 
person. When we read of the social construction of X, it is very commonly the 
idea of X (in its matrix) that is meant (Hacking, 1999, p. 10).  
 
                                                 
92 Those concepts arising from semantic ascent, such as truths, facts, reality, knowledge, 
etc. are elevator words. These are harder to define, but here Hacking has in mind claims 
about the social construction of the very ideas of knowledge, facts, reality, etc. His point 
is that it is quite a different thing to say that the notion of being a fact is socially 
constructed, than to say that an object or even an idea is socially constructed. Such 
‘elevator’ words are almost always evaluative. 
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Ideas are influenced by and in turn influence the matrix they exist within, and the 
scientific models specifying a disease claims are no exception. It is this dynamic matrix 
itself that is often what is being claimed to be socially constructed and whose current 
dynamic form, it is claimed, was not inevitable. 
Hacking admits this three-fold distinction is coarse and involves much slippage 
and blending between the disjuncts. However, it is still very helpful to get clear on what 
is actually being labeled as a social construct. Hacking demonstrates such utility very 
nicely with his discussion of child abuse. The phenomena or events (i.e. the material acts) 
that we might call child abuse are very ‘real,’ and cause pain and suffering. The claim 
that these individual acts are social constructs is hard to understand and false. But the 
idea and definition of what counts as child abuse (i.e. how we as early 21st century 
Americans perceive it), and its place in larger classificatory schemes of behavioral 
interactions between child and parents, is something that Hacking shows is not inevitable, 
has not always been the way such events and behaviors were classified or perceived, and 
may not be the way that non-Americans perceive such behavior, etc. Similarly, there may 
be very ‘real’ symptoms and disability that a person experiences, but the idea behind 
this—the explanation of what is going wrong biologically—the scientific model 
explaining normal and abnormal function—this may be constructed. And not inevitable. 
Hacking says: “ ‘Social construct’ and ‘real’ do seem terribly at odds with each other. 
Part of the tension between the ‘real’ and the ‘constructed’ results from interaction 
between the two, between, say, child abuse, which is real enough, and the idea of child 
abuse, which is ‘constructed’ (Hacking, 1999, p. 101).” 
Once any classification system is in place, if the things being classified are 
people, then even more complex and dynamic matrices occur. People often understand 
they are being classified. For example, consider the concepts of ‘woman refugee,’ 
‘homosexual,’ or ‘cancer survivor.’ Such classificatory ideas are called interactive kinds 
by Hacking, as opposed to indifferent kinds (whose classified objects are unable to react).  
 
We have seen that very commonly, when people talk of the social construction of 
X, they have in mind several interacting items [some objects and some ideas], all 
designated by X… [The objects grouped by interactive kinds] can become aware 
that they are classified as such. They can make tacit or even explicit choices, 
adapt or adopt ways of living so as to fit or get away from the very classification 
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that may be applied to them. These very choices, adaptations or adoptions have 
consequences for the very group, for the kind of people that is involved. The 
result may be particularly strong interactions. What was known about people of a 
kind may become false because people of that kind have changed in virtue of 
what they believe about themselves. I have called this phenomenon the looping 
effect of human kinds… Looping effects are everywhere… Think about the 
transformations effected by the notions of fat, overweight, anorexic. If someone 
talks about the social construction of… anorexia, they are likely talking about the 
idea, the individual falling under the idea, the interaction between the idea and the 
people, and the manifold of social practices and institutions that these interactions 
involve: the matrix, in short (Hacking, 1999, p. 34). 
 
I have not defined “interactive kind,” but only pointed. Kinds that are subject to 
intense scientific scrutiny are of special interest. There is a constant drive in the 
social and psychological sciences to emulate the natural sciences, and to produce 
true natural kinds of people. This is evidently true for basic research on 
pathologies such as schizophrenia and autism, but is also, at present, equally true 
for some, but only some, investigators who study homosexuality (the search for 
the homosexual gene) or violent crime (is that an innate or heritable propensity?). 
There is a picture of an object to be searched out, the right kind, the kind that is 
true to nature, a fixed target if only we can get there. But perhaps it is a moving 
target, just because of the looping effect of human kinds? That is, new knowledge 
about “the criminal” or “the homosexual” becomes known to the people 
classified, changes the way that individuals behave, and loops back to force 
change in the classifications and knowledge about them (Hacking, 1999, p. 104). 
 
 
 For Hacking, the more interesting and sensible claims made in the constructionist 
vein have to do with claims that some classifying idea is contingent on the particular 
matrix it is imbedded within. Such categorizing ideas usually cannot be understood or 
evaluated outside this interactive matrix. When the objects being classified are people, or 
even the behavior of people, then especially complex interactions and ‘looping effects’ 
may occur. These complex dynamic interactions of classifying schemes utilizing 
interactive kinds (instead of indifferent kinds) are one feature that makes social and 
psychological science appear more contingent.93 Charges of social construction seem 
                                                 
93 Hacking says: “The ‘woman refugee’ (as a kind of classification) can be called an 
interactive kind because it interacts with things of that kind, namely people, including 
individual women refugees, who can become aware of how they are classified and 
modify there behavior accordingly. Quarks in contrast do not form an interactive kind; 
the idea of a quark does not interact with quarks. Quarks are not aware that they are 
quarks and are not altered simply by being classified as quarks. There are plenty of 
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more appropriate for the scientific models in fields that seek to classify types or kinds of 
people, especially if the boundary in question demarcates normal from abnormal.94 There 
are important differences between attempting to classify the malfunctions and 
abnormalities of organ systems, tissues, enzymes, genes, etc. versus attempting to classify 
grossly observable abnormalities in behaviors, personalities, appearances—to classify at 
the level of the individual person. Amundson, above, ran into this problem because most 
of his examples dealt with people or their behavior being labeled as abnormal. The 
conventional and theoretical senses of normal are often complexly entangled at this level 
of analysis. On the other hand, there are very few conventional theories, norms or 
folklore about the pancreas and its normal function. A scientific model that explained 
certain behaviors or kinds of people as diseased would have to compete and interact with 
other non-scientific notions of normality and abnormality. It may also have to contend 
with certain ‘looping effects.’ 
 Hacking also explores the dynamics of what he calls transient mental illnesses or 
“… an illness that appears at a time, in a place, and later fades away. It may spread from 
place to place and reappear from time to time. It may be selective for social class or 
gender, preferring poor women or rich men. I do not mean that it comes and goes in this 
or that patient, but that this type of madness exists only at certain times and places 
                                                 
questions about this distinction, but it is basic. Some version of it forms a fundamental 
difference between the natural and the social sciences. The classifications of the social 
sciences are interactive (Hacking, 1999, p. 32).” 
94 “In the end, the “real vs. construction” tension turns out to be relatively minor technical 
matter. How to devise a plausible semantics for a problematic class of kind terms? Terms 
for interactive kinds apply to human beings and their behavior. They interact with the 
people classified by them. They are kind-terms that exhibit the looping effect, that is, that 
have to be revised because the people classified in a certain way change in response to 
being classified. On the other hand, some of these interactive kinds may pick out genuine 
causal properties, biological kinds, which, like all indifferent kinds, are unaffected, as 
kinds, by what we know about them. The semantics of Kripke and Putnam can be used to 
give a formal gloss to this phenomenon. Far more decisive than semantics is the 
dynamics of interactive kinds. The vast bulk of constructionist writing has examined the 
dynamics of this or that classification and the human beings that are classified by it. 
Studies of Authorship, Brotherhood, the Child Viewer of Television, and Danger have, in 
their various ways, been connected with just that: the social construction of the idea of X, 
of X, of the experience of being X, and so on, and how these interact with each other 
(Hacking, 1999, p. 123).” 
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(Hacking, 1998, p. 1).” Hysteria is a well studied instance of just such a transient mental 
illness, and Hacking examines the less well-known diagnosis of fugue states, as well as 
dissociative identity disorder. Hacking is interested in issues lurking behind whether such 
illnesses are ‘real’ or not, but he also is interested in how transient mental illness are 
possible—i.e. what allows them to flourish at particular times and places, and then 
eventually disappear. Such transient illnesses only flourish in specific matrices. He uses 
the metaphor of the ecological niche to stress the idea that a specific set of conditions 
allows particular speciation to occur. He could have also compared these transient mental 
illnesses to infectious disease epidemics. 
 
The most important contribution here is the metaphor of an ecological niche 
within which mental illnesses thrive. Such niches require a number of vectors. I 
emphasize four. One, inevitably, is medical. The illness should fit into a larger 
framework of diagnosis, a taxonomy of illness. The most interesting vector is 
cultural polarity: the illness should be situated between two elements of 
contemporary culture, one romantic and virtuous, the other vicious and tending to 
crime. What counts as crime or as virtue is itself a characteristic of the larger 
society, and the virtues are not fixed for all time… Then we need a vector of 
observability, that the disorder should be visible as disorder, as suffering, as 
something to escape. Finally, something more familiar: the illness, despite the 
pain it produces, should also provide some release that is not available elsewhere 
in the culture in which it thrives. (Hacking, 1998, p. 2)  
 
The transient mental illness has to be something that, from the current schemes and 
horizon of possibilities, looks like other recognized diseases. It would have to be what I 
call a putative disease. Cultural polarity means that the illness has to play off current 
concerns about human behavior. It has to negotiate a space between conventional senses 
of normal and abnormal, and between choice and fate. The observability requirement 
ensures that the condition is one that will stand out to authorities in a position to 
encourage medical interpretation and intervention. For example, the diagnosis of fugue-
states was very observable in Fin-de-siècle France, where army-desertion, immigration 
scares, and mandatory identity papers for all travelers made a mental illness marked by 
observable travel stand out. In America during the same period the expanding frontier 
and the possibility of travel without interference or suspicion made such a ‘disorder’ less 
visible. Lastly a transient mental illness should provide a release for some desire—
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usually a desire not easily attainable by the group particularly at risk for the transient 
mental illness in question. For fugue states this was the desire to take a ‘vacation’ from 
day to day life. 
 On my view, a major component in explaining transient mental illness is to 
recognize that initial models of pathology may contain much borrowed from 
conventional notions of what is normal and abnormal for humans and their behavior. 
However, as the sense of theoretical abnormality (and contrasting normality) is developed 
and refined, the contribution of conventional senses of abnormality may diminish. 
Furthermore, as the model is passed from generation to generation, and is developed and 
refined, the conventional senses that originally aided in the birth of the model may be 
abandoned by society. This is true of the case of fugue state. The ecological niche that 
allowed the diagnosis to be created ceased to be, but the scientific model of a behavioral 
and cognitive abnormality has survived, even if it is now diagnosed with less frequency. 
It is not surprising that such ‘transient’ disorders arise in psychiatry or those fields 
dealing with gross appearance or behavior and the associated conventional judgments of 
abnormality. 
 Hacking specifies three areas of real disagreement between constructionists and 
their pro-science critics. He calls these ‘sticking points,’ and in particular they arise in 
discussions of the extent to which the indifferent kinds specified in scientific models in 
the natural sciences are socially constructed.  
A social construction thesis for the natural sciences would hold that, in a 
thoroughly nontrivial sense, a successful science did not have to develop in the 
way that it did, but could have had different successes evolving in other ways that 
do not converge on the route that was in fact taken. Neither a prior set of bench 
marks nor the world itself determines what will be the next set of bench marks in 
high-energy physics or any other field of inquiry. …If contingency is the first 
sticking point, the second one is more metaphysical. Constructionists tend to 
maintain that classifications are not determined by how the world is, but are 
convenient ways in which to represent it. They maintain that the world does not 
come quietly wrapped up in facts. Facts are the consequences of ways in which 
we represent the world. The constructionist vision here is splendidly old-
fashioned. It is a species of nominalism. It is countered by a strong sense that the 
world has an inherent structure that we discover. The third sticking point is the 
question of stability. Contrary to the themes of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, 
namely refutation and revolution, a great deal of modern science is stable. 
Maxwell’s Equations, the Second Law of Thermodynamics, the velocity of light, 
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the lowly substances such as dolomite are here to stay. Scientists think that the 
stability is the consequence of compelling evidence. Constructionists think that 
stability results from factors external to the overt content of the science. This 
makes for the third sticking point, internal versus external explanations for 
stability (Hacking, 1999, p. 33, emphasis added).  
 
For the biological model of the thyroid to be a social construction its central features 
would be significantly influenced by cultural and social factors and could easily have had 
different content than they do, because the social and cultural landscape—the matrix of 
ideas in which they came to life—could have been different. One could also believe that 
the trajectory of what questions are asked—what sort of research gets done, what gets 
rewarded, what overlooked or ridiculed—is contingent. Such contingency of form or 
trajectory is a real issue, as outlined in chapter 2. However, it is possible, I believe, to 
assess representational accuracy and fit. Radical contingency, however, holds that there 
are no external constraints that inevitably lead some models, like that of the thyroid, to 
converge on increasingly more accurate representations. With enough time and with the 
accumulation of enough robust fit (and probably also some overlap in the interests and 
concerns that drive research and experiment) there would be (and has been) convergence 
in the content of specific scientific research programs. This is the sense in which the 
constructionist denies inevitability. Such radical contingency is especially understandable 
if one’s position on the second sticking point is that there is no inherent structure in 
natural phenomena to be discovered (or that any such structure is beyond our ability to 
describe). 
 The third sticking point concerns the stability of certain scientific models and 
categorizations. Some models require only occasional refinement. They have resisted 
refutation. Certain disciplines appear to have a collection of such stable models built up 
over several generations and spanning distinct historical periods and cultures. Anatomy 
and physiology are examples. We could, as I did in chapter 2, call the collections of such 
stable models the ‘core’ of an established disciplines—the sort of basic and fundamental 
findings that might organize a comprehensive textbook for the field in question. These 
core findings are stable because of a preponderance of evidence and from the mutual 
support of many researchers, and from their interrelations with other core models and 
findings both within and without their home discipline. These explanations of stability 
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are internal to the content of the natural sciences and the support and stability ultimately 
come from experimental data and the scientific method—from the process selecting those 
models with the best fit. Constructionists, on the other hand, do not think this stability 
comes from such sources internal to the methodology of the natural sciences. “The 
constructionist holds that explanations for the stability of scientific belief involve, at least 
in part, elements that are external to the professed content of the science. These elements 
typically include social factors, interests, networks, or however they be described 
(Hacking, 1999, p. 92).” 
 The idea of our scientific theories arriving at much different content even after 
sustained periods of investigation and revision is unlikely. In biology and psychology, 
debates about contingency and stability are better understood when one keeps in mind the 
difference between conventional and theoretical/descriptive sense of abnormality and 
normality. Scientific models are the constructions of human investigators, but to admit 
this does not commit one to their being necessarily contingent, nor even to their being 
determined more by the social and cultural landscape than by the salient detectable 
features of the phenomena being modeled. For any individual model this is an empirical 
question, and the ‘fit’ that the model has with the phenomena, as well as the possibility of 
bias or error, must be assessed. If the model is from a very reputable field that has an 
established methodology, a track record of accurate and useful models, and if the model 
under assessment has existed essentially in its current form for several generations, 
surviving criticism and challenge, and refining itself as new data and other related models 
have been developed, then, in that case, one might feel comfortable trusting an 
assessment that the model was a good representation and constituted legitimate empirical 
knowledge. The current models we have about the function and form of the pancreas and 
the thyroid glands, and diseases that result from their dysfunction, are examples, and it is 
very difficult to see how the content of these models could have been different had the 
social context or values of the community been different. However, there are other 
disease claims, backed by less well-established scientific models, for which the 
possibility of contingency is more concerning. For diseases such as ADHD or gulf war 
syndrome the explanations of the biological abnormality (as well as models of the normal 
function of the biological system effected) are not yet available. Here there is a grey area. 
 122 
Should one trust that these are legitimate disease claims and that the models will not be 
revised or rejected? In such situations social construction in the pejorative sense can 
occur. What seems inevitable may turn out to be much more contingent once more 
information is available or even as we become less interested in some questions relative 
to others. During such periods of exploration and development the matrix within which 
models are constructed may lead to contingent content. 
I believe that the natural sciences often produce models and categorize types of 
things in a way that avoids any problematic sense of being a contingent social 
construction. In the natural sciences, even those dismissive of social construction talk will 
grant that there is a history and a process behind the development of scientific models 
and theories. Such a process is social and is influenced by cultural and historical 
factors—factors external to the presumed content of the theory in question. The defenders 
of the accuracy and stability of some scientific models should clearly distinguish between 
the process of discovery and the time-tested products of ongoing inquiry. 
 In summary, I believe that claims of social construction regarding diseases can be 
understood in terms of the differing senses of normality. The main argument of my thesis 
is that to be a disease is to be a theoretical abnormality in the function or form of a 
biological system. Legitimate disease claims occur when the theoretical sense of 
abnormality is specified by a reliable, objective and uncontroversial scientific model. The 
best understanding of the claim that a disease is merely a social construction is that the 
sense of abnormality being conveyed is to a significant extent a conventional sense of 
abnormality. This explains the origin of the contingency or transience of such a socially 
constructed abnormality. Conventional senses of abnormality are relative to personal and 
social norms or value judgments. As mentioned, the most interesting cases are often those 
disease claims that contain mixtures of conventional and theoretical senses of biological 
or psychological abnormality. Such mixtures tend to occur frequently as one moves 
towards levels of analysis that take account of gross anatomical form and function, 
human behavior and cognition, and even overall assessments of individuals. 
 The looping effects that Hacking discuses are interesting to consider in light of 
the possible mixtures of theoretical and conventional senses of abnormality. Take the 
example of schizophrenia. The theoretical concept of abnormality at the heart of the 
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claim that it is a disease concerns details about various dopaminergic neural circuits in 
the brain and about the neurotransmitters, receptors, and enzymes that control the levels 
and activity of these circuits (and ultimately genes and environmental factors that 
collaborate to create the potential for abnormality). However, the actual behavior that 
serves as the symptoms of the disease, and the overall perception and experience of the 
individuals who suffer from this abnormality in brain chemistry are subject to 
conventional judgments of being abnormal. And these judgments of abnormality are 
influenced in complex ways by the social matrix in which they exist. One need only think 
of the different ways in which suffers of this disease (i.e. those exhibiting the typical 
behaviors) have been judged in different social or historical contexts. In certain historical 
contexts these individuals might have been taken to be divinely blessed oracles or 
vehicles by which the gods communicated with the community. They may be considered 
great artists of unique creativity. They might be considered possessed by demons, 
impure, criminals, etc. These people may also be perceived as suffering from a disease 
beyond their control and deserving of special care and accommodation. The view that a 
community holds about these individuals might be internalized, rebelled against, or 
embraced by the individuals so labeled or judged. The individuals in question can 
understand what the community finds unusual or abnormal about them and this may 
possibly change their behavior in light of this realization. However, across all 
circumstances and regardless of what any particular community might hold, regardless of 
anything the individual may decide, if and when there is a reliable and accurate 
theoretical model of neural malfunction, the biological details being specified will not be 
open to change or alteration due to the interplay of perceptions between suffer and 
community. No matter how the community perceives the behavior and symptoms of 
those with type 1 diabetes or congenital hypothyroidism (i.e. cretinism), the details of 
what is abnormal about the function of the pancreas or thyroid is the same across 
communities and individuals affected. 
 Consider the example of disability, as discussed in many of Amundson’s 
examples. The reaction of the individual and the interplay of how the individual and 
community deal with the behavior in question are contingent and malleable—the person 
being judged abnormal may change their behavior in light of this judgment and the 
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community can change its interpretation and treatment of individuals who exhibit the 
behavior or the gross anatomy in question. Regardless of how the community chooses to 
treat or judge the disabled, the reasons for some of their condition, if specified by a 
reliable model are not contingencies. Where the appropriate scientific models exist, these 
are pathologies and the results of abnormal human biological form and function. The 
biology is not contingent even if the way we choose to deal with it and perceive it, as 
individuals or a community, is open to many possible perceptions. The looping effect is 
at work with conventional sense of abnormality, but not theoretical senses. To fully 
address discrimination, disability, or human suffering we must understand what the 
causes are, what can be changed, and how best we can effect changes. To adjust an 
impractically, inaccurate or unjust label of abnormality, we need to understand what 
sustains the claim and what forces, if altered, would reveal the problem and lead to a 
solution. 
 It is important to keep track of what sort of thing is being called a social 
construction. Ideas are human constructions, and thus scientific models are 
constructions—usually constructions contributed to by groups of researchers. Successful 
models are the result of a very social practice of sharing, challenging and revising the 
details. But what makes these models representations and not merely satisfying stories is 
the possibility of interacting with the actual phenomena—experiments can be reproduced 
and models challenged with new experiments, new apparatus, new results from research 
into related phenomena, etc. The actual phenomenon is not contingent or relative to the 
communities values, even if our initial models of that phenomenon, at any one moment in 
time, may be open to bias or influenced by contingent factors. 
 The global charge that all disease claims are social constructions is unconvincing. 
I see no interesting or meaningful sense in which the models of normal and abnormal 
function for the thyroid gland, the pancreas, or the heart are reflections of personal or 
group values or norms, nor are they intended to maintain certain social arrangements or 
discriminate. The process of discovery and the history of how and why certain models 
were proposed may be contingent, and originally models may contain bias and value 
judgments. However, as models are criticized, refined and increasingly improved to have 
better and better fit with the phenomena they describe, the factors lending to contingency 
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have less influence and the objectivity and representational accuracy of these models 
improves (at least in the successful cases). The stability and longevity of certain models 
in their basic form is evidence of their good fit with the phenomena they model. 
Regarding the view of extreme nominalists about scientific representation, I would 
answer along lines similar to those of Giere as described in the last chapter. Realism is a 
methodological assumption that has worked out very well so far, and for which there 
currently is no reason to doubt this assumption. Whereas Giere had physical sciences in 
mind, I am focused more on the biological and psychological sciences. In the next 
chapter I will give my explication of disease and discuss some interesting and 
challenging cases. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISEASE 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF DISEASE   
 Consider an emergency room doctor talking to a 52 year-old woman. He’s taken 
the history of her complaints, discovered her reasons for coming to the hospital in the 
middle of the night, noted her past history and what medications she is taking, and he’s 
examined her. Some blood work has been done along with some bedside monitoring of 
the electrical activity of her heart. The physician tells the patient that the shortness of 
breath, feeling of pressure on her chest, and sweating that awoke her from sleep a few 
hours ago, were due to a heart attack. Specifically she has had a myocardial infarction, 
most likely secondary to a suddenly occluded coronary artery. Sufficient blood is not 
getting to the muscle that makes up the walls of the heart, and there is evidence from the 
blood work and electrocardiogram (EKG) that some of that muscle may have died. The 
evidence is strong enough to risk the recommended interventions. The patient is given 
certain medications to prevent progression of the physiological processes involved in 
occlusion and to reduce the hearts demand for blood. The evidence justifies risking a 
procedure to find and unclog the occlusion. A catheter shall be inserted into her femoral 
artery and passed up to her heart and into her coronary arteries. The procedure will search 
for the suspected occlusion and, if found, reopen the arteries, possibly placing a metal 
stent to help keep the occlusion from reoccurring.  
 From the physician’s perspective, the patient’s claim that she is suffering from a 
disease is uncontroversial. The physician listens to her complaint, examines her and 
collects some initial data via blood work and an EKG. He knows that many different 
things can cause chest pain, waking at night short of breath, and sweating. He knows that 
discovering the cause of the problems is crucial for providing the correct intervention. 
He’s kept the possible causes in mind, ordering them regarding likelihood as more 
evidence is collected. Based on that evidence, he believes clogged coronary arteries are 
the most likely explanation. This is an acute coronary syndrome, and based on the EKG, 
an ST elevation myocardial infarction (STEMI or MI). The percutaneous coronary 
intervention (PCI) planned will definitively prove the diagnosis if there are occluded 
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arteries, and it allows several kinds of intervention during the same procedure. The 
emergency room doctor will have to make the case that a certain disease process is 
causing the symptoms to the cardiologist on call (who will perform such a procedure). 
The physician responsible for the primary care of the patient will eventually also want to 
know about the details of the diagnosis, because certain long term medications, lifestyle 
changes, etc. will be warranted to slow any further disease progression and lower the risk 
of a second heart attack. 
 The insurance company that is asked to pay for the emergency room visit, the 
PCI, and the hospital stay will be interested in whether this is a legitimate disease claim. 
Was the specific disease diagnosed the right one, and did it justify the procedures and 
care that ensued? If it had been merely a strained chest wall muscle causing chest pain 
and difficulty breathing, less costly intervention would have been justified. Furthermore, 
had the diagnosis been wrong and the patient’s symptoms had been caused by a 
dissection of the ascending aorta or a massive ‘saddle’ pulmonary embolism, death could 
have occurred while the wrong diagnosis and interventions were pursued. In those cases 
hospital administrators and lawyers would have been interested in the claims about what 
particular disease was at work and why it was or was not diagnosed correctly. 
 The patient perceives the situation a certain way based on the specific diagnosis 
and her previous understanding of such situations. The diagnosis will justify certain 
entities to pay for the intervention. The patient will be allowed to miss work without 
being disciplined for her failure to show up. For the next few months her entire life will 
be re-evaluated from the perspective of being a person who has suffered a heart attack, 
and whose life is threatened by the physiological processes that caused the current 
episode and potentially future ones.  
 The patient’s current condition is the result of one or more diseases. One of the 
central questions in the philosophy of medicine is specifying the nature of the concept  
‘disease.’ The patient in the scenario above is suffering a heart attack. A myocardial 
infarction (MI) is a pathology and the clogged arteries causing it were produced by 
microscopic changes occurring in the structure and function of cells making up the 
arterial walls and occurred over many decades. Contributing to these physiological 
processes (let’s assume) were the further diseases of atherosclerosis, hypertension, and 
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diabetes. These were risk factors for the MI. But not all claims of disease are so 
uncontroversial. Is chronic fatigue syndrome a disease? What about alcoholism? The 
child who’s arm is broken by child abuse is experiencing pathology, but is the parent who 
did it also suffering from a disease? Drowning may be an accident, but is it a disease? Is 
the child who cannot sit still in class just ‘being a typical child’ or is he suffering from the 
disease of ADHD, such that without the proper medical interventions, his entire academic 
future may be in jeopardy? If there were a dispute about some claim of disease, how 
would it be settled? How would a physician, lawyer, or policy maker decide if a disease 
is causing the problem in question? How does one decide between legitimate and 
illegitimate disease claims? 
 Depending on what sort of scholarly project one was engaged in or what sort of 
perspective one took, disease might be conceived of differently. The term might be seen 
as justifying or helping to coordinate certain practices and social roles in the community 
(Parsons, 1971). A sociological project might conceive of disease as classifying certain 
kinds of people and behaviors. A pragmatic perspective could be taken, seeing disease as 
whatever doctors diagnose and treat. A more theoretical perspective might also be taken, 
seeking an answer to the question of whether disease is a natural kind or not (see Reznek, 
1995 and D’Amico, 1995). Perhaps it distinguishes importantly different aspects of 
biological phenomena. Concerns about the scope of the term disease might be addressed. 
What relationship does ‘disease’ have to other terms, like ‘illness,’ ‘pathology,’ ‘injury,’ 
‘affliction,’ ‘wound,’ ‘malady,’ ‘malformation,’ ‘defect,’ ‘syndrome,’ or ‘disorder.’ One 
might see these as a family of related terms. Some terms might be narrower (like wound) 
and some broader (like pathology). Some focused on acute issues (i.e. wound) and some 
chronic (i.e. malformation). Some examples might have ‘internal’ loci of causation (i.e. 
like genetic defects) unlike those that imply attacks from without (like infection or 
injuries) and might be the fault of another person or a dangerous environment. Some of 
these terms might highlight systemic malfunctions and imbalances (i.e. disorder) while 
others highlight more localized problems (i.e. injury). Some of the terms may refer to 
static states or structures (i.e. deformity or handicap) while others are dynamic processes 
(i.e. illness or disease). Some terms might emphasize causes (infections) while others 
emphasized consequences (wound). Our intuitions, based on linguistic usage, might be 
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that the term ‘disease’ overlaps with some of these and less with others.95 We might 
claim that getting hit by lightning causes a wound, and is a trauma and injury, but not an 
illness or a disease. Drowning may be a trauma and cause injury, but it does not cause a 
wound, and is not an illness or a disease. Being born with six fingers or as a conjoined 
twin may be a malformation and defect, but not a disease nor trauma. Hypertension may 
be an illness, affliction, and even a defect, but not an injury or syndrome. Amyloidosis 
may naturally be called a disease and a syndrome, but not an injury, like a broken leg. 
Being poisoned may be a misfortune and malady that causes pathology, and seeking 
medical help may be appropriate, but is it also appropriate to call it a disease? And what 
about malnutrition or vitamin deficiencies? Perhaps the only commonality between these 
examples is that they are all inconsistent with being completely healthy. 
 Different examples of diseases may motivate different conceptions. Examples and 
explanations from different historical periods may also motivate very different ideas 
about disease. The original explanatory model for Down’s syndrome is much different 
than the model medical science now offers. In the past, extreme depression and sloth (i.e. 
psychomotor retardation) had theoretical models very different than those currently 
offered by science. In the future our current models may look very incomplete and naïve. 
Different examples from different branches of medicine or biology may motivate 
different conceptions of what we mean when we say someone has a disease. The 
disorders of psychiatry may seem different in kind than those of endocrinology, 
infectious disease, or trauma surgery. Kinesiology and functional anatomy may have very 
different examples of malfunction than other fields. Diseases caused by single gene 
defects may seem very different in character than disorders with complex multifactorial 
causation (including environmental components) such as diabetes, hypertension, and 
atherosclerosis. The diseases affecting only newborns and premature babies might elicit 
intuitions different from those based on diseases of advanced age. Regarding branches of 
biology, medical physiology may give a perspective on what is normal and abnormal 
                                                 
95 A natural language analysis could be offered, although that is not my project or 
interest. My intention is to clarify what physicians mean by the term disease. My 
intention is to clarify the scientific term that is used as part of the practice of medicine 
and biomedical research, that is disease as pathology.  
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different from evolutionary or developmental biology. Disease examples in veterinary 
medicine or plant biology might elicit different conceptions than human medicine. 
 Many theories have been offered in the philosophical literature (see Simon, 2007 
and Schwartz, 2007). Basically, on my reading, most authors can be pushed into one of 
two broad camps, namely the normativist or the naturalist position. As I was illustrating, 
differing perspectives and projects can motivate clarification of what constitutes being a 
disease. Normativists generally are more motivated by activism and ethical concerns. 
They are focused on aspects of the consequences of disease instead of the causes of 
disease (see Engelhardt, 1996; Reznek, 1987; King, 1954; Wakefield, 1992; Nordenfelt, 
1987, 2006). They tend to see disease as more of a welfare or value concept than a 
descriptive or theoretical concept. A strong normativism basically holds that all senses of 
normality and abnormality are conventional, and thus involve value judgments. Realizing 
this allows us to better solve issues concerning the legitimacy of disease claims, because 
fairly applying a normative concept like disease will require some aspect of negotiation 
within a community and consensus building, as well as rational argument. Thinking that 
empirical research can settle claims about whether particular kinds of problems, such as 
those suffered in chronic fatigue syndrome, are legitimately called disease, would be 
mistaken according to the normativists. Research might tell us how we could ameliorate 
the problem with technology, but not whether we should see it as something best treated 
with medical intervention.  
 Naturalists tend to focus more on causes of disease and less on the social and 
personal consequences of being diagnosed (Boorse, 1997). The concept is a theoretical 
and technical term more than an evaluative one. The naturalist position is that disease is a 
descriptive concept. Naturalist tend to be motivated more by epistemological concerns 
than ethical projects or activism. For the naturalist, empirical research is the primary 
means for settling issues concerning the legitimacy of disease claims. Naturalism is the 
modern default position of most physicians. The normativist position, however, is the 
dominant position in the academic literature on disease. It would come as a shock to most 
physicians and patients that what distinguishes legitimate disease claims from non-
legitimate is a complex process of social evaluation. Many academics would reply that 
discovering diseases are essentially social construction, although shocking, is what results 
 131 
form careful reflection. Furthermore this insight is valuable for those having to deal with 
political or ethical issues involving disease claims. 
 What would be the consequences of ignoring questions regarding the nature of 
disease claims? Medicine seems to operate quite well while ignoring any ambiguity or 
indeterminacy in the concept. First, intellectual interest and clarity of thought are worthy 
goals on their own, and certainly enough to motivate a philosophy dissertation. After all, 
disease is a concept central to medicine and much of biological research. But beyond 
intellectual curiosity and rigor, should anyone care about the debate between naturalist 
and normativists? Only in the past few decades has the answer been clearly yes. This is 
due primarily to two factors that are driving demand for definitive answers to practical 
questions of legitimacy concerning specific claims about certain problems being 
diseases.96 One factor is the increasing knowledge and success of biomedical science. 
Humans now understand how many biological systems work and we can increasingly 
exert some control on some of these systems. The second factor is the impact that 
employing more and more biotechnology has on the economy, especially as the 
technology becomes increasingly expensive. There is a finite amount of resources that the 
community can spend on medical intervention. And because some of these resources are 
more scarce than others, issues of allocation arise. Increasing ability to intervene, but at 
increasing cost, produces demand for answers to the question “Is this problem one that 
ought to be treated with medical intervention?” Most people find the answer to that 
question involves asking if the problem is a disease or caused by a disease. The boundary 
between legitimate and illegitimate disease claims, it is hoped, provides an answer to 
where the boundary lies between what conditions should be treated medically and which 
should not. 
 How can the boundary between legitimate claims of disease compared to 
conditions and problems falsely being claimed to be human diseases be discovered? 
Normativists and naturalist offer different answers on how we must draw this line. 
Furthermore, normativists and naturalists see the relationship between legitimate and 
illegitimate disease claims and other boundary issues differently. As mentioned, one of 
                                                 
96 I touched on much of this in chapter 3 when I discussed the phenomena of 
medicalization. 
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these related boundary issues concerns which sorts of human problems should be 
addressed with medical intervention and biotechnology and which not. If a certain 
problem is a disease, treating it is therapy and this could be distinguished from non-
therapeutic uses of biomedical intervention, whether this is preventative intervention, or 
intervention for means of enhancement, self creation, self expression, social 
standardization, etc. The boundary between what interventions and technologies will be 
paid for as a matter of one’s health insurance versus those that should not be covered by 
such pooled risk management mechanisms is closely related to the therapeutic versus 
non-therapeutic divide. As mentioned many people are hopeful that legitimate diseases 
can serve as a proper target for what to address with medical intervention and what ought 
to be covered by insurance. For example, Norman Daniels (Buchanan, et. al. 2000; 
Daniels, 1985) has written on the topic of how much health care we ought to provide 
each other as a matter of equalizing opportunity. There is a level of health and 
functionality to which everyone ought to be maintained or restored. He argues we owe 
each other this as a matter of social justice, and sees some basic level of health care 
provision as following from the theory of distributive justice offered by Rawls. Daniels 
case rests on having a somewhat objective boundary between normal and abnormal 
biological function, and this could potentially be determined by a naturalistic conception 
of disease. The nature of disease might influence issues concerning the similarity of 
psychiatry to the rest of medicine and about the similarity and differences between 
mental illness and physiological diseases. There are interesting questions about the 
relation between the art of medicine and the science of biology which will be influenced 
by how one answers the questions about what counts as disease. Is medicine applied 
biology the way mechanical engineering might be considered applied physics? Is 
medicine fundamentally different due to its uses of pathos and ethos, as well as logos. 
Similarly, the line between what physicians should treat and not treat, or what role 
physicians should play in society, is related to the legitimacy boundary. Being diagnosed 
with a disease is frequently interpreted as being labeled abnormal in some way. This 
creates boundaries between the healthy and ill, and this is particularly important when 
diseases carry with them a social stigma, such as HIV. People will often assume that they 
can be or should be treated differently. Being clear on exactly what kind of abnormality 
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or misfortune is being claimed by having a disease is important (as are the specific 
details). This clarity might prevent or mitigate certain kinds of prejudice and 
discrimination. 
 The naturalist hopes that appeal to a descriptive, scientifically determined 
legitimate boundary will help in determining how to draw boundaries in these other 
controversies. The normativist, on the other hand, generally sees this as putting the cart 
before the horse. The normativist stresses that it is the negotiation and pull of these 
difficult social issues and boundaries that determine where the lines between legitimate 
disease and illegitimate will be drawn. 
 The concept of disease is of interest to me because of the boundary issues, 
especially the issue about whether or not the concept of disease can be used to draw a line 
between using biomedical technology for therapy (treating disease) versus its use for 
extra therapeutic reasons (i.e. enhancement). I am interested in arguments for and against 
using biotechnology for enhancement. I am interested in how one discerns an illegitimate 
disease claim. I am also interested in the relationship between science and medicine, and 
in the nature of scientific knowledge generally. I am interested in the nature of psychiatry 
and its relation to the rest of medicine. I am planning on practicing medicine as a career 
and also hope to contribute to philosophical discussions involving medicine. I want to 
continue clarifying my own concept of disease as I use it in medical practice, maintaining 
a reflective equilibrium between theory and practice.  
 My perspective and project may bias my theory of what constitutes being a 
disease. One of the fundamental divergences between normativism and naturalism is the 
attitude taken towards science. I do have a positive attitude towards science, and believe 
it is capable of producing useful knowledge. I believe that science can and sometimes 
does offer descriptions of the world that are accurate and unbiased. Most of the 
knowledge at the core of most of the fields involved in the biological sciences is as 
objective and factual as human knowledge can be. In this regard, my position could be 
conceived of as naturalist. Alternatively, my acknowledgement of the perspectival nature 
of knowledge and my admission that scientific models are (in a non-pejorative sense) 
social constructions, is more in line with normativist views. Chapter 2 offers a sketch my 
position on science. My project is theoretical and not ethical. Disease is a theoretical and 
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descriptive term, not an evaluative one on my account. I believe that biologists and 
physicians have a coherent and wide concept of disease as pathology. This concept is 
essentially the same across different fields of biology, from plant and animal biology to 
human medicine. Historically, the notion of disease as biological abnormality has been 
among a cluster of notions determining what we designate as disease. Different aspects of 
these core notions may have been emphasized or marginalized across different historical 
and cultural contexts.97 As biological science has advanced, however, the causal notion of 
biological abnormality has displaced other notions at the core, especially those dealing 
with the experience and consequences of disease. Such displaced notions would include 
disability, suffering, pain, death, etc. As biomedical science has progressed, the concept 
of disease has become increasingly a descriptive and naturalistic one. The core of the 
modern concept of disease is biological abnormality—the malfunction or malformation 
of a biological system that could have operated normally otherwise. It would probably be 
appropriate to call what I am clarifying the concept of pathology. I believe that the 
narrower definitions of disease, wound, injury, trauma, infection, poising, etc. all have as 
part of their core meaning a departure from normal biological form or function. Therefore 
I feel it is appropriate to call the majority of those conditions discussed above (broken 
legs, burns, malnutrition, having six fingers, being a conjoined twin, suffering from 
drowning or poisoning, etc.) ‘diseases’ and ‘pathologies.’ They are pathologies just as 
much as having diabetes, cancer or cholera. The woman suffering a heart attack in the 
above example is slotted into an entirely new set of social networks and interactions, and 
has new rights and responsibilities that come with her new status as a sufferer of this 
particular kind of disease. Society often accepts these changes with astonishingly little 
skepticism or need for verification.98 This power to alter one’s place in the social network 
                                                 
97 The theoretical framework in which normal and abnormal function is understood may 
differ, and the technology to examine and manipulate things at levels of analysis lower 
than the grossly observable, are important differences across time and culture. However, 
as a core concept of disease, biological abnormality, is identifiable across cultures and 
historical periods. This is why we can recognize medicine as a profession in other times 
and places, and why we can to some extent evaluate the disease claims of these 
communities. 
98 Part of the reason for this is the trust most people place in physicians. Part of the 
willingness to place such trust in physicians is a belief that diseases are important and 
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makes the term ‘disease’ and its pattern of application a natural target for sociological 
study. Although a valid project, it is not my project here to examine the notions of illness 
as understood by the general community, by patients, by the disabled, etc. I am not 
concerned with the concept as it is used to influence social practices and used to 
categorize people and acts in socially significant ways. 
 In this chapter I will review the naturalist and normativist positions. I do this by 
discussing the concepts of disease offered by Boorse and Engelhardt. I find these the 
most sophisticated and most frequently cited statements of the two opposing positions on 
the nature of disease. I shall highlight where I agree and disagree with their positions. I 
shall then give my own criteria for what makes a disease claim legitimate and distinguish 
this from illegitimate and putative claims. Finally, I review some of the resources my 
position provides in analyzing particular cases, and then discuss and analyze a number of 
interesting and controversial disease claims. 
 
4.2 NATURALISM: BOORSE’S BIOSTATISTICAL THEORY  
 Naturalists tend to have a positive view of science and its products, tend to 
believe disease is a descriptive not evaluative concept, and tend to emphasize the 
importance of causal explanation instead of consequences. The fundamental problem 
facing naturalists is explaining how a non-evaluative and descriptive term can also 
express a sense of abnormality. How can abnormality be merely observed and not be the 
judgment of a human observer—a judgment necessarily made in reference to, and against 
a background of, personal and social values? To deal with this problem naturalists 
frequently appeal to statistics and evolution. Evolution offers the hope of explaining how 
it is that naturally occurring phenomena can appear as-if-designed without actually 
having been designed. As-if-designed biological creatures can then have something 
equivalent to the concept of normal operation and function that we apply to artifacts or 
machines. These authors usually equate (in some way) the natural and the normal. 
Statistics offers the hope of determining such normal function or operation without 
                                                 
‘real,’ and that physicians can distinguish legitimate claims from illegitimate. If people 
felt that the concept of disease was indeterminate or merely a social construction in some 
way, physicians would not retain the authority that they do. 
 136 
appealing directly to value judgments or intentions of a designer. Christopher Boorse’s 
theory of disease is the best argued version of the modern naturalist position.  
 Boorse wrote a series of articles in the 1970s developing his biostatistical theory. 
He argued for ‘objective’ notions of health and disease (Boorse, 1975, 1977, 1987, 1997). 
“It is a traditional axiom of medicine that health is the absence of disease. What is a 
disease? Anything that is inconsistent with health. If the axiom has any content, a better 
answer can be given. The most fundamental problem in the philosophy of medicine is, I 
think, to break the circle with a substantive analysis of either health or disease (Boorse, 
1977, p. 542).” For Boorse health is the ‘normal’ operation of the body and disease is a 
departure from this normal operating state. These are not unusual understandings of 
health and disease, but Boorse thinks that they get primarily descriptive and therefore 
objective conceptual elaboration by the biological sciences, and physiology in particular. 
He says, “I suggest that the distinction between normal and pathological conditions is the 
basic theoretical concept of Western medicine. A bodily state or process is disease, 
disorder, injury, lesion, defect, sickness, or illness only if it is abnormal in the sense of 
pathological; in other words, these are all specific kinds of pathological conditions. 
(Boorse, 1987, p. 365)” 
 Disease is abnormal biological function. Health is normal biological function. 
Normal function is determined by looking at the dynamic operation of naturally occurring 
organisms. The biological sciences have approached and modeled the operation of parts 
of living systems in a manner analogous to analyzing the function of parts of a machine. 
 
Theoretical health now turns out to be strictly analogous to the mechanical 
condition of an artifact. Despite appearances, ‘perfect mechanical condition’ in, 
say, a 1965 Volkswagen is a descriptive notion. Such an artifact is in perfect 
mechanical condition when it conforms in all respects to the designer’s detailed 
specifications. Normative interests play a crucial role, of course, in the initial 
choice of the design. But what the Volkswagen design actually is, is an empirical 
matter by the time production begins. Thence-forward a car may be in perfect 
condition regardless of whether the design is good or bad. If one replaces the 
stock carburetor with a high performance part, one may well produce a better car, 
but one does not produce a Volkswagen in better mechanical condition. Similarly, 
an automatic camera may function perfectly and take wretched pictures; guided 
missiles and instruments of torture in perfect mechanical condition may serve 
execrable ends. Perfect working order is a matter not of worth of the product but 
of conformity of the process to a fixed design. In the case of organisms, of course, 
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the ideal of health must be determined by empirical analysis of the species rather 
than by the intentions of a designer. But otherwise the parallel seems exact. A 
person who by mutation acquires a sixth sense, or an ability to regenerate severed 
limbs, is not thereby healthier than we are. Sixth senses and limb regeneration are 
not part of the human design which at any given time, for better of worse, just is 
what it is (Boorse, 1975, p. 83). 
 
A strength of Boorse’s position is that it recognizes that modern biology has made 
impressive strides in explaining the normal operation of circumscribed biological 
systems. Something like natural design is approximated by evolution. The design is 
discovered by empirical investigation of the biological systems in question. 
 Boorse dismisses other candidates for the core notion of disease. First he 
dismisses the idea that diseases are basically undesirable biological conditions. “It is 
undesirable to be mildly below average in any valuable physical quality, e.g. height, 
strength, endurance, coordination, reflex speed, beauty, etc. It is undesirable to have 
such universal human weaknesses as a need for sleep or for regular access to food and 
water. These conditions are not diseases. Yet one could never distinguish them from 
diseases on grounds of disvalue alone (Boorse, 1977, p. 544).” The idea that disease 
is whatever physicians treat is also dismissed. Physicians intervene to control 
biological functions when no disease is present (e.g. reduction of fertility via 
hormonal birth control, circumcision, or purely cosmetic rhinoplasty). Physicians also 
consider many conditions to be diseases for which they have little or no ability to 
intervene (e.g. Charcot-Marie-Tooth disease).99  
 Pain and suffering, for Boorse, are also not the central concepts involved with 
being a disease. He cites the common occurrence of diagnoses being made before any 
painful or disfiguring sign or symptoms of the problem have developed (e.g. tuberculosis 
detected on routine PPD testing in workplace or school physical or early detection of HIV 
infection). Conversely, many conditions are painful and cause suffering, but are not 
diseases or disease processes. Childbirth is one example. Boorse also dismisses the 
possibility that the central concept of disease involves disability. Again, many diseases 
                                                 
99 Many of the examples in this paragraph and the next are mine and not Boorse’s. 
Charcot-Marie-Tooth disease is a neurodegenerative disease that does not have a therapy 
at the moment. 
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are not disabling (e.g. ringworm infection or minor lacerations), while certain disabling 
conditions (e.g. pregnancy, certain cases of obesity, or normal deteriorations caused by 
aging) are not diseases. Like the other candidate concepts, disability picks out a class of 
conditions and problems different form those picked out by the concept disease. 
 Adaptation, or rather maladaptation, to one’s environment is also not the core 
notion that explains what conditions are legitimate diseases. Certain diseases might be 
very adaptive to certain environments—some genetic mutations might prevent us from 
acquiring HIV, or might help us avoid cholera or malaria. Depending on the environment, 
normal biological function or structure might be poor adaptations. Humans are not well 
designed to live on other planets in our solar system, but finding difficulty in doing so is 
not to acquire a set of diseases.100 Another possible candidate for the core concept of 
disease is homeostasis. Boorse points out that many physiological systems attempt to 
keep certain parameters within tight control, and have mechanisms to return these 
parameters to equilibrium if perturbed. However, many chronic disease processes are 
situations where, at least temporarily, new equilibria are achieved (e.g. congestive heart 
failure or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease). Also many biological functions, like 
movement and reproduction, have little to do with homeostasis.101 Boorse also considers 
simple statistical rarity in form or function as the means to distinguish disease from 
health, but quickly dismisses this for obvious problems. I shall discuss this dismissal 
below when I discuss how Boorse tries to modify and thus retain a statistical account of 
normality as typicality for his theory. The success of his biostatistical account of disease 
relies on making such a modification.  
 For Boorse, the core idea behind the medical concept of health is natural or 
normal biological function and behind disease is abnormal biological function. “…[O]ur 
                                                 
100 This raises an interesting question whether certain conditions such as caisson’s 
disease, acute mountain sickness, or even drowning, are really diseases, as these are 
similar to the situation of attempting to operate in environments not well suited for 
normal biological functioning. The crucial issue on my theory is how the models of 
normal biological function account for normal vs. abnormal environments. Models of 
normal function usually assume ideal external conditions. I discuss these cases in more 
detail below. 
101 Again, the examples here are my own and are meant to clarify and strengthen 
Boorse’s arguments.  
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discussion suggests that a direct attempt to analyze abnormal functioning will better fit 
the medical notion of disease than the [other] ideas… (1977, p. 550).” Evolution by 
natural selection has produced organisms with typical functions. These functions taken in 
sum can be seen as species typical design. This design can be examined and analyzed by 
the same reverse engineering techniques we might use to figure out how a never-before-
seen foreign-made technology worked. With this picture in mind, Boorse tackles the 
central problem for a naturalistic theory of disease: How can normal function be 
determined without direct appeal to the preferences or value judgments of those creating 
or using the biological models? In answering the question Boorse must address two 
issues. He must address the issues concerning how it is that one knows which function 
among the many observable functions of a biological system is the proper, correct or 
normal function. This is the classic question about how we know that the proper function 
of the heart is to pump blood and not to produce certain noises, electrical discharges, or 
peptide hormones. The second issue concerns distinguishing, without appeal to values or 
preferences, normal variations from the significant variations—variations significant 
enough to be pathology. Boorse’s basic answer is that natural design and the natural level 
of efficiency and mode of function is determined by statistical analysis. But to utilize 
statistical analysis to distinguish pathology from non-disease, Boorse needs a statistical 
sense of normal function that both avoids any appeal to values or preferences and avoids 
the problem using simple statistical rarity as biological abnormality. 
 Boorse addresses the first issue with a theory of how proper function is 
determined. He relies on insights from several philosophers of biology concerning the 
fundamental difference between living organisms and non-living matter (even if very 
sophisticated in its chemical behavior). The fundamental difference is the fact that living 
organisms are goal-directed—namely, “they are disposed to adjust their behavior to 
environmental change in ways appropriate to a constant result, the goal. In fact, the 
structure of organisms shows a mean-end hierarchy with goal directedness at every level. 
Individual cells are goal-directed to manufacture certain compounds; by doing so they 
contribute to higher level goals like muscle contraction; these goals contribute to overt 
behavior like web-spinning, nest-building, or prey-catching; overt behaviors contribute to 
such goals as individual and species survival and reproduction (Boorse, 1977, p. 555).” 
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Thus the function of any part or process in the hierarchy is its “ultimate contribution to 
certain goals at the apex of the hierarchy.” The proper function of a sub-system (such as 
the beta-cells of the pancreas) are the contribution(s) it makes to the ultimate goals of the 
entire system. The function of the heart is thus to pump blood and not to produce heart 
sounds, because pumping blood is a contribution to the apical goals of the type of animal 
possessing such a heart, while making sounds is a by-product. The apical goals chosen by 
scientists may vary depending on the branch of biology or the species in question. For 
medicine and physiology, survival and reproduction are the ultimate goals. Boorse points 
out, however, that regardless of the apical goals specified, the matter of what 
contributions actually are being made by a particular subsystem to the specified ultimate 
goals is an empirical matter and not an evaluative one. Boorse also states that however 
the issue of determining standard or proper function is settled, as long as it can be done 
without merely appealing to human evaluation, it has little consequence on how most 
real-word cases might be handled by the biostatistical model of disease. Larry Wright’s 
(1973) analysis of function, Boorse thinks, could easily replace his own, without 
significant changes to the list of pathologies on his account. 
 Boorse realizes that simple statistical abnormality (i.e. rarity as abnormality) 
cannot, alone, serve as a means to distinguish disease from mere variation in form or 
function. He says: 
 
…[T]here is a persistent intuition that the average person—or at least the average 
heart, lung, kidney, thyroid, etc.—must be normal, or we would have no way of 
telling what the normal person or organ should be like. I shall return to this 
intuition when we construct our functional account. Here we note only that 
statistical normality fails as a necessary or sufficient condition of health. It cannot 
be necessary because unusual conditions, e.g. type O blood or red hair, may be 
perfectly healthy. It cannot be sufficient because unhealthy conditions may be 
typical. No doubt the average person or organ is healthy in a particular sense of 
displaying no indications for treatment, but that is not the same as complete 
freedom from disease. Some of what medical tests consider disease processes are 
at work in virtually everyone below the level of clinical detection. There are also 
particular diseases—atherosclerosis, minor lung inflammation, perhaps tooth 
decay—that are nearly universal. In spite of these difficulties, we will give 
statistical normality an important role in our view, which shows that necessary 
and sufficient conditions are not the only possible components of an analysis 
(Boorse, 1977, p. 546).” 
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There are variations of form and function within species. Simple statistical norms would 
make type O+ blood normal and AB- abnormal. Brown irides would be typical while 
green would be rare and pathological. Boorse claims these sorts of polymorphisms can be 
(as they actually are) handled disjunctively as variants of normal. Another difficulty for 
statistical normality, also noted above, is pathologies that typically affect most species 
members, such as atherosclerosis. Simple statistical analysis would make atherosclerosis 
a normal biological process. 
 Boorse, citing inspiration from King (1945), thinks that a notion of statistically 
abstracted species-typical design can be saved: 
 
The question therefore arises how the functional account avoids our earlier 
objections to statistical normality. King did explain how to dissolve one version 
of the paradox by saying that everyone is unhealthy. Clearly all members of a 
species can have some disease or other as long as they do not have the same 
disease. King somewhat grimly compares the job of extracting an empirical ideal 
of health from a set of defective specimens to the job of reconstructing the Norden 
bombsight from assorted aerial debris. But this answer does not touch universal 
diseases such as tooth decay. Although King nowhere considers this objection, the 
natural-design idea nevertheless suggests an answer that I suspect is correct. If 
what makes a condition a disease is its deviation from the natural functional 
organization of the species, then in calling tooth decay a disease we are saying 
that it is simply not in the nature of the species—and we say this because we think 
of it as mainly due to environmental causes. In general, deficiencies in the 
functional efficiency of the body are diseases when they are unnatural, and they 
may be unnatural either by being atypical or by being attributable mainly to the 
action of a hostile environment. If this explanation is accepted, then the functional 
account simultaneously avoids the pitfall of statistical normality and also frees the 
idea of theoretical health from all normative content (Boorse, 1975, p. 83). 
 
Boorse sees that the sample over which one must average may include many defective 
individuals. Part of the problem is the ‘hostile environment’ which potentially effects all 
individuals that live in it. Once a particular sub-system X is isolated and a hypothesis 
function Y highlighted, how are we to determine what is the normal range of functional 
efficiency if all individuals potentially have diseased Xs at the time of observation? 
Similarly, perhaps X behaves differently in different environments, or at different times 
of the year, or even at different stages of the organism’s life. Taking account of the 
environmental effects is not the only factor that needs to be addressed. Variation that is 
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not necessarily pathological may be due to differences in age or sex of the individuals in 
a sample of conspecifics. Selecting the type of sample over which to average will also be 
important for these reasons. The sample should not be too large or completely random. 
Boorse suggests a reference class that shrinks the sample by taking into account age and 
sex.102  
 The perfectly healthy individual or even the perfectly functioning organ or 
biological system is to some extent an abstraction or idealization. Boorse believes 
appreciating the effects of hostile environments and also carefully selecting the 
appropriate sample over which to generalize allows us to continue using a statistical 
notion of abnormal function. We avoid the problem of simply averaging over all 
individuals under all environmental conditions by selecting from a smaller sample in an 
idealized environment. Another modification allows inabilities or malfunctions even if 
the inability or malfunction is never actually manifest. Take the example of hemophiliacs 
that never experience the trauma necessary to demonstrate a dysfunction in clotting. 
Boorse replaces actual functioning with normal functional readiness or ability. These are 
the modifications Boorse makes to address some of the basic problem facing naturalistic 
statistical theories of disease. 
 Having made modifications, Boorse provides the following definitions: 
 
1) The reference class is a natural class of organisms of uniform functional 
design; specifically, an age group of a sex of a species. 
 
2) A normal function of a part or process within members of the reference class is 
a statistically typical contribution by it to their individual survival and 
reproduction. 
 
3) A disease is a type of internal state which is either an impairment of normal 
functional ability, i.e. a reduction of one or more functional abilities below typical 
efficiency, or a limitation on functional ability caused by environmental agents.103 
                                                 
102 The problem of the environment is even more difficult than the aspect addressed here 
by Boorse. How scientific models handle the environment, and particularly how they 
designate normal environments is important for disease claims. Conditions that appear to 
be disease or pathology may be normal (but undesirable) functions of a biological system 
placed within a harsh or unusual environment. 
103 This last clause is one suggested by Boorse to handle common environmental damage 
to functional ability.  
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4) Health is the absence of disease (Boorse, 1997, p. 7).104 
    
These are Boorse’s naturalistic concepts of disease and health. Normal functioning is 
“performance by each internal part of all its statistically typical functions with at least 
statistically typical efficiency, i.e. at efficiency levels within or above some chosen 
central region of the population distribution (Boorse, 1977, p. 558).” Normal function is 
determined statistically over a sufficiently large enough sample to detect typicality but 
not so large or random as to miss it. Functioning below some determined minimum cutoff 
of efficiency is pathological and would constitute a disease of the part or process which is 
poorly contributing to the hierarchy of goals. Boorse says “abnormal functioning occurs 
when some function’s efficiency falls more than a certain distance below the population 
mean (Boorse, 1977, p. 559).” 
 For Boorse, biomedical researchers look at all of the members of some relevant 
group and note both the typical mode of function (based on statistically-typical goal-
contribution) and the typical level or range of functioning (based on statistical analysis) 
of the system in question. Diseases are internal states of the organism. They are usually 
the result of proximal causes internal to the cutaneous boundary of the organism in 
question. However, there may be distal environmental contributions to malfunction or 
even direct proximal causation of malfunction (i.e. trauma) due to environmental factors. 
Careful attention to environmental effects is also therefore necessary. Biological sciences 
do carefully control environmental factors during laboratory experiments used in 
generating evidence for the models being produced.  
 Boorse does a good job distinguishing theoretical concepts concerned with health 
and disease from concepts referring to more practical, clinical concerns. “Contrary to 
some critics, I have never doubted that medical practice is permeated by values, nor that a 
good doctor must have more tools than a scientific knowledge of pathophysiology. I have 
not spoken to issues of clinical sensitivity for lack of anything original to say. But I did 
                                                 
104 Boorse offers this fuller definition of health in an earlier article: “Health in a member 
of the reference class is normal functional ability: the readiness of each internal part to 
perform all its normal functions on typical occasions with at least typical efficiency 
(Boorse, 1977, p. 562).” 
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insist on the value-ladenness of medical practice… [and continue to do so with] …the 
distinction between disease and a richer family of practical concepts… (1997, p. 13).”  
This is an effective distinction for Boorse and deflects many criticisms from the 
normativist camp based on concerns with practical problems beyond the concept of 
disease.105 He reminds the reader that being careful to keep the theoretical concepts of 
disease separate from the more practical concepts used in patient care, such as suffering 
or the stigma of being deformed, can prevent much confusion concerning the more 
evaluative aspects of medical practice. Boorse believes failing to separate the concept of 
pathology from these wider social and personal concerns causes much of the willingness 
for people to assume disease is an evaluative and subjective judgment. 
 When I first read Boorse I found so much to agree with that it took me years to 
discover how I subtly disagree with his theory. I still think it is an insightful account and 
a classic in the philosophy of medicine. We share admiration for the accomplishments of 
modern biological science, and physiology in particular. I agree with Boorse that the 
concept of disease as used currently and developed (over centuries) is not an evaluative 
one but a theoretical and descriptive one. Those practicing medicine or doing biological 
research currently are aiming at distinguishing normal from abnormal function when 
discussing disease or building explanatory models of disease. Usually such explanations 
offer details of unobservable parts and processes posited as the causes of the observable 
suffering or problems of the patient. The core concept is biological dysfunction—
disruption of a physiological process or the malformation of an anatomical structure. I 
also agree with divorcing theoretical issues from the practical issues. Boorse’s discussion 
                                                 
105 Boorse has a very nice figure in his 1997 essay (Fig 2, p. 13) that lays out some of 
these other practical concepts. These are concepts that might be useful in issues of when 
and if disease can be detected by the tests available, whether it can or cannot be treated, 
whether the symptoms and problems brought to the physician are currently understood as 
disease or not, and issues with positive notions of health (i.e. those that go beyond merely 
the absence of disease and require other criteria). Theoretical health can also be 
distinguished from positive health and other practical health concepts. Theoretical (or 
negative) health for Boorse is the lack of any abnormal functioning parts or processes of 
the individual organism in question. Theoretical health is the absence of any disease. 
Boorse also discusses positive health as the idea of functioning above the minimal 
efficiency required to not be pathological. Likewise Boorse discusses diagnostic health, 
which is lack of any detectable or diagnosable subnormal efficiencies of functionality, 
and therapeutic health, which is lack of any treatable pathology. 
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of the interlocking hierarchy of functions produced by the piecemeal work of 
constructing biological models for circumscribed systems at different but related levels of 
analysis is insightful. I agree that it does not particularly matter for the concept of disease 
how functions are analyzed, and different model builders might have different ideas 
about the concept of function or even about what warrants that type of analysis of natural 
objects. But, like Boorse, I believe evolution explains why functional analysis is so 
fruitful. 
 Where I disagree most fundamentally with Boorse is his reliance on the statistical 
sense of normality. I understand the appeal. It appears as if statistical determination of 
normality and abnormality can produce this distinction in a way that is free of any value 
judgment. The fundamental problem is how to distinguish insignificant variation from 
significant variation purely by calculation and without a human agenda, preference or 
value. How is it determined that some variations are just unimportant small differences 
around the mean, while others are significant outliers? Human choice and perspective 
will be involved at some level. The details about how such human choice or perspective 
is involved and how it is controlled are important details. On my account it is crucial to 
understand how scientific models are created, and how they are improved, tested, refined 
and eventually gain the respect that comes with being judged as unbiased and accurate 
representations of the phenomena being explained. Chapter 2 suggests how philosophers 
and sociologists of science ought to continue to study that process. Ultimately appeal to 
the statistical sense of normality cannot by itself distinguish normal variation from 
pathology. I discuss this in Chapter 3. This was part of Amundson’s criticism of Boorse-
like attempts to define the biologically normal. 
 Boorse’s position attempts to have judgments of abnormality made in reference to 
an ideal of normality. This ideal of normality is a statistical summation.106 It is an 
                                                 
106 Boorse says: “Clearly physiological function statements are about a trait’s standard 
contribution in some population or reference class, e.g. a species. A text may say that the 
function of the human lens is to focus light on the retina. This claim is not falsified by the 
existence of people with cataracts, or no lens at all. Similarly, one case of an animal’s life 
being saved by some characteristic would not be enough to make this effect a biological 
function. One squirrel might catch its tail in a crack en route to being run over by a car, 
but that would not make defense against cars a function of the squirrel tail. The statement 
about the human lens is true because it is overwhelmingly typical of members of the 
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abstraction away from any particular organism, but still is an appeal to the actual 
organisms. I agree with Boorse that appeal to an ideal is necessary for judging biological 
abnormality. However, the ideal cannot simply be some statistical average. As discussed 
in Chapter 3 when examining Amundson’s position, statistical averaging alone cannot 
distinguish significant from insignificant variation. My own position makes clear that 
judgments of disease must be made against an ideal of normality. The ideal, however, is 
the abstract and simplified scientific model in question—a creation of human imagination 
and investigation. The model is not merely a summation of observation. This is an 
important aspect of disagreement between Boorse and myself. The model (for  a 
legitimate disease claim) is designed to distinguish what counts as normal variation and 
what counts as pathology. This leaves open the possibility that models may contain 
blatant biases and may contain elements of conventional judgments of normality. This 
feature of my account may be seen by some as a concession to normativism in allowing 
conventional value judgments to enter into disease claims. 
 I disagree with Boorse on his goal-directed analysis of functions. I have not 
included an argument for a particular analysis of functional ascriptions in biology 
because it is a topic too complex to briefly discuss, and because I agree that the fine 
details matter little for a theory of disease. There is no need to give a global 
understanding of function or its warrant. Globally, science is still struggling to define the 
goals or proper function for the higher order systems of the human body, and uncertainty 
                                                 
population for their lens to contribute to their survival and reproduction in that way. In 
general, function statements describe species or population characteristics, not any 
individual plant or animal. As a result, the subject matter of comparative physiology is a 
series of ideal types of organisms: the frog, the hydra, the earthworm, the starfish, the 
crocodile, the shark, the rhesus monkey, and so on. The idealization is of course 
statistical, not moral or esthetic or normative in any other way. For each type a textbook 
provides a composite portrait of what I will call the species design, i.e. the typical 
hierarchy of interlocking functional systems that supports the life of the organism of that 
type. Each detail of this composite portrait is statistically normal within the species, 
though the portrait may not exactly resemble any species member. Possibly no frog is a 
perfect specimen of rana pipiens, since any frog is bound to be atypical in some respects 
and to have suffered the ravages of injury or disease. But the field naturalist abstracts 
from individual differences and from disease by averaging over a sufficiently large 
sample of the population. The species design that emerges is an empirical ideal which, I 
suggest, serves as the basis for health judgments in any species where we make such 
judgments (Boorse, 1977, p. 556).” 
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still exist for designations involving cognition and behavior. Physiology does quite well 
by allowing the fine details of function to be settled during the construction of models of 
isolated systems. I hold the view stated by Cummins (1975) and elaborated by Hardcastle 
(1999, 2002). 
 
4.3 NORMATIVISM: ENGELHARDT ON CREATING MEDICAL REALITY   
 Normativism is the position that disease is an evaluative concept and not 
primarily a descriptive or theoretical concept. Normativist emphasize the consequences 
of a particular disease and human judgment about these consequences. Normativists tend 
to highlight the failings and biases of particular scientific research projects. Regarding the 
concept of normality in biology, normativism is often the position that there is only one 
sense—the conventional sense. When this is the case, legitimacy for normativists is a 
matter of gaining the willing acceptance of a disease claim by a majority of those in a 
community via some form of fair negotiation. Radical normativists may see no 
differences between legitimate and illegitimate claims of disease, except that some have 
gained acceptance over others. 
 H. Tristram Engelhardt is frequently cited as an exponent of the normativist 
position on disease. He synthesizes historical, philosophical and medical perspectives 
concerning human disease and produces a complex picture of the nature of disease 
claims. Drawing on his interpretations of Hegel and Peirce, he stresses the perspectival 
nature of all knowledge, as well as its being culturally and historically conditioned. 
Humans ‘see’ phenomena through a ‘lens’ of multiple assumptions and expectations that 
come from our particular perceptual and cognitive abilities, our cultural values, customs 
and projects, and our education, as well as from the theories and explanations we already 
hold to be true. He says: 
 
The world in which we live is not furnished by uninterrupted facts. We see things 
around us in terms of social and theoretical expectations. We are taught early how 
to explain the occurrences of our world. Within the generally dominant scientific 
world view, we take for granted that a set of complex, etiologic forces directs the 
production of illness and disease. Individuals in other cultures, or our antecedents 
in our own culture, untutored by our current scientific world view, do not or did 
not see illness as a result of infectious agents, genetic flaws, or endocrinological 
abnormalities. We, however, do. Our world is structured by a special set of 
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assumptions about the rule-governed character of our experience. These scientific 
and metaphysical presuppositions fashion for us our everyday expectations. They 
give shape to our lifeworld. In addition, the particular character of our social 
intuitions invests occurrences with social significance…. We see the world 
through our social, scientific, and value expectations. The medical facts with 
which bioethics deals are not timeless truths, but data given through the formative 
expectations of our history and culture. Recognizing a state of affairs as heart 
disease, cancer, depression, homosexuality, or tuberculosis is a rich and complex 
process. All knowledge is historically and culturally conditioned, and the 
influence of history and culture is often, as we shall see, particularly marked in 
medicine. This is not to say that investigators do not attempt to know, timelessly 
unconstrained by social and cultural forces. In endeavoring to know truly, one 
attempts to understand the world as it would be seen from God’s eye, from the 
viewpoint of dispassionate, scientific observers or investigators, so that the 
findings could be shared with other investigators, even those outside our culture—
in principle, even with alien investigators on planets circling distant stars 
(Engelhardt, 1996, p. 190). 
 
Therefore, despite efforts to present knowledge as purely objective and from no particular 
perspective, all scientific models will be perspectival and informed by cultural and 
historical period. Our own situation, even if we believe it to be more enlightened, offers 
no advantages, in these respects, over other knowers. 
 Medicine is not a purely theoretical science but an applied science. It offers 
interventions and interacts with humans at the level of their goals and plans, and at the 
level of their understanding of themselves and their role in the community. Because of 
these practical and social aspects, the art of medicine and its theory are even less capable 
of abstracting towards a ‘God’s eye view’ than purely theoretical sciences. Engelhardt 
says: 
 
Portrayals of reality are cultural products. Although there are constraints placed 
upon us as knowers by the given character of the objects, objects appear to us 
through our concepts and in terms of the conditions of our experience. In the case 
of the unapplied sciences, where one’s choice among different construals of 
reality is dictated by the ideal of a fully intersubjective account free of 
idiosyncratic values and purposes, there is a commitment to avoid imposing the 
values and perceptions of one particular group of knowers. Within an unapplied 
science one attempts to know anonymously and impersonally. But even here 
portrayals of reality are fashioned through background commitments that involve 
choices among different epistemic values. The world of unapplied science is a 
compromise made in the face of controversies. In applied sciences where the role 
of non-epistemic values is more salient, the constructed character of reality is 
 149 
easier to recognize. The goals that medicine can apply are manifestly varied and 
dependent on the visions of particular individuals and communities… There are 
choices to be made among alternative accounts of medical reality. Since these 
choices are not simply determined on epistemic grounds, we become accountable 
for ways in which we fashion that reality. How should one choose among 
competing descriptions of reality? The question is, Who gets to choose?... 
Communities must begin with a recognition of the constructed character of 
medical reality. This recognition underscores our choices and indicates our 
responsibilities as individuals who not only know reality but also know it in order 
to manipulate it. One must also recognize that these manipulations tend to be 
communal. The issue of who decides is thus moved from the area of individual 
free and informed consent to a communal area of negotiations regarding 
construals of reality (Engelhardt, 1996, p. 226). 
 
For Engelhardt, medical reality, including what is or not legitimately taken to be disease, 
is a social construction. This constructed reality is dependent on community and 
individual choices and we have a responsibility to participate in the creation (by 
negotiation) of this reality.  
 So biology as science may be partly concerned with the accurate, unbiased 
descriptions of biological processes. But medicine, as applied science, seeks explanatory 
models because it has as a central goal the control of biological processes so as to 
alleviate suffering. But, of the many problems in a community that can cause suffering, 
only some are going to be seen as medical issues. Participation in this determination of 
the goals and problems of medicine is how individuals can influence the creation of the 
medical reality that otherwise informs our view of such matters. Engelhardt says: 
 
Each of the major social institutions identifies problems for its care in terms of 
sets of values that make problem situations stand out as inviting interventions, as 
failing to meet a standard, as a difficulty to be set aside. The institutions of 
education, religion, morality, law, and medicine in this fashion variously 
characterize circumstances as those of ignorance, sinfulness, blameworthiness, 
criminality, civil liability, or disease. To see circumstances as one of sinfulness, 
criminality, or disease is to place it within the province of one of the major social 
institutions with its peculiar models of explanation and with its own special 
directing goals. The facts available within the spheres of religion, law, morality, 
and medicine are seen as problems of a particular kind in terms of particular webs 
of values, descriptive conventions, explanatory models, and social roles. 
Religious accounts of reality involve supernatural causal models dependent on 
views regarding the final destiny of individuals and the universe. It is in this 
fashion that religions give ultimate meaning to life, suffering, and death. Legal 
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accounts will incorporate particular systems of evidence and proof, which 
determine which findings can be assessed in what ways in order to achieve the 
goals of particular practices of blaming and praising. One might think here of Hart 
and Honore’s classic account of causation and the law. As they point out, when 
flowers in a garden wither due to a gardener’s failure to tend them, the gardener is 
held as having caused the flowers to die, though from a more neutral perspective, 
the failure of a passerby to water the flowers and the absence of sufficient rainfall 
are equally causes of the flowers dying. It is the social presumptions regarding the 
duties of gardeners that make these other circumstances assume the role of 
background conditions and highlight the gardener’s failure to water the flowers as 
the cause of their dying. A set of social relevances is employed to establish a 
particular account of causation, so as to identify certain causes because of their 
role in a social practice. The result is that a set of social expectations and values 
frames a context for experience and action (Engelhardt, 1996, p. 222). 
 
Engelhardt highlights the complex evolution of social practices and values that create our 
legal and religious expectations and even theories of causation and practices of 
explanation. The boundary between legitimate and illegitimate disease claims is 
determined in a manner importantly similar to how the boundaries between legitimate 
and illegitimate crime and sin are determined. 
 Engelhardt explains how for any individual at a particular place and time, their 
view of disease is conditioned by the ‘medical reality’ that exists for that community. He 
discussed four broad “clusters of concern” that are important for shaping any particular 
medical reality. These four complex, culturally relative sets of values, expectations, and 
practices inform what problems will be recognized as diseases and which not. Engelhardt 
discusses: 1) disease claims as influenced by the culture’s practices and expectations 
concerning making evaluative judgments. He also discusses disease claims as relying on 
the current conventions and practices of both 2) description and 3) explanation. Further, 
disease claims are shaped by and help shape 4) the particular social roles involved with 
being sick, being a patient, being a physician or healer, etc.107 
 Disease claims are evaluative for Engelhardt. “Problems stand out as problems for 
medicine because they are disvalued. They are seen as pathological. They are associated 
                                                 
107 He calls these complex clusters ‘languages’ such as in the “disease language as 
evaluative,’ but I find it more instructive to continue speaking of disease claims. 
Following this terminology alteration, Engelhardt would discuss ‘disease claims as 
evaluative,’ etc. 
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with pathos or suffering, and suffering is judged, all else being equal, as a disvalue 
(Engelhardt, 1996, p. 203).”108 To claim that some condition is a disease is to pass a value 
judgment, and the judgment is a comparison of the condition to an ideal conception of 
form, function, ability, etc. Such judgments are ultimately conventional, in that they 
appeal to the complex web of moral and nonmoral values concerning human form and 
function prevalent in our community. These values are learned from and shared by the 
community. “Abnormality is recognized as abnormality within a particular context of 
expectations. For example, if one steps away from moral traditions with strong notions of 
certain actions being improper, it is difficult to make sense of consensual acts being 
perverse or unnatural. Consider the examples of a brother and sister who are competent, 
sterile, and unmarried who decide at the age of fifty to have intercourse. Is such an act 
unnatural? Is it perverse? Is it wrong? (Engelhardt, 1996, p. 199).” Disease, like 
perversity cannot be perceived except through a set of assumptions, values and 
expectations about what is normal and abnormal. And these values and assumptions need 
to be shared by members of the community in order to be successfully appealed to. This 
is demonstrated when members of communities without shared values and expectations 
encounter each other and cannot arrive at the same judgments. In extreme cases, the two 
groups cannot even understand what the other is claiming. Such shared values, 
expectations, and social practices are required whether making claims about the 
perversity of incest or the pathology of diabetes. “One draws a line between innocent 
physiological or psychological findings and pathological findings because of particular 
human values in a particular circumstance, not because of the discovery of an essential 
distinction that exists outside of particular human expectations… The more nominalist or 
                                                 
108 He also says: “To see a phenomenon as a disease, or deformity, or disability is to see 
something wrong with it. Disease, illness, and disfigurements are experiences as failures 
to achieve an expected state, a state held to be proper to the person afflicted. This may be 
a failure to achieve an expected level of freedom from pain or anxiety. It may involve a 
failure to achieve an expected span of life. These genres of judgments characterize a 
circumstance as one of suffering, one of pathology, one of a problem to be solved. Such 
judgments may be made either by the individuals afflicted or by others regarding those 
individuals. In being characterized as perverted, diseased, or deformed, and adverse 
judgment is rendered. This is the case even with a disfigured nose, for which the bearer 
seeks cosmetic surgery (Engelhardt, 1996, p. 204).” 
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instrumentalist views of disease are better justified in that they eschew the ontological 
quest to discover the essence of disease (Engelhardt, 1996, p. 205).” 
 Engelhard criticizes Boorse’s attempt to specify a value-free concept of disease 
by appeal to statistical typicality and evolutionary design. Engelhardt correctly perceives 
the central problem as revolving around the difficulty in distinguishing normal variation 
from pathology because evolution often produces a spectrum of similar designs each with 
slightly varied levels and modes of functionality. Evolution, notes Engelhardt, is also a 
historical and backwards looking theory. Without some normative viewpoint—some 
ideal of what is supposed to be normal—there is no way to separate out what range of 
functionality or variants of design are to count as typical or normal. At best, Engelhardt 
sees Boorse’s concept of species-typical design as something of interest only to 
zoologists and other theoretical scientists. It is far removed from the practical issues of 
medicine, and offers little help in explaining why certain variations are seen as disease 
while others are not. 
 Besides relying on our community’s expectations and values regarding what is 
biologically normal and abnormal, the legitimacy of a disease claim also relies on the 
practices, values, and expectations involved in describing and explaining a shared reality. 
“Descriptions require standardization of terms. Such standardizations will be fashioned 
through quasi-political or societal discussion and against background assumptions about 
what will be useful in achieving particular goals and purposes. Those assumptions are 
themselves structured by explanatory views (Engelhardt, 1996, p. 208).” Engelhardt 
discusses how certain signs and symptoms become describable in standard ways once we 
begin to see them as related to disease. Adopting a theoretical framework makes us see 
the world differently. The physician sees Koplik’s spots on the buccal mucosa of a child, 
not merely some small reddish dots inside her mouth. Engelhardt describes how at 
different historical periods theoretical frameworks within which physicians worked 
allowed for very different interpretations of evidence. It also allowed different ideas 
about what constituted a proper model of disease. For many centuries things we now 
consider just signs or symptoms of disease, such as fever or pain, were in themselves 
types of diseases. These disease claims had their own presumed causes and remedies. 
Engelhardt also reminds us that the very notion of causation—what counts as being a 
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cause—is neither unequivocal amongst professional philosophers, nor across history or 
culture. 
 Engelhard considers the issue that some cases of disease (such as heart attacks) 
are not as culturally relative as others. To the extent this is true, it reflects that certain 
things (like death) are disvalued and are counter to basic goals no matter what the cultural 
circumstances. Some conditions fit within almost any imaginable framework for defining 
problems that are involuntarily caused and disvalued states of the mind and body. 
Considering that disease claims are dependent on the evaluative and explanatory 
practices of the community that deploys them, Engelhardt suggest that we may want to 
dispense with the term disease and talk of clinical problems. “Given these concerns, one 
might even wish to eliminate or strongly qualify the term disease in situations where 
misunderstandings could arise. One might think of substituting the term clinical problems 
to identify those difficulties that stand out as conditions that ought to be addressed and 
solved by medicine. Such a term would more accurately indicate the ways in which 
clusters of value judgments make conditions stand out as problems to be treated 
(Engelhardt, 1996, p. 205).” 
 Rephrasing Engelhardt’s position as one regarding the legitimacy of specific 
disease claims is helpful. For Engelhardt, to be a legitimate disease claim, a condition 
must be judged to be harmful or otherwise disvalued by the community in question. It 
must also be seen as something not avoidable by means of sheer willpower or choice. 
Additionally, it must be recognized as fitting into the causal matrix of a physiological or 
psychological explanatory framework currently used by one’s community and culture. In 
other words, the claim is understood within a physiological, anatomical, or psychological 
causal matrix consistent with whatever the prevailing theories are concerning these 
subjects. To be seen as a disease a condition must be seen as abnormal against a 
background of shared community expectations and values concerning what is normal 
regarding human form, function, ability and behavior. 
 On Engelhardt’s account, controversy arises when smaller groups within a large 
community have different sets of values and expectations about what is abnormal 
regarding human form, function, and behavior. Take for example the current controversy 
over whether obesity is a disease or merely a series of poor lifestyle choices. Groups may 
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also differ over expectations, values and practices concerning explanation or what 
constitutes legitimate evidence. The current controversies over autism’s link to vaccines 
is an example. What counts as evidence for scientists and physicians differs greatly from 
what counts as evidence to observant mothers of autistic children. Engelhardt speaks of 
‘confronting a moral stranger’ to illustrate the problem of trying to discuss issues of 
disease claims with those holding differing basic assumptions, values and expectations. 
We experience the confrontation of moral strangers when we attempt to persuade or 
negotiate with those operating within a significantly different medical reality. Catholics, 
conservative Christian fundamentalist, Muslims, feminists, secular liberals, etc. may at 
times confront each other concerning a controversial disease claim. These groups have 
different sets of assumptions concerning normality, the human good, and what constitutes 
appropriate evidence and explanation. This problem occurs within our modern secular 
societies—large communities without unifying religious or metaphysical principles—and 
it is often a problem encountered when trying to understand disease claims from distant 
cultures or historical periods.109 
 For Engelhardt, disputes over disease claims will have to be settled by 
negotiation, unless one set of values and practices comes to dominate by fiat or force. It is 
likely larger communities will have to accept multiple schemes of disease categorization. 
 
Such differences in understanding regarding what it means to know truly and 
decide fairly are often at the root of conflicts regarding the proper characterization 
of medical facts, or regarding whether a problem should be understood as a 
medical, legal, or moral problem… The choice of how to view a circumstance is 
not simply an epistemic or knowledge-based determination. It is also a 
                                                 
109 Engelhardt says: “Particular scientific communities at particular times embrace 
particular facts, findings, and rules of evidence and inference that we later find to be 
idiosyncratic, just as particular moral communities involve the acceptance of particular 
moral rules and views of the good life. Scientific controversies can occur between 
individuals united in a general commitment to science as an endeavor of intersubjectivity 
establishing claims regarding the nature of the world, but divided due to different 
particular understandings of rules of evidence and inference. When the debates involve 
scientific issues with heavy ethical and political overlays, the conflicts become, as one 
would expect, complex. The individuals involved in such controversies will be 
participants in different moral and scientific communities and, as a result, will be in 
conflict with regard to different understandings of knowing truly and deciding fairly 
(Engelhardt, 1996, p. 225).”  
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determination based on a set of value considerations. The very characterization of 
reality can thus become a moral issue. The very naming and characterization of a 
problem can raise questions of what values ought to be invoked, and of how they 
ought to be ordered. It will raise as well the question of who should participate in 
framing the classifications. And whose hierarchies of costs and benefits should 
have precedence. This issue must be answered in part, as has been indicated, 
through the practice of free and informed consent. It must also be answered 
through public acknowledgment of the ways in which problems are classified as 
medical, legal, religious, and so on. Since medical characterizations of problems 
depend not just on knowing reality truly, but on deciding in a fair manner among 
various ways of classifying reality, problems of individual rights, democratic 
prerogatives, and rights of privacy become salient. If classifications are natural, 
no one is at fault for describing reality as it is. One may not like the way reality is, 
but the scientist has not taken away anyone’s rights by describing things the way 
they are. However, if one is fashioning classifications in order to pursue particular 
goals, the choice of the particular goal is open to negotiation among those 
involved (Engelhardt, 1996, p. 225). 
 
…different constructions of medical reality can be embedded in alternative health 
care systems, which carry with them quite different understandings of what 
should count as a disease to be treated and what treatment expenses should be 
sustained by the community. Within different communal systems, there may very 
well be different notions of the sick role and the role of the physician versus that 
of the priest. Since there are numerous understandings of medical reality, those 
who so wish should be at liberty to act on their own moral and metaphysical 
visions in the company of consenting collaborators… There is no canonical 
content-full secular vision of medical reality, of illness and disease, of health and 
proper health care… Given the limited secular moral authority of the state, and 
given the diversity of the moral and metaphysical visions of medical morality, 
there should be, to paraphrase Mao Tse-tung, space for a thousand views of health 
care to develop and for a hundred different systems of health care delivery to 
contend (Engelhardt, 1996, p. 227). 
 
Essentially people can negotiate over the legitimacy of a disease claim or agree to 
disagree. Conventional senses of normality and abnormality must be negotiated. Appeals 
to nature cannot distinguish what problems are to count as medical problems. The illusion 
of science delivering a morally and politically neutral boundary between normal and 
abnormal that would help settle these issues should not tempt us, for the same reasons we 
should not allow force to simply impose a medical reality.  
 Engelhardt’s is just one normativist account, but it captures the strengths of the 
position and explicitly confronts (and accepts) what I believe are the counter-intuitive 
results of a strong version. Normativism about disease suffers from the classic 
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philosophical conundrum of either saying something accurate but uninteresting, or very 
interesting, counter-intuitive, but highly inaccurate. If all the normativist wants is to 
discredit a picture of science and medicine as infallible producers of purely descriptive, 
unbiased knowledge then I would agree.110 However, the normativist position implies 
much more than this. These more radical implications are the ones that make the position 
interesting and counter-intuitive. 
 Part of this more radical position is the claim that science and its products share 
significant similarities and few dissimilarities with other socially constructed institutions 
and their products--institutions such as religion, law or politics. This is an attempt to 
discredit or downgrade the special (and potentially dangerous) authority that science has 
garnered in Western secular societies. I would agree that this authority does need to be 
challenged in some circumstance. However, globally discrediting all scientific 
explanations or undermining scientific authority regarding empirical matters is a foolish 
project.111 The counter-intuitive result of viewing science this way is that all issues of 
legitimacy become political and ethical issues. It follows that all disputes about the 
legitimacy of disease claims should therefore be handled by fair negotiation, not expert 
authority or further empirical investigation. Legitimacy becomes an issue of the moral 
and political acceptability of the details of the explanatory model. Even if one avoids 
taking the activist stance, and takes a sociological stance, the legitimacy issue concerns 
whether the sense of abnormality claimed ‘fits’ with the social expectations, values, and 
practices already in place (i.e. can the current claim be understood as legitimate through 
the lens of our community’s medical reality). Normativists discount or ignore the 
possibility of issues about the ‘fit’ between the models explanation of biological 
abnormality and the evidence gathered. The accuracy of representation is ignored as a 
factor in legitimacy. It is then easy for normativists to hold that all judgments or claims 
about normality and abnormality involve the conventional sense of normality. 
                                                 
110 See Chapter 2. 
111 One reason normativists and other social construction activists think they should push 
such a radical position is because they believe scientific authority is so ingrained and 
unquestioned that only a radical, counter-intuitive statement of their case will awaken 
people from their mesmerized homage to science and its dictates.  
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 The central problem with normativism develops from over-emphasizing certain 
examples and drawing counter-intuitive (but interesting) sweeping generalizations. The 
expectations and values held by the normativist influence their selective choice of 
examples of disease, which in turn, once analyzed, reinforce their position. 
Homosexuality, drapetomania, masturbation, and hysteria are all frequently discussed.112 
The problem for the normativist becomes how to explain the less controversial and less 
bizarre claims of disease—those that do not seem culturally relative like type 1 diabetes, 
Grave’s disease, cholera, or spina bifida. It is difficult to overcome intuitions that 
conditions like these, especially when coupled with detailed, reliable explanatory models, 
are biological malfunctions independent of any cultural or personal evaluations or 
perspectives. It is hard to imagine these conditions might not have been considered 
biological abnormalities had our culture developed differently or our values and 
expectations been different. Normativists explain the difference between legitimate and 
illegitimate disease claims as resting on complex cultural developments. I find such 
normativist accounts unsatisfying. 
 Engelhardt acknowledges that some disease claims are less culturally relative. He 
gives the example of a heart attack at one end of a continuum of cultural relativity. “Thus, 
on the one hand, crushing substernal pain radiating down the left arm accompanied by 
weakness, collapse, and a feeling of impending death is likely to make myocardial 
infarction a disvalued circumstance across cultures, even if there are appreciable 
differences in cultural values regarding human function. On the other hand color 
blindness, the inability to roll up the sides of one’s tongue, or the incapacity to taste 
phenylthiocarbamide may or may not count as genetic diseases or defects, depending on 
the environment in which the person lives and the goals they and their culture support 
(Engelhardt, 1996, p. 204).” It is important to carefully distinguish the outward signs and 
symptoms of what we may suspect is a myocardial infarction, from the actual disease 
itself. First, these signs and symptoms (i.e. chest pain, weakness, sweating and fearing 
impending death) may be considered signs and symptoms of a divine calling in some 
cultures—signs of a supernatural force taking hold of a person. I see no reason why the 
                                                 
112 I doubt anyone would know of drapetomania as a disease claim if not for the 
normativist literature in the philosophy of medicine. 
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interpretation of these symptoms is not as culturally relative as the interpretations of color 
blindness. Second, within a Western medical framework these symptoms are not 
necessarily associated with myocardial infarction, they might be caused by other 
pathologies, some leading more directly to death or harm than others.113 It is the cause—
seeing them as associated with a certain hidden biological malfunction—that allows signs 
and symptoms to be part of a legitimate disease claim and allow us to pick the correct 
therapy and avoid the wrong ones. Heart attacks (i.e. MIs) and cholera are less 
controversial and less culturally relative because the explanatory models upon which the 
claims rest are unbiased, and accurate. We feel comfortable that these problems are 
caused by biological malfunctions and we find the explanations accurate and unbiased. 
These claims also involve appeal to the sorts of processes and biological functions that 
are not open to direct observation and thus not easily open to evaluation by the average 
member of the community. The average community member may judge the 
consequences of a heart attack as (conventionally) undesirable and bad. However, the 
sense of abnormality involved in its being a disease is not conventional. Even assuming 
Engelhardt is correct that some symptoms are disruptive enough to be disvalued in all 
societies, this does not explain why such societies interpret these as biological 
phenomena. Being disvalued does not guarantee that a recurrent kind of problem will be 
seen as a biological malfunction instead of a spiritual or criminal matter.114 
                                                 
113 The symptoms could be from a pulmonary embolism, an aortic dissection, a panic 
attack, a pheochromocytoma, esophageal spasm, flash pulmonary edema, etc. Engelhardt 
adds certain details to the symptoms and history that make MI a likely first guess, but on 
just these details alone the diagnosis cannot be made with enough confidence to intervene 
only for MI and not test or watch for the other diseases.  
114 Engelhardt provides other factors needed to constitute a disease claim beyond being 
disvalued. I think this is a hedge due to the fact that there can be cases where the 
perception of value is not correlated with the theoretical assessment of biological 
abnormality. This is particularly true if we look at cases of diseases in plants and animals, 
where theoretical biological normality and abnormality are much less well correlated 
with human goals, values and expectations. Humans often manipulate animal and plant 
abnormality to achieve valuable goals—there are many examples from pest disposal. The 
basic point is that assessing biological abnormal function and assessing the perception of 
a particular community of humans about whether the consequences of this are harmful, 
valuable, good, bad or indifferent are two different assessments. Such assessments can 
and do diverge. 
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 I disagree with the normativist emphasis on the consequences of diseases and 
biological abnormality at the expense of issues of causation. I believe that discerning the 
causes of problematic clinical signs and symptoms in order to control them has always 
been at the heart of medical practice. Disease has always implied an unseen or esoteric 
abnormality that causes the perceived or known problems. Discerning the true or hidden 
cause is the art of diagnosis. Over time the theoretical framework within which causes are 
explained has changed, as well as the technology and procedures to investigate 
increasingly remote aspects of the causal processes. I agree with Engelhardt that the 
practices and assumptions involved with explanation and even causation may have 
changed, however the notion of biological abnormality has always been part of the core 
conception of disease.115 
 Engelhardt dismisses Boorse for focusing on a purely theoretical concept and 
trying to separate this from practical or clinical issues. He dismisses Boorse’s concept as 
of interest only to the zoologist or plant biologist. Engelhardt stresses that medicine is an 
applied science, even suggesting we might stop using the term disease and instead use the 
term ‘clinical problem.’ Boorse, however, was correct to separate theoretical and 
practical issues. First, an applied science does not necessarily have trouble with such a 
separation of concerns. Civil engineering is an applied science, and there is no conceptual 
difficulty separating the descriptive or theoretical details that explain why a bridge failed 
and collapsed, from the social interpretation or consequences of the event. Natural 
disasters, like earthquakes, can also be explained in descriptive and theoretical terms 
regarding causation, regardless of whether they do or do not have catastrophic effects on 
humans. Secondly, the issue about separating practical issues from theoretical is related 
to the failure to distinguish signs and symptoms from causal explanations. Signs and 
symptoms are clinical problems. Dealing with them results in all the complex practical 
issues Engelhardt notes. These symptoms must be evaluated as harmful by the patient 
                                                 
115 I have not done explicit historical research. However, I would argue that across culture 
and time the concept of disease is a ‘cluster concept’ and can involve varying core 
elements. Over the past 200 or so years or so, the notion of biological abnormality has 
displace other core elements in the concept of disease. Being painful, disabling, or 
otherwise stigmatizing are no longer essential parts of the understanding of disease in 
modern western medicine and biology. 
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(and community) to be the sort of problem that leads one to seek medical intervention. 
Many abnormalities of biological function that do get people’s attention are ones that 
cause conditions perceived to be harmful, dangerous or undesirable and lead to people 
seeing their doctors. However, not all clinical problems (or symptoms) are caused by 
disease. There is not reliable correlation between symptoms and clinical problems that 
are brought to doctors and signs and symptoms that are caused by disease. Current 
American medical practice often chooses to ignore some diseases, while, on the other 
hand, chooses to treat some clinical problems considered theoretically to be normal 
variation. The medical community often chooses not to ‘’treat’ albinism, but does 
intervene to treat noses that are too big or breasts that are not the desired size or shape. I 
shall discuss more cases in the next section. There is no practical or theoretical reason 
why we cannot (or should not) continue to separate theoretical issues from practical 
issues in medicine. 
 Once we separate the clinical and social issues of dealing with human patients 
from the theoretical issue of biological function, many of the points that Engelhardt 
makes are worthy of note. Many of his points apply to ‘clinical problems’ and with 
treating symptoms. It is difficult to understand the full nature of the problems that an 
individual patient has, and many aspects of discovering and alleviating these problems 
involve deploying evaluative and prescriptive judgments. The way that members of our 
community perceive people who have particular medical problems has a huge impact on 
individual lives and on the community. The roles those labeled as diseased are expected 
to fulfill, etc. are complex but important topics of study. I do not mean to imply that they 
should not be pursued. However, I do believe that the theoretical issues of what 
constitutes a disease for pathologists, physicians, and the biosciences can be separated 
from these issues of clinical care and the creation of a particular community’s medical 
reality. The distinction here is one often painfully recognized by third year medical 
students, freshly arrived to the clinic and ward, as they discover that understanding and 
diagnosing pathology (or even intervening) is only a small part of what patients expect 
from their doctors. 
 I do not agree that negotiation is the appropriate means to distinguishing 
legitimate from illegitimate disease claims. In negotiations over a controversial disease 
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claim, with people who do not share our moral values and social conventions, we can in 
certain circumstances appeal to scientific models, and we can offer to gather more 
evidence and either re-confirm the explanatory model in question or revise it if needed. 
The case of parents insistent that scheduled childhood vaccine panels cause autism is one 
example of offering more evidence to convince those with different assumptions that a 
particular model of biological abnormality was inaccurate (Institute of Medicine, 2004). 
In the case of autism and the MMR vaccine, the scientific boundaries need to guide 
political policy. In certain circumstances there may only be hypothetical and speculative 
models. But knowing that is the situation, and that therefore only political and ethical 
negotiation may occur until more evidence is available, is significant. Ultimately this 
returns to issues about one’s faith or trust in contemporary science and its ability to 
provide accurate and reliable explanations. Are the scientific explanations supporting 
legitimate disease claims better than those behind illegitimate or putative claims? Is there 
more to being a disease than the perception by the community that the condition is 
undesirable, not voluntarily controllable, but potentially controllable via medical 
intervention? Ultimately the strong normativist is beholden to actual community practice 
and whatever consensus can be reached—there are not matters of more or less accurate 
explanations of etiology. There are just different explanations that happen, for the time 
being, to fit with the expectations, values and practical needs of the community. On this 
radical account there is also nothing like an actual cure for a disease—what constitutes a 
cure is also relative to the community and a matter only of perception. Regarding the 
disputed legitimacy of a disease claim, my position gives priority to the quality of the 
scientific explanatory models involved. If these models exist, and are unbiased and 
accurate, then the boundary between normal and abnormal biological function might help 
settle other practical or ethical boundary disputes, such as those mentioned at the outset 
of this chapter. For the normativist, my position gets the order of priority wrong. The 
normativist position holds that by settling the complex political and ethical issues 
involved in many of these boundary disputes, we clarify the expectations and values 
needed to distinguish legitimate and illegitimate disease claims. 
 I sketched my view of science and what it produces in Chapter 2 and discussed 
the different conceptions of normality in Chapter 3. I agree with many of the subtle points 
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Engelhardt raises when discussing the factors that go into the creation of knowledge by a 
community of people with shared goals regarding understanding and controlling a 
phenomenon. In creating and refining scientific models there is a complex interplay of 
perspectives and practices and there is opportunity for people to ‘talk past’ each other if 
they operate from positions and world-views that rest on importantly different 
assumptions and values. I would agree that scientific models are social creations in a 
strict sense and are the products of humans with perspectives and agendas, and who 
reside within a culture and in communities. Such creatures cannot step outside of their 
culturally conditioned viewpoints. However, I also have reasonable faith in the self-
correcting nature of the social phenomena and institutionalized practices that have come 
to be called the scientific ‘process’ or ‘ethos.’ I believe that models can increasingly be 
improved and refined to gain more fit with the actual phenomena being represented and 
also decrease the amount of bias and conventional evaluative judgments involved. It is 
possible to accurately represent salient features of phenomena in simplified models. I 
agree that scientific communities and individual scientists have passed off (and might try 
again to pass off) value judgments as if they these were natural facts. However, this does 
not implicate all scientific models as biased or as incapable of offering usefully objective 
and reasonably unbiased empirical explanations of biological phenomena. There are 
important differences in the quality of scientific models and explanations that serve as the 
foundation of different disease claims. 
 I agree with Engelhardt that even a modified statistical sense of normality (such 
as the one used by Boorse) is insufficient to address the problem of distinguishing 
insignificant from important variations in biological form or function. I agree with 
Engelhardt that judgments of abnormality are made in reference to an ideal. For 
Engelhardt, this ideal of normality must be a product of expectations or value judgments 
about human form or function.116 I do not agree, and believe that some judgments of 
abnormality, particularly many having to do with disease, are made in reference to the 
ideal of normal function specified in a biological model. There are important differences 
in the sense of normality offered in accurate biological models compared with the sense 
                                                 
116 This can either be explicitly held and perpetuated by individuals in a society or 
implicitly part of the community’s social practices and institutions. 
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used in the evaluative judgments we make about observable consequences of disease. 
Frequently, many of the people making the claim of abnormality, as in those labeling 
someone a diabetic, have little or no knowledge of the actual details of the model—no 
knowledge of the details of normal function. However, those making claims can 
recognize that the claim is not one made against a social convention or socially 
negotiated value, but rather in reference to a theoretical sense of normal biological 
function. When a lay-person calls their friend diabetic and therefore diseased, he knows 
that there is an explanation of theoretical normality available from experts and in 
textbooks, even while he might admit he does not know the details. 
 In contrast to his analysis of disease, I do believe Engelhardt may have a valuable 
point about the positive conception of health. This may require more than a piecemeal set 
of biological models of normally functioning systems. It may require a content-full vision 
of the capacities and abilities necessary for human flourishing. 
 
4.4 MY POSITION: DISEASE AS THEORETICAL BIOLOGICAL ABNORMALITY  
 I consider Boorse and Engelhardt to be good representatives of the naturalist and 
normativist positions on disease. I have presented their positions above and highlighted 
what I think insightful and helpful, as well as highlighting where I think their positions go 
wrong. Naturalism correctly sees disease claims as descriptive and not primarily 
evaluative. Naturalists, however, struggle with explaining how scientific theory can 
produce a non-evaluative sense of normality, and usually appeal to statistical analysis or 
evolution. Normativism starts from the perspective that all judgments of abnormality, 
including disease claims, are made in reference to an ideal or norm, and that the only 
source for such ideals are social practices and personal values. Basically, all judgments of 
normality are conventional. Normativists, however, tend to undervalue the knowledge 
created by successful scientific explanation of natural phenomena, and are mistaken that 
all claims of normality are essentially the same. 
 In this section I will offer my own theory of disease—a theory that incorporates 
some insights of normativism and naturalism. My theory offers a reasonable 
reconstruction of what physicians and biomedical scientists mean when they use the term 
disease. It appeals to a realistic conception of how science operates, what it produces, and 
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the nature of those products.117 My account makes clear the distinction that is of most 
interest to policy makers and applied ethicists—those interested in the boundary issues 
mentioned at the outset—the distinction between legitimate disease claims and 
illegitimate claims of disease. 
 Before specifying what I take a legitimate disease claim to be, I want to reiterate 
the main problem faced by a philosophical examination of the concept of disease, as well 
as reiterating some key points to recall for understanding my explication.118 An analysis 
needs to specify how to distinguish insignificant variations in form and function from 
significant variation. This will be influenced by the assumptions implicit in the analysis 
about the nature of science and its products. An analysis must explain how science can 
create a sense of normal and abnormal that are not primarily evaluative, and do not use as 
their ideal of reference social and personal judgments about what is normal or proper. As 
noted, naturalistic theories often utilize a statistical notion of normality. Most 
normativists basically believe there is only one sense of normality, the conventional 
sense. My position holds that there are at least three largely distinguishable senses of 
normality, and that some successful scientific models utilize a sense distinguishable from 
statistical or conventional normality, namely the theoretical sense. 
 Some points to keep in mind include that one’s willingness to accept my position 
depends on one’s willingness to see science as creating accurate and useful models of 
biological systems. Science does produce new and significant knowledge about the 
mechanistic functioning of biological systems. This progress is piecemeal and often slow. 
                                                 
117 See Chapter 2. 
118 While I am trying to provide a definition of disease as currently used by physicians 
and biomedical researchers, I nonetheless realize that there is some amount of vagueness 
and imprecision in the concept. By calling my project an explication I admit that what I 
am doing is also subtly reconstructing the concept. My term may be viewed as an 
improvement on older less precise historical variants. Would I go further and insist that 
my explicatum is superior, or that it replace the vaguer explicandum? I see no problem 
with allowing variant uses of the word in situations that do require precision. However, 
when boundary issues necessitate knowing legitimate claims about some clinical problem 
being a disease, more precision is needed. Also, to be precise, what I am providing in the 
next few pages are the criteria needed to be a legitimate disease claim. However, the 
explication of ‘disease’ as compared to a syndrome, clinical problem, lifestyle choice, 
behavioral problem, personality quirk, etc should be easily extrapolated from what I have 
said throughout this essay.  
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Larger and larger circumscribed systems are modeled, and the composite models become 
more and more detailed with regards to the chemical processes involved. One such 
example is the model of normal and abnormal function and structure of the thyroid. Of 
note is the hierarchical structure of interrelated models that emerges, and the ability to 
talk of ‘levels of analysis.’ For instance one can discuss the function and structure of the 
thyroid as a whole organ, or ascend to a ‘higher’ level and discuss the role of the thyroid 
in calcium metabolism, or its role in regulating energy metabolism, or even discuss the 
role of the thyroid in the larger endocrine system. One could ascend to a discussion of the 
gross anatomy and physical appearance of the normal and abnormally functioning thyroid 
gland, such as various types of goiter. One could descend ‘levels’ and discuss the 
structures and functions of the group of cells that produce calcitonin, parathyroid 
hormone, or thyroid hormone. One could examine the structure and function of individual 
cells, their receptors and organelles. One could descend to the level of describing 
enzymes and structural molecules, or genes, or move lower and describe how these 
entities utilize certain atomic-level chemical properties to accomplish there functions and 
maintain there structures.  
 In the process of creating these models and in testing and refining them many 
conceptions of normal function emerge at many levels of analysis. These conceptions of 
normal function emerge from the process of trying to understand and accurately describe 
how the thyroid gland works, and the sense of normality created is neither statistical nor 
conventional. It refers neither to an analytical sum nor a social norm, but rather back to 
the developing idealized model itself. These models also explain various types of 
malfunction or malformation.119 Possessing models of malfunctions and malformations of 
a specific biological system warrants legitimate disease claims. The core concept 
involved in being a disease or pathology is being the malfunction or malformation of a 
biological system which otherwise could have functioned normally. Without accurate 
                                                 
119 The distinction between malfunction and malformation is often just a matter of the 
level of analysis. Lower level issues of malfunction (whether current or prior 
malfunctions) can lead to higher level issues of malformation. The diseases of collagen 
metabolism are an example. Similarly, lower level issues of malformation (such as a gene 
point mutation) can lead to higher level malfunctions (in enzymes or channel proteins). 
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models of biological systems that describe both normal and abnormal function and 
structure there cannot be a theoretical sense of normal and abnormal.  
 Of crucial importance, however, and often overlooked by proponents of the 
success of scientific model building, is the fact that the models offered at any one time 
vary regarding their virtues and limitations. They are works in progress, always open to 
refutation or refinement. And, most troubling for policy makers who want to rely on them 
to settle boundary disputes, they can greatly vary as to their reliability, their fit with the 
phenomena being described, or vary regarding the amount of bias or misleading aspects 
they contain. The need to assess models for such issues becomes particularly acute in 
newer models or those that operate at higher levels of analysis (i.e. those that involve 
aspects of grossly observable human form and behavior). Bias and the blending of 
conventional senses of abnormality with theoretical senses are possible. One must be 
aware of such blending and potential bias especially when the designation of something 
as a disease (a biological malfunction) will potentially result in new monetary or social 
assistance for some group, or the potential discrimination of a group. In such cases the 
values and biases of our culture, and individual and group preferences, easily mix with 
theoretical senses of what is and is not normal.  
 Any scientific model must be individually examined and evaluated. Such ability 
to evaluate models can be acquired,120 but even for the non-specialist there are many 
clues that can more or less be relied on to estimate their relative virtues and problems. 
Biological and medical models are perspectival. This does not detract from their 
usefulness and value. They represent some of the most useful, objective, and 
explanatorily powerful scientific models that humans have ever produced. They are in 
many senses the best examples that we have as far as empirical knowledge of natural 
processes. Dismissing science generally or entire fields of inquiry, instead of judging 
models individually, is a gross error.  The normativist position, to the extent that it 
globally dismisses scientific models as merely social constructions that inform us more 
about our social values than about natural phenomena, is misguided. 
                                                 
120 Acquiring the background and ability to make such evaluation is part of what makes 
someone a specialist in a medical or scientific field. 
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 My own position is that a disease claim is legitimate if it is based on and includes 
reference to: 
 
1. a specification of a circumscribed biological system  
2. a specification of the normal structure and normal function for this system 
(and/or its parts) 
3. a specification of a particular malfunction or malformation in the structure or 
function of the system (and/or its parts) 
4. these specifications are part of a scientific model (i.e. generated by those in 
the community recognizable as the authorities on the details of the biological 
system in question) 
5. the scientific models involved are assumed to be or judged to provide (at least 
by the appropriate scientific authorities) an accurate unbiased representation 
of how human biology normally functions and how it can in this particular 
way malfunction or be malformed. 
 
Several paradigm examples of legitimate disease have been used throughout the essay, 
such as type 1 diabetes mellitus or Graves’ disease of the thyroid. Several examples of 
illegitimate disease claims have also been discussed, such as the diseases particular to 
antebellum slaves proposed by Samuel Cartwright. Illegitimate claims rest on 
problematic models of biological dysfunction or malformation. The problems are usually 
issues with poor fit between the model and the phenomena being modeled, and/or 
unacceptable bias in the model. Even contemporaries of Cartwright could probably see 
the political and moral agenda behind his proposals. Illegitimate claims usually involve 
the recognition that conditions 4 and 5 cannot be met. 
 Putative disease claims are those that do not meet the criteria for legitimacy, but 
which are not clearly false or so biased as to obviously be veiled value judgments. This 
may be a large area of disease claims. Potentially there can be problems with any or all of 
the conditions above. A putative claim could be a hypothesis that a cause exists for a set 
of symptoms or signs, without clear designation of a circumscribed system. It might lack 
clear specification of any normal functions. Usually a putative claim proposes some 
mechanism that is speculative in that it awaits more evidence or better alignment with 
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less speculative models of biological function.  Many ‘syndromes’ in medicine start out 
as putative disease claims. These are sets or patterns of signs and symptoms that recur or 
hang together in such a way as to generate suspicion about a common lower level causal 
mechanism. Putative disease claims assume an underlying biological malfunction even 
when the details are not yet clear. This presumed common cause (an etiology) is in 
distinction to an individual sign or symptom, such as red patches and fibers growing out 
of the skin, or eliciting pain on palpating certain areas. These sign and symptoms might 
be observed or produced on examination, and might be caused by disease, or be used in 
order to diagnose a disease, but are not themselves disease, putative or otherwise. They 
might however be clinical problems in and of themselves, and be reasons to see a 
physician and be treated. 
 My account makes it clear that in designating a biological system as abnormal, the 
normal ideal against which this is contrasted is the scientific model. This is in contrast to 
Boorse and Engelhardt. For Boorse, the ideal against which abnormality is contrast is a 
statistical abstraction of the typical goal-directed function of the human part in question. 
For Engelhardt the ideal being contrast with abnormality is a complex of social and 
personal conventions. 
 Before closing this section I will review a few of the resources available on my 
account for examining controversial or interesting cases regarding disease claims. It is a 
strength for any account to be able to explain why some disease claims are controversial 
and whether they are legitimate, putative, or illegitimate. In the final section of this 
chapter I will deploy the resources of my account and analyze some controversial cases. 
 One obvious resource is the ability to somewhat untangle the three senses of 
normality from each other and avoid equivocation in that regard. With these different 
senses of normality in mind, it becomes easier to determine if what is being claimed is 
that a biological system or an individual is abnormal. For legitimate disease claims the 
individual has a malfunctioning biological system. This system is functioning or has been 
formed in a manner different than the ideal or normal. The ideal (the normal function and 
structure of that system) is specified in a scientific model, and most likely the details are 
available in a definitive textbook. The ideal is not necessarily an average or statistical 
abstraction, nor the prevailing evaluative opinion of the community. Claiming that an 
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individual is abnormal or handicapped is often a judgment made in reference to social, 
conventional norms and ideals. Keeping the ideal against which abnormality is judged 
clear allows us to recognize illegitimate and putative claims more easily. 
 Another resource for evaluating controversial disease claims is the idea of ‘levels 
of analysis.’ The example of ascending or descending levels with regard to the thyroid 
gland was discussed above. The closer one gets to gross observable human anatomy and 
form, or to human behavior, the harder it becomes to keep the conventional sense of 
normality out of explanatory models. In the other direction, the closer one gets to 
physical chemistry and physics, the more prevalent statistical senses of normal become 
and the less frequently is functional analysis used. The models for the behavior of an 
ideal gas or for protein folding, if they appeal to any sense of normal at all, appeal to a 
statistical sense. 
 My account offers a satisfying distinction between signs and symptoms of the 
disease at one level of analysis and mechanistic causes at lower levels of analysis. This 
can help in situations where a biological function may be ambiguous between being 
abnormal or being just a normal variant. Take hair loss as an example. Hair loss may be 
part of the causal story of a disease (e.g. polycystic ovarian syndrome) due to a much 
lower level malfunction. In this case it is a symptom of disease. Considered by itself it 
may be ambiguous regarding whether it is normal biology or abnormal. Some cases of 
middle aged balding seem to be just normal variations of development and aging. In 
some cases hair loss might be difficult to classify as a case of abnormal function in and of 
itself, but if it is explained by or linked to a lower level abnormality it can be seen as a 
sign or symptom of disease. These sorts of considerations also explain why some 
historical disease claims, such as fever, are currently regarded as just signs or symptoms 
of disease but not diseases in their own right. As science develops more elaborate and 
sophisticated tools and techniques, as well as a greater stockpile of reliable models, it can 
delve to increasingly lower levels of analysis. Sometimes what looked like abnormal 
biological function is now reconceived as a normal response to a lower level abnormality. 
As a practical issue of building disease models, the model is felt to be complete if the 
lowest level of analysis at which there is a biological malfunction is reached, and below 
that level there are only mechanistic explanations of the normal functionality allowing the 
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malfunction to be instantiated. Reaching this point might be finding a gene mutation, and 
below the level of the mutation might be only analysis that explains the normal 
biochemical phenomena that allow genes to have their form and function. This leads to 
an interesting issue concerning the theory of human disease: should a disease 
classification be carried out only at the lowest levels of abnormal function, and are all 
diseases potentially traceable to just one level of analysis? It might be that all disease is 
genetic in origin and explanation, or perhaps all disease is ultimately environmental. 
 My account offers a realistic, albeit simplified, sketch of science and its products. 
My sketch is pragmatic and discusses the creation of various kinds of models of natural 
phenomena. The human processes of generating hypothesis and evidence for them, and 
the community aspects of testing, communicating, verifying, criticizing and refining 
these models is sketched simplistically. Discussing ‘science’ grossly and making any 
accurate general observations while doing so is difficult. The point here is that both for 
illegitimate and legitimate claims of disease, what is determinate are the virtues of the 
model being referred to, especially the fit between a model and the phenomena it 
describes and explains. This is also what is missing in putative claims. The basic idea is 
that the better the scientific model (i.e. regarding these virtues) upon which a disease 
claim is based, the more legitimate the claim, and the easier it will be to demarcate the 
kind of boundaries discussed in the opening section (e.g. between therapy and 
enhancement). Figure 4.1 below represents this crude idea. One could select the quality 
of the scientific model being used in a disease claim (assuming the virtues of the model 
could be summed and different models compared on a spectrum). From that point on the 
top spectrum, a roughly perpendicular line could be drawn down through the other 
spectra (assuming these qualities could also be arranged on a spectrum). 
 My analysis explicitly distinguishes and explains putative disease claims. It 
explains why these are so problematic from a policy standpoint. Putative claims prevent 
the clear settlement of boundary issues while better evidence or while expert consensus is 
not available. Until these claims better approximate legitimate claims their use in policy 
or bioethical debates is more problematic than helpful. However, such putative disease 
claims, especially when a biotechnology potentially allows a medical intervention, are 
usually the cases that put pressure on policy makers. Boundary disputes that rest on 
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putative disease claims remain indeterminate as long as the needed uncontroversial model 
of theoretical normality vs. abnormality is lacking. Until it’s available the policy 
decisions and line drawing will have to be made based on negotiation, legislation, or fiat. 
The process of acquiring uncontroversial new evidence and better models may take a 
significant amount of time. Decisions in such contexts will often involve appeal to 
community values and conventional senses of what is normal and acceptable, and to what 
we as individuals and as communities might prefer. In such circumstances our guard 
against discrimination and personal agendas should be fully alert. Being aware of the 
nature of situations involving putative claims is valuable. In this way my account is 
messier than most naturalistic accounts, but more realistic. 
 It is possible on my explication to extrapolate an account of how most disease 
claims evolve from speculative and putative, to those based on less tentative experimental 
models, to finally evolving into claims based on definitive models of biological systems. 
My account captures one of the basic idea of disease across historical periods. Even if the 
explanatory models were of a different nature, a core idea behind human disease is a 
malfunction of those systems that otherwise operate normally to sustain life and provide 
ability.  
 One last point to highlight concerns the definition of health. Health (negatively 
defined) is the absence of pathology. As science slowly builds up a more complete 
picture of human biological form and function, and a much more complete catalogue of 
all possible malfunctions, such a negative assessment of health will be possible. But this 
is not a positive definition of health. It is not a positive definition of the ideal (i.e. ideally 
normal) human. For this, Engelhardt may be correct that we need an evaluative theory of 
human nature—a theory of what the good is for grossly observable human form and 
function. This may be particularly true if human cognition, behavior and appearance are 
part of the complete theory of the ideal. But even if there are such requirements for a 
positive definition of human health, this does not present a problem for most run-of-the-
mill disease claims. Disease claims only require is well-respected, verified models of 
simplified normal and abnormal function of isolated and circumscribed biological 
systems. 
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4.5 ANALYSIS OF CONTROVERSIAL AND INTERESTING CASES  
 In various places in this essay, I have discussed examples that are unproblematic 
and straightforward regarding being legitimate disease claims. Type I diabetes and 
thyroid adenoma have served as examples. I will not discuss further these sorts of 
uncontroversial examples. Excellent textbook explanations offer the normal models of 
function for the pancreas and thyroid glands, and for their parts, and the cells that make 
up these parts, and the sub-cellular organelles and molecules whose functions combine to 
allow the cells to operate normally, etc. Medical textbooks offer models of abnormal 
functions as explanations of particular diseases in these organs. In this section, I shall 
discuss challenging or interesting cases from the point of view of my philosophical 
explication of disease.  
 My goal is to provide a realistic way to distinguish legitimate disease claims from 
illegitimate. Many of the cases that raise the legitimacy issue, however, are going to be 
putative disease claims. Many putative claims revolve around a clinical problem (i.e. a 
problem or issue that someone brings to or wants to bring to a physician or medical 
specialist). Potential medicalization, as discussed in Chapter 3, is part of the controversy 
surrounding many of these examples. The grouping of the examples is somewhat 
arbitrary. Many of them can be approached from different perspectives—that is, they are 
interesting on multiple dimensions. 
 
4.5.1 Pathological Biological Functions That Are Not Harmful 
 For normativists disease is culturally relative because the criteria for being a 
disease, namely certain kinds of perceptions and value judgments, can be different in 
different communities or cultures. Most normativists hold that a biological condition 
needs to be perceived as harmful, or inconvenient, or disabling, to be perceived as 
disease. The examples in this section are challenges to such forms of normativism (i.e. 
pathology without harm or disability). From my perspective such examples can exist 
because diseases are biological abnormalities but not necessarily harmful. In fact, on my 
account certain biological conditions could be considered beneficial or desirable by a 
community but still be a theoretical biological abnormalities. There can be complex 
relations between community perceptions and values and the theoretical models that 
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explain biological function, however there is not a direct or necessary connection 
between the two—they are separable. For a given biological abnormality, the 
community’s perception of whether or not it is undesirable, harmful, etc is malleable in 
ways that scientific theory is not. 
 Offering examples of such situations is difficult. One problem is that, while there 
need not be any connection, many biological abnormalities do cause symptoms that are 
judged harmful.121 Another problem is the potential to argue over details. These can be 
either the details about the theoretical models that present some biological process as 
abnormality or the details about whether the community in question perceives the 
condition as harmful or inconvenient. Because of these problems science fiction 
examples are often used so that such details can be controlled. However, this does not 
entirely solve the problem because the details of what constitutes normal biological 
function and what does not are not easily imagined—they are the result of empirical 
investigation. The verified, accurate models that explain normal and abnormal function 
do so in ways that are often unpredictable and sometimes counter-intuitive. When a 
scientific model specifies a biological abnormality but the community does not perceive 
the effects of this abnormality as negative the question is: Is this a diseases?  
 Diseases not found harmful raise many interesting practical issues. The most 
interesting scenario would be within a community where there was divergence regarding 
the communities judgment of the value of the condition or symptoms. If some in the 
community found the condition harmful and undesirable while others thought just the 
opposite, would we consider treating patients with the condition? Would we treat only the 
ones who found it undesirable? Would we try to prevent people who desired the 
condition from getting the condition? Might physicians even be called on to help some 
people acquire this disease? The possibilities and issues raised by certain science-fiction 
scenarios of ‘beneficial diseases’ are numerous. 
 
 
                                                 
121 Part of the difficulty here is the fact that in the early days of hypothesizing symptoms 
that are judged harmful and undesirable are the ones we search for explanations of their 
being abnormalities in biological function.  
 175 
 
4.5.1.1 Genius as Abnormality 
 Consider the case of a genetic mutation that causes one to be perceived as a 
genius by our current community. This is, to my knowledge, a science-fiction example, 
but potentially similar, real-world examples will be considered below. Is this a disease? 
The problems mentioned above make the case difficult to analyze. There are not currently 
enough accurate models explaining normal and abnormal cognitive function of 
circumscribed neurobiological systems. Furthermore, we have no uncontroversial notion 
of human intelligence, nor a clear notion of what makes for genius. Statistical attempts to 
measure intelligence are inadequate for reasons similar to those I have claimed make 
statistical measures inadequate for determining biological normality.122 The details of the 
biological (or psychological) malfunction that allowed enhanced cognitive abilities would 
be important. To be a disease claim, the biological or psychological models developed of 
those systems implicated in causing the symptoms, would have to specify how the system 
was malfunctioning—how it was deviating from normal function. Importantly, it would 
also have to make clear how this was not just a variant of normal function. If such models 
existed, described a biological malfunction giving rise to desirable cognitive abilities, 
then, I would have to bite the bullet and admit this was a case of a desirable disease. The 
abnormalities would also need not give rise to any undesirable symptoms. Again, to the 
best of my knowledge, there are not currently any cases like this.  
 Compare this to the situation of certain cases of severe mental retardation. The 
cases of Down’s syndrome and Fragile X syndrome will serve as examples. In these 
cases we do have increasingly good models of abnormal biological function and structure 
leading to changes at the cellular and metabolic level.  These changes purportedly lead to 
the observable findings of the syndrome including the particular intellectual disabilities. 
However, there are gaps in the explanation, potentially as one gets to higher levels of 
analysis. The signs and symptoms of these diseases were observed together and 
constituted a syndrome for which explanatory models are now being built and refined. 
 For Fragile X syndrome, certain features are caused by problems in elastin 
                                                 
122 The statistical measures alone cannot tell us what is normal variation from significant 
variation.  
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production, including the findings of prominent ears, hyperextensible finger joints, soft 
skin and flat feet. Related physical findings can include pectus excavatum, mitral valve 
prolapse, strabismus, an unusually long face, prominent chin and enlargement of 
testicular size. A significant number, but not all, children with Fragile X show behavioral 
symptoms similar to autism, including stereotyped movements, and decreased interest in 
social interaction. These affected children show developmental delay and an IQ in the 
range of mental retardation. Mathematical skills, executive function, visual memory, 
visuospatial-processing abilities, visual-motor coordination, auditory short-term memory, 
processing of sequential information, sustained attention, and working memory are all 
areas that can typically be affected. The theoretical model of Fragile X describes a region 
on the X chromosome composed of repeating trinucleotide sequences which as it expands 
in size (to somewhere between 30 to 200 copies), eventually causes a loss in the 
expression of mRNA and thus the failure of synthesize a protein. This protein, FRMP 
(fragile X mental retardation protein), normally has a multitude of regulatory effects on 
the expression of other genes whose products are important in synaptic signaling and the 
establishment of synaptic structure and on other metabolic functions. Malfunction due to 
loss of this and other proteins and nucleic acids causes the syndrome. More detail and an 
excellent pictorial summary of part of the model of the normal cellular signaling 
mechanisms dependent on FRMP is available in a review article by Chonchaiya (2009). 
 Down’s syndrome relies on a similar putative model of normal functions and of 
the abnormal dysfunction that gives rise to the clinical findings, including the various 
features of lower intellectual abilities. I would judge these both to be legitimate disease 
claims. At worst they are putative disease claims that are extremely close to meeting 
criteria 5, namely that the models of normal and abnormal function are close to being 
taken as being accurate, having good fit, and are unbiased. If anything is missing, it is 
some of the details about how lower level defects in proteins and metabolism cause 
defects at the cellular level that eventually sum to create the cognitive deficits. Our 
science fiction example of a genius mutation, in order to be a legitimate disease would 
require such accurate models to back the claim. It would also need to have only desirable 
consequences. 
 Other science fiction examples might be explored, such as a genetic mutation that 
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makes one less sensitive to pain (but not so much that frequent injury becomes a 
problem123), or mutations that make one age slower. These would be legitimate disease 
claims if respectable scientific model existed to explain abnormality against a backdrop 
of otherwise normal function. If the models specified these things as abnormal biological 
function, then regardless of whether or not the community found the resultant effects to 
be beneficial, they would be legitimate disease claims. Again, there would be room to 
argue about whether these were really biologically innocuous conditions, regardless of 
the perception of the public. The issue faced by researchers would be determining normal 
variation in function from abnormal function. On my account the process of creating, 
testing and refining the model would ultimately produce these distinctions. The 
normativist would challenge that it is the conventional judgment of the community, or of 
the researchers involved, that determines if these variations in biological function are 
normal or abnormal. My position concedes that initially conventional values can and do 
enter into hypothesis generation, but this is not the end of the story—scientific research 
and model building engage with the phenomena and increase the epistemic virtues of a 
model. Researchers seek to reduce the bias in the model. Many subtle issues go into the 
determination of whether the activity and the variations in activity of some circumscribed 
microscopic biological system are considered abnormal or normal. Even if initially 
influenced by statistical and conventional senses of normal, as the model develops and 
gains ‘fit,’ it develops a different sense of normality and abnormality. The sense of 
abnormality generated in the models for fragile X syndrome is not the same as the sense 
used to judge the ears or testes of those perceived as abnormal. For genius to be a 
symptom of disease some biological model would have to specify the abnormality that 
gives rise to what we judge as genius. In this case my account would make it a disease. 
Boorse has the option of falling back on ‘natural design’ as a distinction between normal 
function and abnormally beneficial functionality. He defines disease only for functional 
efficiency below a cut-off. Extremes of functionality are unnatural for him, but not 
necessarily disease. 
                                                 
123 See Cox, et. al., 2006 and Cox, et. al., 2010 for case reports of a rare genetic mutation 
that does cause congenital inability to feel pain. However, as predicted, affected children 
seem to get injured frequently. 
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 Many intellectually sophisticated fiction genres have considered scenarios of 
superpowers as disease. Often the superpowered become either heroes or villains and 
usually must keep their abilities anonymous and their identities hidden due to the 
possibility of discrimination and persecution due to their being different. Perhaps in a 
future where such things are possible (perhaps made possible by bioengineering) we 
might need a new term besides ‘disease’ to describe biological abnormalities granting 
superhuman ability. Our scientific models will likely become complex enough to make 
these new distinctions, but until then, biological abnormality satisfactorily modeled and 
explained is legitimate disease regardless of whether or not we perceive the effects as 
harmful, beneficial, or inconsequential. 
 
4.5.1.2 Asperger’s Syndrome 
 This may be an actual example of increased intellectual abilities as part of a 
pathology. Autism is usually understood to manifest along a spectrum of clinical severity 
with regard to the symptoms of cognitive and linguistic impairment and developmental 
delay. At the less severely effected end of this spectrum is Asperger’s syndrome. 
Diagnosis is made in the face of symptoms such as impaired social interaction skills, 
repetitive stereotyped movements, and a restricted pattern of interests, while lacking the 
typical language and developmental delays of more severe autism syndromes. Intense 
pre-occupation with certain narrow subjects or abilities, and physical clumsiness are 
typical. Technically, Asperger’s is a pathology but to make the diagnosis in the United 
States in accord with the latest DSM-IV-TR, the patient must experience significant 
impairment in day-to-day functioning.124 So the case is not one that neatly separates 
perceived undesirability from theoretical abnormality. Furthermore the biological models 
behind autism are less well worked out than those for Fragile X syndrome. Autism and 
the autism spectrum diagnoses are putative diseases, awaiting better mechanistic models. 
The spectrum of severity may breakdown into importantly different disease entities 
distinguished by different causal mechanisms but similar observable symptoms. 
 However, assume that further along the spectrum of autism there are people with 
                                                 
124 Interestingly, this requirement of interference with daily life, is a frequent part of 
psychiatry diagnosis. More on this below in the subsection on psychiatric disease. 
 179 
poor but not debilitating social skills and intense interest and talent regarding certain 
kinds of applied mathematics, such as engineering, economics, and accountancy. One 
study found that in a sample of 919 families with a child with autism, 28.4% had either a 
father or grandfather who was an engineer, vs. only 15% of control group families 
(Baron-Cohen, et. al. 1997). Perhaps these engineers are very high functioning autistics 
and have special abilities without significant loss of social skills. The crucial issue is 
whether we can imagine a disease or pathology that is not undesirable. This example is 
problematic because it takes a case of what intuitively is clearly a disease and waters it 
down until what remains is minimal harm and the prospect of benefit. On my account 
some of these engineers, accountants, or mathematicians may have a putative disease, 
and one that helps them with their profession. I have also heard similar speculation about 
a spectrum of psychopathy (i.e. an abnormality resulting in lack of normal empathy). 
Perhaps there are people lacking empathy such that they thrive at certain professions but 
not so much as to produce trouble with the law or with socializing. There can, in my 
opinion, be diseases (i.e. theoretical biological or psychological abnormalities) that are 
not necessarily harmful, even if the actual cases of this are rare and difficult to find. 
Asperger’s syndrome is a putative disease claim, but a problematic one, due to the 
existence of mostly hypothetical and still evolving models of normal and abnormal 
function of a biological or psychological system involved with the observable symptoms. 
Criteria 1 and 2 on my account of legitimate disease claims are not met. Such models of 
psychiatric disease face special difficulties as we will discuss below. 
 
4.5.1.3 Paganini 
 It is hypothesized that the virtuoso violinist Paganini suffered from a connective 
tissue disorder, perhaps Marfan’s syndrome (Schoenfeld, 1978) or Ehlers-Danlos 
syndrome. This example is very much like the Asperger’s example, except that we have a 
physiological disease with more respectable and complete biological models. Again, 
science fiction examples could be generated off of this theme, and one could imagine 
athletes or contortionists having significantly increased ability due to connective tissue 
mutations. Presumably any potential harms, like weaker artery walls in Marfan’s would 
not be manifest in these science fiction examples. On my position, Marfan’s syndrome is 
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a legitimate disease claim and some of the science fiction examples might also be 
legitimate diseases, even if they produced no harms and only benefits for those affected. 
An interesting wrinkle would be such diseases that affected people to different degrees 
along a spectrum. Then we would have a physiological disease that in some cases caused 
what was perceived as harm and in some cases caused what was perceived to be benefit. 
Regardless, if our best biological models of the systems involved describe the effects as 
caused by a biological malfunction, then all the effects or symptoms would be legitimate 
disease claims. 
 
4.5.1.4 Immunity to HIV-1 Infection from Mutated CCR5 Allele 
 Perhaps the best real-world example involves a genetic variation that may give 
substantial immunity to infection by HIV (the virus that causes AIDS). The genetic 
variation is in a chemokine receptor (CCR5) on white blood cells. These receptors are 
used by the HIV-1 virus to gain entry to these cells so that the virus can highjack the cells 
DNA and RNA transcription functions to reproduce itself. Certain mutations (delta 32) 
when present in all the copies of the genome (making the person a homozygote regarding 
that allele) prevent certain prevalent strains of HIV-1 from entering the cells (Samson, 
1996). There has been a case of a patient with HIV-1 infection treated with a bone 
marrow transplant as therapy for development of myeloid leukemia. The transplant was 
with cells from a person homozygous for the delta 32 CCR5 genes, and thus after 
transplant, the new white blood cells of the HIV patient, now expressed only the mutated 
CCR5 chemokine receptors. This patient then achieved undetectable levels of the virus 
for 20 months—essentially the infection was controlled and possibly cured (Hutter, 
2009). 
 So is this a case of acquiring a disease that has a benefit—acquiring one disease 
that alleviates another, much worse disease? Is this an example of the kind of disease 
many of us may not mind having? Let us assume that the variant CCR5 protein has no 
other biological effects. The normativist position would be that the mutation is not a 
disease because it causes no harm, and in fact, in certain circumstances is a benefit. My 
position would be that the scientific model will (at least eventually) decide whether this 
gene allele is the cause of a disease, namely causes a biological malfunction, or is just a 
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normal variant, like variations in blood type. On my position regardless of the perceived 
benefits or harms, if there are respectable biological models describing the causal effects 
of the allele as malfunction it is part of a disease explanation. So far, at least, having the 
allele (even being homozygous for it) is considered having a normal variant receptor. 
 The crucial issues here, for a theory of disease, are the distinction between normal 
variation and significant, pathological variation, and how this distinction is achieved. Is it 
conventional judgments of what is normal or abnormal? My position is that to be a 
disease there must be a theoretical model specifying that a variation in function or 
structure is not merely a normal variant, but an abnormal structure or function. Statistical 
data are often important elements in such models, but typicality or rarity in themselves 
cannot settle the issue. The function and structure of cell receptors and the role they play 
in larger biological functions is not the type of issue about which conventional notions of 
normal and abnormal are formed. In the current example, the CCR5 cytokine is one of 
many different proteins on the surface of cells that instantiate the normal immune 
functions of the body. The possession of a mutant CCR5 genotype is a variant of normal 
and not a disease. Among its many functions, its expression allows T helper lymphocytes 
to migrate to the correct area when an immune response is being mounted. Certain groups 
of chemokines expressed on the endothelia that line blood cells in these areas of localized 
immune response adhere to CCR5 and other molecules on the surface of the T 
lymphocytes and help facilitate migration from the blood to the area in which they are 
needed (Janeway, et. al, 2007). There appears to be some redundancy in the immune 
system so that complete loss of the CCR5 receptor as in the homozygotes in this example 
does not lead to any detectable malfunction.125 There is also interesting speculation as to 
what selective pressures are responsible for the increased prevalence of this genetic allele 
in white northern-Europeans. Some have speculated that immunity from other bacteria 
and viruses may have been part of the selective pressure.126 
 
                                                 
125 It may be that the allele causes greater susceptibility to the West Nile virus. See Glass, 
et. al., 2006. 
126 CCR5 mutations may have been selected for as part of increased immunity from 
Yersinnia pestis and/or the smallpox virus. Yersinnia pestis is the bacteria that caused the 
Black Plague in Europe (see Galvani, 2005).  
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4.5.1.5 Sickle Cell Trait and Cystic Fibrosis Carriers as Examples of Heterozygote  
Advantage 
 Sickle cell anemia is a disease caused by the inheritance of mutated alleles, 
specifically alleles that encode for the amino acid valine instead of glutamic acid at the 
6th position of beta globin. The beta globin protein is a component of hemoglobin which 
functions to carry oxygen, effectively picking it up in the lungs and releasing it in 
capillaries near oxygen requiring tissues. The mutated hemoglobin that results in sickle 
cell disease is prone to form gelatinous polymers in low oxygen conditions, and these 
polymers cause distortion of the roughly torus shaped red blood cells. These distorted 
cells can become stuck in smaller capillaries and cause infarction of these vessels, leading 
to the familiar clinical sequelae (Hauser, 2005). People who carry only one mutated allele 
are said to have sickle cell trait, and only rarely have some mild complications at very 
high altitudes or after extreme exertion or in other oxygen deprived states. The frequency 
of these alleles is quite high in certain populations, and in particular where malaria is 
endemic. It is theorized that being a heterozygote with this mutation (i.e. having sickle 
cell trait) offers some survival advantage in an environment were malaria frequently kills. 
Similar hypotheses have been made about a survival advantage explaining the high rate 
of certain alleles responsible for cystic fibrosis. These include survival advantages in 
environments were cholera or tuberculosis infections frequently killed (Alfonso-
Sáncheza, et. al., 2010). Sickle cell disease, sickle trait, cystic fibrosis, and being a carrier 
of cystic fibrosis, are all legitimate disease claims on my view, even in the cases where 
some carriers have no perceived harmful effects, and may even have an advantage 
avoiding malaria or tuberculosis infections. 
 
4.5.1.6 Dyschromic Spirochaetosis 
 This is a disease caused by the bacteria Treponema carateum, a relative of those 
bacteria that cause syphilis and yaws. This sub-species of bacteria is limited to the 
Americas. Infection of a human occurs by skin-to-skin contact and unlike syphilis, skin is 
the only organ affected. Like syphilis the manifestations of the disease occur in stages, 
with the initial infection being an isolated cutaneous lesion, but progressing to diffuse 
lesions which become both hyper- and hypopigmented. The skin of the affected patient 
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can become mottled with variously pigmented lesions, including shades of blue, brown, 
red, purple and white (Hook, 2005). The disease is also called Pinta for painted or colored 
spot in Spanish. The infective agent was determined in 1938 when the bacteria was 
isolated form a Cuban patient (Editorial in JAMA, 1944). This example is sometimes 
sighted in the literature on disease claims due to the fact anthropologists have observed a 
tribe in the remote Amazon for whom the disease was endemic and who believed that the 
resulting skin lesions were (conventionally) normal. Furthermore, this tribe believed that 
those who did not have the lesions were diseased, and even forbid young women from 
marrying men lacking such ‘normal’ skin pigmentation (Dubos, 1965). 
 Pinta clearly is a biological abnormality and legitimate disease claim on my 
account. However, the condition is considered to be normal and desirable by some 
cultures and undesirable and abnormal on other perspectives. Interestingly even from a 
Western cultural viewpoint the disease might be perceived as having consequences no 
more serious than a sort of natural tattooing or body art. For the normativist this is an 
excellent example of the relativity of the perception of disease. It is important to separate 
the issues of theoretical biological abnormality from any conventional judgments about 
normality and abnormality. Regardless of perception, the cause of the condition is a 
biological abnormality.  Similarly, it would not be any less of a theoretical pathology (in 
reference to our best models of intestinal parasitosis) to be infected with a large 
tapeworm, even in a society that valued and pursued this condition for its weight loss and 
allergy alleviating benefits.127 The creation of increasingly detailed and accurate models 
of biological phenomena simultaneously create the theoretical sense of biological 
abnormality, and this sense, once the models are well worked out and verified, often has 
little to do with how the pathology might be judged beneficial or harmful. The issues 
involved with accurate theoretical explanation of what causes biological abnormality are 
not issues of desirability or harm. 
 
 
                                                 
127 Being infected by certain parasites can cause weight-loss and can modulate the 
immune system such that certain allergies no longer manifest. Although, malnutrition and 
other undesirable effects may manifest. 
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4.5.2 Harmful or Disvalued Conditions That Are Not Pathological 
 Now consider painful or otherwise generally undesirable conditions that are not 
theoretical abnormalities. Just as some states of having a disease may not be harmful, 
some normal biological functions and activities are harmful, painful and anything but 
desirable. The normativist explains these conditions as somehow not meeting our 
expectations of disease or abnormality regardless of being harmful or disvalued 
biological conditions. For the naturalist these examples show the lack of necessary 
connection between being an inconvenience or harm and being a disease. The most 
obvious example of this is pregnancy. One of the more challenging is the biological 
process of inflammation. But here too, the more one looks at interesting cases the more 
one realizes that at the edges the distinction between what is normal variation and what 
pathology is sometimes difficult to establish. On my account it is best to allow carefully 
refined but fallible theory to determine such differences. Biological theory can become as 
detailed, complex and nuanced as needed. An area that requires such nuance will be 
certain biological processes that may be pathological conditions in some contexts but not 
in others. 
  
4.5.2.1 Pregnancy, PMS and Fertility 
 Pregnancy is described in modern medical theory as a normal biological process 
and there are models that detail its normal stages and development, and the processes that 
produce these. The result of many of these processes is inconvenience for the mother. 
The state is one of relative immune compromise, and has potentially harmful 
complications. It is necessary to clearly distinguish the details of normal pregnancy from 
the potential complications, which are biological abnormalities and legitimate disease 
claims. Such complications could include pre-eclampsia, failure of labor to progress 
normally, placental abruption, traumatic tearing of the vaginal wall and perineum, etc. 
 PMS (pre-menstrual syndrome) is another putative disease claim. The example is 
interesting because it is a case of distinguishing normal variations in biological processes 
from extremes. The putative theoretical model of PMS as a disease holds that it is an 
endocrinological disregulation along with significantly increased inflammation that leads 
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to the physical and mental symptoms posited to compose the syndrome. The hormonal 
system that controls the menstrual cycle, and the effects of such surges and dips in 
hormone levels on cognitive and metabolic functions, is very complex and still not well 
understood. The question is how to distinguish abnormalities from the normal effects of 
the normal changes in hormones as the body goes through the normal processes of 
ovulation and menses. The solution to the question about whether this is a legitimate 
disease claim will have to await much better scientific models, including those that 
specify the normal interaction of the endocrinological system with the purportedly 
effected neural and psychological systems. Of note, the current DSM-IV-TR has a 
putative disease entity called premenstrual dysmorphic disorder that is a variety of mood 
disorder that occurs consistently in the 2 weeks before menses. The diagnostic criteria 
highlight the mental symptoms and the fact that the condition is a severe interference 
with social or professional functioning (APA, 2000). The practical solution in this case 
for demarcating a clinical problem versus a problem not extreme enough to treat is to 
include the requirement of disruption of daily functioning. This is a subjective criterion 
that allows patients and physicians to negotiate whether or not to utilize biotechnology to 
address problems without needing a full explanation of causation by a biological 
abnormal process.  
 Fertility is another normal biological function. However, under certain 
circumstances it might be perceived as a harm or benefit. People may seek treatment to 
restore it or enhance it when deficient, or to prevent or decrease it (vasectomy and tubal 
ligation, oral contraceptives, etc.). On my account, fertility would be an illegitimate 
disease claim it itself, but infertility may be a sign or symptom of a biological 
abnormality. Interestingly, on my account the reversal of a vasectomy may be the 
treatment of a disease—the reversal of an iatrogenic pathological trauma. I shall discuss 
this further in the section on trauma and environmental causes of disease. 
 
4.5.2.2 Apoptosis, Inflammation, Septic Shock, Autoimmunity, and Allergy 
 These examples are extremely challenging as they mostly represent normal 
processes that can be harmful, even deadly. On my account they are not legitimate 
disease claims in and of themselves. But, as we shall see, these normal processes may be 
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part of the causal story of legitimate disease. 
 Apoptosis refers to a complex but well modeled set of pathways for the 
programmed and orderly death of a nucleated cell. The importance and biological 
normality of such processes is stressed in the following passage from The Molecular 
Basis of Cancer: 
 
Cell death is one of the fastest growing fields in cancer research. It is now well 
recognized that a fundamental characteristic of multicellular organisms is that 
some cells must die for proper development to occur and to maintain homeostasis 
and health. This propensity to die for the greater good of the organism has 
evolved so that cells are systematically dismantled through a hard-wired response 
termed ‘programmed cell death” (PCD). The number of cells in an organism is 
tightly controlled by an exquisite balance between proper cell proliferation, 
differentiation, and cell death. Indeed, in mammals billions of epithelial and blood 
cells die every day. On the surface, the enormity of cell death in multicellular 
organisms seems incredibly wasteful, yet these processes play essential roles in 
maintaining the homeostasis that ensures that individual tissues maintain their 
correct size and proper function. All eukaryotic cells can undergo the cell death 
response, which can be triggered by internal or external stimuli. Important 
examples of this phenomenon are seen in vertebrate development during the 
sculpting of fingers where the cells between digits are cleared through cell death 
and in the selective removal of autoreactive lymphocytes. Similarly, cell death 
plays an important role in regulating blood cell numbers. Blood cell progenitors 
are continuously made in excess in the bone marrow, yet these progenitors, and 
their progeny are cleared by cell death, which prevents overproduction and 
disease states such as leukemia, lymphoma, and/or lympho-, myelo-, or 
erythrocytosis. In the case of erythrocytes, this excess again seems incredibly 
inefficient, yet plays an important role in keeping the organism prepared for times 
of hypoxia induced by rapid blood loss due to injury or following exposure to 
agents that provoke anemia. Here erythrocyte progenitors can be quickly rescued 
from the cell death program by increases in the hormone erythropoietin, which 
inhibits cell death and promotes the differentiation of these progenitors into 
erythrocytes. These examples underscore the importance of balancing cell 
proliferation, differentiation, and cell death. Indeed, when this balance goes away, 
disease ensues. (Dorsey, et. al., 2008, p. 205). 
 
Apoptosis is the orderly and programmed, energy-dependent, destruction and death of a 
cell via specifically activated genes and the resultant encoded proteins. Death by 
apoptosis prevents the inflammation that would occur from less orderly other forms of 
cell demise. In apoptosis the cell implodes and neatly packages the waste materials for 
easy, orderly disposal by the body. The models of the molecular pathways involved 
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describe the normal process and also highlight various ways in which the process may 
malfunction. Some types of malfunction in apoptosis play a role in the causal mechanism 
and models of specific kinds of cancer. 
 The discovery and characterization of these biological functions could have been 
guided by the perception of early investigators that they were good, bad or indifferent. 
Initially the process was named when cells undergoing the process were perceived to be 
shrinking and wasting away like leaves off a tree in fall. The point is that as the models 
were built up and the processes were understood in relation to other biological functions, 
apoptosis was increasingly understood as a necessary and normal process. Even if 
initially perceived as harmful—it is basically mechanized suicide—it is ultimately 
determined to be theoretically normal. Theoretical normality and being perceived as 
beneficial are not necessarily coordinated. The loss of this ability to self-destruct at 
appropriate times is an important kind of abnormality. It is difficult to imagine how 
conventional value judgments could have determined that eventually apoptosis would be 
considered normal. 
 Aging is perceived as harmful. Aging may also be considered as a type of self-
destruct mechanism. Some research supports the hypothesis that mammalian cells are 
programmed to have a certain lifespan and then to cease to reproduce, causing the 
breakdown and eventual ceasing of function of tissues. In contrast cancer cells that lose 
some of the normal biological regulatory processes via genetic mutation can theoretically 
reproduce and survive as immortal cell lines. Perhaps the requirements of building 
complex multicellular organism with the ability to grow, heal and accomplish very 
complex higher level functions, are always balanced by the need to reduce cancer-
causing mutations during cell division and in the face of environmental damage. The 
resulting compromise of this balance is aging. Aging, on such a picture, would be a 
normal biological process and there could be various malfunctions in the systems that 
regulate normal aging. But the reliable and detailed models explaining these processes 
are still works in progress. On my view it might someday be the case that aging and death 
are biologically normal and not associated with disease, in contrast to the normativist 
view in which aging and death are, in themselves, diseases. Perhaps on my account there 
would be diseases (i.e. biological abnormalities) that cause longer life. It may, however, 
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always remain difficult to separate the conventional value judgments about death from 
any theoretical sense of its normality. 
 Inflammation is another interesting biological mechanism. It is harmful and often 
the most proximal explanation of pain and discomfort in many clinical situations. It was 
once considered as disease in its own right, but is now seen as a general mechanism 
involved in many immune responses to infection, cancer, or other triggering stimuli. 
Inflammation is a normal biological process, necessary to remove toxins, necrotic tissue, 
or invading pathogens. Like apoptosis, abnormalities in the pathway of the normal 
inflammatory response lead to specific diseases. It is also known that inflammation is a 
necessary stimulation for the healing of damaged tissues, and blocking inflammation will 
delay or prevent the initiation of the general pathways for healing at the cellular and 
molecular levels. In the normal functioning of the mammalian body inflammation is 
necessary but must be very carefully and complexly regulated (see Kumar, 2004). 
 Inflammation is a part of the causal mechanism that instantiates many diseases. It 
is an example of normal biological processes occurring in the wrong context or occurring 
as the normal response to signaling initiated by a biological malfunction. It is worth 
noting that in many cases of disease a malfunction at a lower level of analysis will initiate 
otherwise normal processes to ensue at higher levels of analysis. Inflammation is 
involved in autoimmune diseases and is part of the mechanism creating the clinical 
problem of shock. 
 Septic shock is an important clinical problem. It is the leading cause of death in 
intensive care units in the United States, and has an overall mortality of 28.6%  (Angus, 
et. al., 2001). Shock is a state of global hypoperfusion—a failure to adequately perfuse all 
the tissues and organs of the body with blood. It can have several causes, including broad 
categories like cardiogenic shock (pump failure), hypovolemic shock (caused by acute 
loss of blood volume), and distributive shock (caused by inappropriate activity of the 
vasculature causing low resistance and pressure). Operationally it is defined as a low 
systolic blood pressure, despite at least one hour of adequate IV fluid resuscitation, that 
continues to be less than 90 mm of mercury (or a mean arterial pressure less than 60 mm 
of mercury).  
Sepsis means literally a rotting of tissue. When applied to a wound it refers to a 
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pus producing infection. When applied to an individual, as in septic shock, it refers to an 
infection that has spread to the blood. The patient who is ‘septic’ is one who presents 
with a set of signs consistent with a systemic infection causing a response. In this 
syndrome, even tissues remote from the original source can display the signs of 
inflammation, including dilation and increased permeability of the vasculature. The 
diagnosis of sepsis (by definition) requires two components: evidence of this systemic 
inflammatory response and a known source of infection. The systemic inflammatory 
response syndrome (SIRS) is a host response to infection (although it can be caused by 
non-infectious causes like acute pancreatitis, and not all cases of localized infections 
elicit a SIRS). Models of SIRS provide details of the types of molecular signals (e.g. 
certain pieces of bacterial cell wall) that elicit the response and how the cells of the 
immune system mobilize specific receptors and initiate chemical cascades to signal the 
various other cellular and tissue components that instantiate the response. Operationally 
SIRS is defined as the presence of at least 2 of the following 4 conditions: 1) temperature 
greater than 38 C or less than 36 C; 2) heart rate greater than 90 beats per minute; 3) 
respiratory rate greater than 30 breaths per minute; and 4) a white blood cell count greater 
than 12 million per liter, or less than 4 million per liter. 
Thus septic shock is a strong systemic inflammatory response caused by an 
identifiable infection that is severe enough to lead to hypoperfusion of vital organs even 
in the face of adequate attempts to boost blood pressure with IV fluids. Septic shock is a 
type of distributive shock—the main malfunction is that arteries are failing to properly 
maintain pressure so that normal perfusion occurs. A classic hypothetical model of the 
general malfunction involved in distributive shock is presented by Landry and Oliver 
(2001). Although inflammation is a normal host response, many current models of robust 
systemic inflammation and septic shock hypothesize that it is an abnormal response, with 
dysregulation of the normal control of inflammation creating a chain of events that leads 
to shock. Research has investigated different genetic variations that allow differential 
levels of response, and the details are being worked out concerning which differences are 
normal variation versus variations significant enough to be malfunctions (see Kumar, 
2005). 
 It is important to note that SIRS and shock are clinical problems diagnosable 
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based on vital signs and the sorts of rapid tests (CBC, chest X-ray, etc.) that might be 
done at the bedside in a typical emergency medicine department. They are not in 
themselves disease claims, but clinical conditions caused by one of several possible 
disease processes. Septic shock moves closer to being the diagnosis of a disease as it 
requires that the unstable condition of hypoperfusion be caused by an infection, but it is 
still just a general clinical syndrome (i.e. set of signs and symptoms) that are presumably 
caused by an underlying disease process. The issue of abnormality here is difficult. 
Distributive shock may itself be a type of biological malfunction. It may be that certain 
genetic predispositions allow a hyper-active immune response compared to a more 
normal response. There are models of distributive shock that hypothesize that it is a 
condition of global over-response by the immune system and interventions aimed at 
damping down the immune response have been developed. There are also models that 
suggest that a crucial part of the abnormality in septic shock is an exaggerated response 
by the body aimed at down-regulating the immune system once it is strongly stimulated 
and globally activated. These later models would explain the extremely high mortality of 
a malfunction that turns off the immune system in the setting of a serious infection. 
 Determining what is normal and abnormal about the body’s response to certain 
kinds of serious infection is an area still being worked out. Sepsis and septic shock are 
clinical problems and syndromes, and some research projects posit them as putative 
diseases. It is important to remember that pathology at one level can give rise to normal 
processes at higher levels. Such normal processes, like inflammation, might be the most 
proximate cause of the clinical signs and symptoms that are harmful. This is another 
example of the recurring problem of distinguishing what constitutes extremes or 
otherwise significant variation. As I have repeatedly stated, the best way to settle this 
issue is to allow scientific research and models to increasingly develop theoretical senses 
of what is normal variation and what pathology. Biomedical research does this and will 
continue to do so. These examples also reiterate the lack of necessary coordination 
between a biological process being perceived as undesirable and what biological science 
describes as abnormal. 
 Another interesting area is diseases of autoimmunity. Generally, these are a group 
of diseases that involve the immune system causing inflammation, destruction, or other 
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types of dysregulation of the normal tissues of the body. The field of immunology 
continues to work on a theory of the normal operation of the immune system, and part of 
this theory includes models of how the immune system recognizes ‘self’ from ‘other’ 
(Janeway, et. al., 2001). Some autoimmune diseases are failures of the normal process of 
determining what is considered ‘self.’128 It also contains models detailing how the 
immune system has checks and balances to ensure that it does not get out of control. Such 
models describe the circumstances when the system is appropriately switched on and 
when off, as well as the initiation of the process of repair and regeneration. Autoimmune 
diseases are cases of otherwise normal processes and mechanisms occurring at abnormal 
sites, or due to abnormal regulation. 
 Many of the paradigm examples of legitimate disease claims in this essay have 
involved autoimmune aspects in their models. Type 1 diabetes and Grave’s disease are 
examples. As I have argued, models may, as needed, become very complicated as far as 
distinguishing theoretical senses of normal and abnormal. Consider graft-versus-host 
disease that occurs in the setting of certain organ transplants. Basically the white blood 
cells of the organ donor are, by a normal process, ‘educated’ in the donor’s body to 
recognize that donor body as ‘self.’ The white blood cells of the organ recipient are 
normally ‘educated’ in the recipient’s body to recognize its tissues as ‘self.’ When a liver 
or bone marrow from the donor is transplanted and contains donor lymphocytes, these 
cells recognize the new recipient tissues as foreign and via normal immune processes can 
elicit inflammation and destruction of normal recipient tissues. Is such graft-vs.-host 
disease a legitimate disease claim? It is caused entirely by normal biological processes 
active in a certain specific context. The therapy is aimed at preventing normal immune 
responses. Perhaps some would argue that it is a type of infection—invasion by a type of 
cell that causes tissue damage. Consider also the various kinds of immune mediated 
rejection of transplanted organs by the normal behavior of the recipient’s immune 
system. Is it a disease to reject these transplanted organs? On my account, I would argue 
these processes are all normal. It is human desires and agendas that perceive such 
rejections or immune responses as unacceptable or abnormal. Organ transplant is a 
                                                 
128 This process involves the appropriate (and normal) death of certain immune system 
mediating white blood cells, and the survival of others. 
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therapy for legitimate disease claims, but the normal biological processes that make it 
challenging are not in themselves causing disease. 
  
4.5.2.3 Mountain Sickness and Decompression Sickness 
 Continuing on the theme of undesirable states that may not be diseases, consider 
the conditions of mountain sickness and decompression sickness. These problematic 
conditions occur when humans move from one set of environmental conditions to 
another. In mountain sickness, humans acclimated to living in more typical elevations 
nearer sea-level ascend too rapidly to mountainous elevations. Decompression sickness, 
also sometimes called ‘the bends,’129 occurs when humans place themselves in conditions 
of high ambient pressure and move too quickly to a lower ambient pressure. 
Decompression sickness is a risk for those working in deep sea and space exploration. 
The challenge for disease claims is that these might just be normal physiological 
responses to unusual or extreme environmental factors. A simpler version of the basic 
problem would be a person suffocating when moving from a well-oxygenated 
environment to one without oxygen, such as an astronaut being exposed to space without 
any life support apparatus. Would such a death be due to a disease—to a biological 
abnormality? The same issue seems to occur for drowning. These cases highlight that 
what is considered theoretically biologically normal may be relative to simplifications 
and idealizations of the environment in which the models are assumed to operate. The 
models of normal biological function assume environments with certain atmospheric 
pressures and gas contents. If there is a spectrum of responses as we subtly change 
environmental aspects, how do we determine where normal physiological responses end 
and abnormal or pathological responses begin? How similar are some of these situations 
to trauma from hostile elements of the environment—such as being burned by the sun?130 
How are some of these similar or different from being poisoned by the bite of a 
venomous snake or by the treachery of an angry spouse? Perhaps they are importantly 
                                                 
129 It is also called caisson’s disease, and all these different names are considered 
alternate designations for the same disease because the model of underlying biological 
process involved in each case are the same. 
130 Getting a little red is a natural reaction, although still trauma. A blistering, cracking, 
bleeding sun burn is severe trauma. 
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similar to cases where the environment fails to provide the necessary nutrients for certain 
biological functions—such as cases of endemic goiter and cretinism due to iodine 
deficiency. 
 As far as whether mountain sickness is a legitimate disease claim, I again allow 
the models of the biological phenomena involved to distinguish normal from abnormal 
processes.  Acute high altitude illness is a clinical syndrome that affects some people at 
high altitudes (esp. those higher than 8000 ft.). The ‘sickness’ is caused by the thinning of 
air—less molecules per square feet, measured as a drop in barometric pressure. The 
partial pressure of inspired oxygen drops and thus the driving force behind oxygen 
movement in and out of the blood in the lungs is decreased, and tissue hypoxia can result. 
Symptoms such as headache, fatigue, and malaise can develop. The symptoms are caused 
by relative tissue hypoxia and from resulting changes in the vasculature. Certain 
acclimatization processes begin to occur and take minutes to days to adjust. Potentially 
fatal complications may rarely result due to pulmonary or cerebral edema, most likely 
caused by extreme forms of vascular permeability (Allemann and Scherrer, 2010). There 
are clearly normal variations in the efficiency, speed and reserve capacity of the 
acclimatization functions. The models of the biological systems involved do designate the 
more extreme effects, such as pulmonary or cerebral edema, as putative disease claims. 
These rare complications are malfunctions compared to the normal functioning of these 
systems, even when these systems are stressed by ascent to higher altitude. The more 
common less extreme symptoms due to overly rapid ascent do not appear to be legitimate 
disease claims but variations in normal function. 
 Decompression sickness basically occurs when gasses in the body that were 
dissolved into solution at one pressure ‘boil’ out of solution as pressure changes. This 
happens when lower ambient pressures are entered and when the normal pulmonary and 
circulatory processes that deal with such out-gassing are overwhelmed. Here the models 
involved designate normal processes that are elicited merely by humans moving between 
extreme environmental conditions. I believe that decompression illness is not a legitimate 
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disease claim.131 
 Decompression sickness seems only to involve normal biological responses to 
extreme environmental changes. However, it may be disease if what constitutes a normal 
response assumes only idealized environments. With such assumptions it would be a kind 
of trauma like being poisoned or stabbed or hit by lightning. The case of suffocation due 
to lack of oxygen, some would argue, is different only in the rapidity and extremity of the 
consequences when compared to decompression sickness or to disease caused by lack of 
nutrients from the environment. Suffocation, I believe, is a trauma and pathology caused 
by insult from the environment. Theoretical models describe the sustained lack of oxygen 
on most cells in the body as eliciting abnormal metabolic processes. Interestingly, 
whether the water was hypertonic, hypotonic, or isotonic would change what kind of 
trauma and biological abnormality was occurring. 
  
4.5.3 Conditions Perceived as Pathological but Which Are Theoretically Normal 
 These examples involve conditions that are normal in reference to biological 
theory, but are potentially considered to be disease-like or abnormal in a conventional 
sense. For the normativist these would be diseases. Many examples here will involve the 
normal flora found in the intestinal tract and on the skin. Modeling of the human body’s 
normal anatomy and physiology has revealed that the gut is normally the home to trillions 
of bacteria, with viruses, protozoa and fungi as well. These organisms in the gut, unlike 
those on the skin, are not mere colonizers, but function in symbiosis with the host. The 
gut flora metabolize certain products secreted into the gut and synthesize other products 
that are absorbed into the body. Complex immune system functions monitor traffic across 
the gut wall, and monitor the make-up of the flora present in the gut lumen. An excellent 
review article (Guarner and Malagelada 2003) details some of the scientific models 
explaining the normal functioning of the gut flora and the role it plays in several possible 
biological malfunctions. The abstract of that article states:  
 
The human gut is the natural habitat for a large and dynamic bacterial community, 
                                                 
131 Interestingly, most medical insurance policies do not cover treatment of 
decompression illness caused by scuba diving, due to it being expensive and because the 
activity is a high-risk and voluntary activity that occurs in extreme environments. 
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but a substantial part of these bacterial populations are still to be described. 
However, the relevance and effect of resident bacteria on a host’s physiology and 
pathology has been well documented. Major functions of the gut microflora 
include metabolic activities that result in salvage of energy and absorbable 
nutrients, important trophic effects on intestinal epithelia and on immune structure 
and function, and protection of the colonized host against invasion by alien 
microbes. Gut flora might also be an essential factor in certain pathological 
disorders, including multisystem organ failure, colon cancer, and inflammatory 
bowel diseases. Nevertheless, bacteria are also useful in promotion of human 
health. Probiotics and prebiotics are known to have a role in prevention or 
treatment of some diseases (Guarner and Malagelada, 2003, p. 512). 
 
 Loss of this normal flora by sterilization would be an abnormality. Such losses of 
normal flora are an important component mechanisms in the disease of clostridium 
difficile overgrowth. The overgrowth can result in subsequent destruction of the colon 
wall and is often the resulting side-effect of using anti-biotics that inadvertently kill off 
significant portions of the normal flora. It also turns out that many of the species found 
normally in the gut and that are involved in symbiotic normal functions, in one context, 
can be pathogens in other contexts. Many varieties of E. Coli are found normally in the 
gut and feces, but if these species enter the urethra (normally sterile) then a urinary tract 
infection can result. Certain bacteria or worms are always pathogenic if they infect the 
gut. Other bacteria not known to be part of the normal flora can colonize without 
infecting the gut or skin, meaning that they are present but not at that time eliciting an 
immune response, but potentially could. The presence of bacteria in the large intestine is 
not a legitimate disease claim, and has necessitated the development of concepts such as 
normal flora, colonization, commensal and symbiotic relationships, all in contrast to 
infection. These concepts and the notions of normality and abnormality here are 
generated by the development of the models that describe these phenomena. These senses 
of normal and abnormal are independent from conventional judgments about the 
desirability or normality determined by our community’s perceptions about bacteria (or 
‘germs’) inhabiting our bodies. 
 Pregnancy is also a type of symbiotic relationship and involves the growth of a 
biologically foreign entity inside the body. It resembles cancer in some aspects and 
infection in others. The immune systems response to pregnancy is complex. However, 
pregnancy and the changes of the immune system and other physiological changes during 
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pregnancy are not diseases—they are designated as normal functions in the models 
developed to explain these phenomena. An interesting example of biological malfunction 
during pregnancy is hemolytic disease of the fetus and newborn. Basically this is a 
condition where the immune system of the mother has come into contact with certain 
proteins on the surface of fetal blood cells—proteins different from those on the mother’s 
red blood cells. The mother’s immune system produces antibodies to these proteins. In 
future pregnancies if the new fetus has a blood type with those particular surface proteins, 
the mother will produce antibodies that can cross the placenta and destroy fetal red blood 
cells and cause anemia in utero (Janeway, et. al., 2001).  This is a legitimate disease for 
the newborn, and represents an abnormal attack on the fetal red blood cells by a toxic 
antibody produced by the maternal immune system. For the mother the production of 
antibodies to the fetal RBCs is a normal process. Interesting models of how different 
blood groups emerged in human populations, how these are normal variants, and how 
such variation is involved in resisting infectious disease and causing transfusion related 
sickness are reviewed in Antsee (2010). 
 
4.5.3.1 Spermatorrhea 
 This is, on my account, an illegitimate disease claim. It is basically the 
medicalization of a normal biological function or process due to cultural notions of 
abnormality. It is a supposed pathology of sperm production whose most reliable outward 
symptom was involuntary emission of male ejaculate. This was a putative disease claim 
for Western European medical theory in the nineteenth century. In Victorian England it 
was taken quite seriously and respectable medical thinkers and journals considered 
theoretical hypothesis about its nature, causes and potential cures. Its relationship to the 
‘disease’ of masturbation and the curative effects of circumcision were seriously 
discussed (Darby, 2005). Interestingly the disease entity (yijing) was one of great concern 
within the framework of traditional Chinese medicine during the same period. Yijing had 
been a disease in Chinese medicine for at least two thousand years and continues to be 
today (Shapiro, 1998). 
 Here we have an example of a putative disease claim that is rejected as 
illegitimate within one framework due to biological and sociological research concluding 
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that the symptoms were theoretically normal and not the result of any underlying 
abnormality, while another explanatory framework continues to see it as a theoretical 
abnormality. These theoretical notions of normality stand regardless of the conventional 
judgments of harm or deviancy that might be held by particular communities. Within 
traditional Chinese medicine yijing is a legitimate disease (or at least a well established 
putative claim), while in Western medicine it is now an illegitimate disease claim. 
  
4.5.4 Normal Variations as Opposed to Pathology 
 The problem of distinguishing normal variation from pathology was discussed in 
Chapter 3 and included examples such as blood groups and eye color. The sinister 
conditions of left-handedness and hirsutism are also interesting cases. With hirsutism 
there is a continuum regarding the amount of body hair that people have, and describing 
what is normal is challenging, just as determining when baldness is or is not biologically 
abnormal. As discussed in Chapter 3, the basic problem exposes the weakness of trying to 
establish disease by strictly statistical senses of abnormality (i.e. atypicality). The 
problem is one that the normativist believes can only be solved with the use of 
conventional senses of abnormality, and more specifically by appealing to the perception 
of the biological function or structure as disvalued, harmful or inconvenient to those 
afflicted. My position is that scientific models in the process of increasing the accuracy 
and detail with which they describe the biological phenomena in question, create a 
theoretical sense of normal and abnormal function that is importantly different than the 
purely conventional or statistical notions of normality. The sense of normality is not 
established globally. Science settles the variation issue locally, creating the sense of 
normality appropriate for each model and the explanatory task at hand. The disease 
claims for left-handedness, green eye-color, and type A blood are all illegitimate. 
Hirsutism in itself is not a legitimate disease claim, but might be a sign of an underlying 
pathology, and might form one amongst other signs of a legitimate disease claim, such as 
ovarian cancer. It is important to keep straight the level of analysis involved with 
normality judgments. At the observable level admixtures of conventional and theoretical 
abnormality are hard to prevent. 
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 A very controversial example involving normal variation is homosexuality. This 
is currently not a legitimate disease claim. However, there are research projects looking 
at the neuro-endocrinological and genetic aspects of sexual preference and behavior.132 
These projects are working on explanations that not only distinguish biological processes 
causing sexual preference but differences between male and female as well. Suppose that 
science develops models explaining sexual preference for the same gender as caused by a 
certain combination of genetic factors. How would the question of whether this is a 
normal variant (like eye color) or a mutation leading to disease (like sickle cell anemia) 
be settled? One issue would be developing models of a circumscribed neural system that 
has a normal function. Models would also have to distinguish normal variation in 
function and structure from abnormalities. In such a scenario same-gender-preference 
might be described as a result of an abnormal neural structure, and this would be a 
putative disease claim. Legitimacy would require the models to survive criticism and 
further testing, be refined, and eventually accepted as unbiased and accurate. This 
scenario seems unlikely given what is known currently, and I assume that such research 
will eventually explain the neural differences between sexual preference (as well as any 
between males and females) are variants of normal. But my opinions are surely 
influenced by conventional senses of what is normal and abnormal. Suppose that genetic 
differences in neural structure were discovered that explained the preferences of 
pedophiles. Would we expect this to be explained as just a normal variation in neural 
structure? Explanations of diseases that involve human behavior or gross human 
appearance or functionality will always present challenges as far as untangling the 
conventional senses of abnormality from the theoretical. However, even if conventional 
senses help initiate the research, the eventual resulting theoretical notions of normality 
and abnormality cannot be predicted and depend increasingly on the details of the 
phenomena as described in the model. No one would have guessed when work on 
intestinal physiology and infections began that it would have been normal for so much 
biologically necessary bacteria to reside there. Furthermore, regardless of whether 
                                                 
132 Recently a research group in China sent a brief communication to Nature (a 
prestigious journal) about the correlation between normal serotonin signaling in mice 
brains and gender preferences in mating behaviors (Liu, et. al. 2011). 
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differences in sexual preferences are theoretical variations of normal or some are 
abnormalities, how we decide to handle such information or individual differences in 
preference or behavior in our community is something that can be negotiated. 
 
4.5.5 Statistically Pervasive Diseases (i.e., Widespread Pathology) 
 The naturalist that wishes to rely on statistical notions of normality faces the 
problem of what to do with prevalent disease. Examples here include diseases such as 
atherosclerosis, hypertension, tooth decay, etc. If most or many species members have a 
disease, then it becomes hard to distinguish diseased functionality from normal merely by 
observing and measuring functional mode and efficiencies. Theoretical models can start 
with tentative hypotheses until further details allow more accurate determinations. 
Theoretical models can also abstract away from the actual circumstances that organisms 
operate under in their natural environments. In fact, most laboratory experimentation with 
biological function is done under exquisitely controlled and simplified conditions. In this 
way theoretical models are simplifications and idealizations away from any actual 
organism or environment.  
 Many of the examples along these lines have complex multifactorial models of 
causation. Causation results emergently from the interplay of many complex components. 
Many of the subsystems involved in causation, if examined in isolation, might be 
considered as operating normally or as variants of normal, but in combination with other 
variant systems produce emergent abnormal function. Issues with multiple realizability 
occur. These models also involve complex mixtures of genetic predisposition and 
environmental factors. These diseases tend to increase in prevalence with age. As with 
any disease that is pervasive and increases in prevalence with age, the issue of what 
constitutes normal from pathologic aging becomes a difficult issue. Atherosclerosis and 
essential hypertension are legitimate disease claims (or at least putative disease claims 
very close to legitimacy).  
 
4.5.6 Ontogeny and Development 
 There is hope that science may be able to develop sets of reliable scientific 
models for the normal biology of aging, because it has made great strides in doing so for 
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ontogeny and development. The field of embryology and pediatric medicine provide 
impressive epidemiological (i.e. statistical) and mechanistic (i.e. theoretical) models for 
normal development. These fields have also developed models of abnormalities that 
explain human diseases that effect development and growth. Disease claims such as De 
Georges syndrome, Down’s syndrome, thalidomide limb aplasia, and many more are 
legitimate. 
 
4.5.7 Aging as Disease 
 For our contemporary society, aging and death are seen as undesirable aspects of 
biology. Many aspects of our culture deal with the fear of aging and death, and many 
facets of our economy deal with easing or avoiding these inevitabilities. There are many 
research projects whose goals are to slow or prevent the effects of aging. Some might 
even claim that medicine itself is essentially the technological attempt to stave off aging 
and death. So is aging a disease? 
 For the normativist it is disease. However, on my account we must wait until 
science has much better models of the mechanisms of aging, and how these relate to the 
necessities of multicellular organisms and cancer. As best I can tell, based on the research 
now available, there is a normal programmed life span for humans. There is a normal 
aging process, even if it has larger variations than those found in growth and 
development from zygote to adult. The burden of proof is on those claiming aging is a 
pathology. All the familiar issues will plague the development of such models. It will 
involve grossly observable changes in ability, structure and behavior. It will be hard to 
separate conventional value judgments from theoretical notions. Idealizing normal 
function to that of the young male adult has been and continues to be an issue in 
biological research. Conventional norms influence theoretical models, but part of 
seriously addressing issues of aging will require that these sorts of biases are minimized 
as much as possible. It will also be difficult at first for researchers to distinguish normal 
variation from pathology. 
 The ultimate difficulties will not revolve around whether or not aging in general, 
or any particular aspects of aging, are designated as legitimate disease claims. The 
ultimate difficulty will be what to do with the knowledge gained by developing the 
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models. Even now the economic burden of sustaining the chronically ill is a problem. 
Such knowledge will likely allow intervention and such intervention will be desired (at 
least based on our current culture). Issues of who has access to such intervention and the 
impact such widespread intervention would have on society will be difficult regardless of 
how the disease issues are settled. The settling of the issue of disease will help prevent 
the creep of medicalization and may help focus people on the real types of negotiation 
and discussion needed to make decisions on what we should do about slowing or 
preventing aging. 
 Consider osteoarthritis. This is basically a condition caused by wear and tear on 
the joints. However, there is variation in how early and how severely people are affected 
by this condition. Is it a legitimate disease claim or just part of normal aging? To the best 
of my knowledge concerning the models, run-of-the-mill osteoarthritis, although a 
clinical problem, is not a legitimate disease. If it were a putative or legitimate claim it 
would have to be so in comparison to the joint function and structure of the young adult 
joint which has not been exposed to much vigorous use. Here the model of normal 
function and structure would be significantly idealized. Skin wrinkling with age, on my 
analysis, is another case of an illegitimate disease claim.133 The weakening of the 
immune system with age is also probably part of normal biological development. We 
treat this clinically with vaccinations. Another age-related disease claim involves 
senility—loss of memory and cognitive speed with age. Is some amount of senility 
normal? What about extremes? This disease claim faces many of the general problems 
just reviewed. It is at best a putative claim, and I believe garden-variety senility will 
prove to be an illegitimate disease claim. But compare this to the case of certain 
dementias, such as Alzheimer’s or Huntington’s. For these we have increasingly good 
models about what is causing the loss of cognitive ability. Huntington’s is a legitimate 
disease claim, and Alzheimer’s is a syndrome and putative claim that looks promising as 
a legitimate disease. Alzheimer’s has complex multifactorial causation and like essential 
hypertension and atherosclerosis the models of causation are complex and involve 
                                                 
133 However, it may occur at an extremely young age in a person not unduly exposed to 
the sun, and may be abnormal biologically. 
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elements of aging. Distinguishing normal variation from significant variation is 
challenging and takes time.  
 
4.5.8 Environmental Insults and Injuries 
 Several conditions claimed to be diseases are due to less than hospitable 
environments. Such examples highlight the issue concerning the idealization of the 
environment in models of normal biological function. It is also interesting to consider 
whether all hostile effects on an organism result in pathology, or only some. Perhaps 
some effects of a hostile environment elicit a normal biological response. A normal 
response might even be one that is perceived as harmful to the organism (see the 
discussion of suffocation and decompression sickness above). It is also important to note 
that my account of ‘disease’ is wide enough to encompass injuries and traumas, such as 
being stabbed by a knife. 
 Infectious diseases seem to be paradigmatic examples of disease. Such invasions 
by hostile organisms from outside the sterile core of the body are legitimate disease 
claims. Sun burns of the skin can come in a spectrum of severity, but are also legitimate 
destructions of normal structures and disruption of normal function. Nutritional diseases, 
such as beri-beri, pellagra, vitamin A deficiency, and scurvy are also classic examples of 
disease, and have models of the increasing dysfunction of metabolism as the body is 
deprived of necessary nutrients. Reliable and verified models explain that certain 
vitamins and minerals are required by certain species and that the body cannot normally 
synthesize these and must acquire them by ingestion. Other substances ingested can cause 
metabolic malfunctions and are diseases of poisoning or overdose. Above we considered 
decompression sickness and I stated that it was not a legitimate disease claim, but rather 
the normal biological response to unusual or extreme changes in the environment, but 
that suffocation and drowning were legitimate claims on my account. Ultimately it is the 
presence of reliable models contrasting normal and abnormal function of a circumscribed 
system to environment effects that determine legitimate disease claims. Traumatic 
injuries also count as legitimate claims if there are legitimate models of the structural and 
functional damage caused. Hanging, gun shot wounds, burns, etc are all legitimate 
disease claims. 
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4.5.9 Old Injuries, Old Traumas, and Malformations 
 The examples in this section are not active processes, but the result of previous 
trauma or malfunction. These lingering malformations or residual malfunctions are part 
of the current stable structure and functioning of the organism. Normativists are eager to 
point out that labeling these differences as abnormal invites discrimination (Amundson, 
2000). They also point out that in some cases concentrating on ‘fixing’ abnormalities 
instead of accommodating differences perpetuates discrimination (Dreger, 2004). But 
these decisions about what to do in the face of disability, differences, or disease are 
different decisions than whether or not the condition results from a biological 
abnormality. These issues were discussed at greater length in Chapter 3. 
 There are many examples of legitimate disease claims such as the residual 
weakness, aphasia or dysarthria that remain years after a stroke, due to the neural 
connections lost at the time of injury that could not be regained or compensated for. 
Paralysis from car accidents, or from spina bifida, are also legitimate claims to pathology. 
A person who has a vasectomy or tubal ligation can be understood to have acquired an 
iatrogenic disease. The existence of a previous biological malfunction or trauma to 
explain the current condition is important in the legitimacy of such disease claims. There 
are also many legitimate and putative birth defects and congenital syndromes that result 
from malfunctions in embryological development. 
 
4.5.10 Macroscopically Observable and Cosmetic Abnormalities 
 Some diseases affect appearance and have very good causal explanatory models. 
These types of abnormalities are observable and can be considered and judged without 
any specialized knowledge. Any theoretical model of abnormality will have to co-exist or 
compete with conventional judgments. Certain cases of icthiosis (i.e. fish-scale-like skin), 
psoriasis, and alopecia areata are increasingly understood at the molecular and genetic 
levels of analysis. However, when explanatory models are not available and are only 
suspected, conventional senses of abnormality fill the void, and medicalization often 
occurs, especially if those having the condition believe biotechnology can help them. But 
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in these cases where the theoretical models are not yet available, regardless of whether 
medical intervention is or should be offered, these are not yet legitimate cases of disease. 
 Consider baldness again. To normativists this will be a disease that is relative to 
cultural views at any given time or place. The normativist focuses on consequences. Our 
current culture mostly values youthful appearance and will find baldness undesirable and 
abnormal. However, some cultures may find baldness a sign of experience and survival 
and value it. It may not be considered abnormal in those contexts. In such societies men 
might even fake baldness, the way that certain celebrities wear fake glasses to appear 
more sophisticated. The naturalist will tend to consider baldness a part of normal aging, 
but this will depend on how normal is determined. If it is determined statistically, then 
the sample selected will matter. There is the potential for biasing by idealizing what is 
normal to the young members of a species. My position will stress mechanistic function 
and the cause of the external appearance in question, rather than its typicality. Was the 
cause a biological malfunction at a lower level of analysis? If so it is a disease. 
 Alopecia areata134 is a legitimate disease claim. Baldness, secondary to trauma, 
like a burn, would also be pathological. Androgenic alopecia in a middle aged man is a 
putative disease, but may turn out just to be a normal variation in older men. Currently 
we lack a well verified and uncontroversial scientific theory of normal aging or normal 
appearance for humans.135 Wrinkles are in a similar position to baldness regarding being 
a sign of disease. 
 Obesity and shortness as disease claims are interesting. They are macroscopically 
observable and in our current culture judged as less desirable aspects of body habitus. 
These qualities come on a spectrum and are relative. Even to define them operationally 
requires a judgment about where to make a cut-off between normal variation and an 
extreme. I discussed these problems in Chapter 3. These observable signs can sometimes 
be part of a syndrome with a biological abnormality as the explanation. There are models 
of disease caused by mutations in the genes for growth hormone receptors that result in 
extreme short stature. See Kamboj (2005) for an excellent review of those diseases 
                                                 
134 This is an immunological attack on hair follicles causing loss of hair in smooth round 
patches, and in severe cases all hair on the body. 
135 Science does have much better worked out models for the normal appearance and 
normal changes in appearance for species other than humans. 
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associated with short stature and discussion of the many clinical problems for which 
recombinant exogenous growth hormone might be used as intervention. There are also 
genetic defects that are implicated in extreme obesity due to disruption in the biological 
systems that regulate energy storage at the cellular level and involved in signaling the 
brain concerning hunger and satiation (i.e. the system involving leptin, grehlin, orerin, 
insulin, etc.). See Grimm and Steinle (2011) for a concise review. Some legitimate 
disease claims involve obesity or shortness as grossly observable symptoms. These 
models explain why a person is extremely short or obese, but do not necessarily make 
obesity or shortness in and of themselves diseases. It is conceivable that eventually all 
cases of extreme shortness (or obesity) might be explained as caused by one or another 
known biological abnormality. This situation would perhaps allow calling extreme 
shortness (or obesity) a disease. These comments apply equally to gigantism or cachexia.  
 Norman Daniels has argued that treating shortness (a symptom) only in those 
patients who can be diagnosed with a lower level biological abnormality is unfair. 
Daniels argues that the stigma and disadvantage is the same for those with diagnosable 
causes and those without (Daniels, et. al., 1992). I agree that if one is intervening to 
prevent the social stigmata then fairness requires treating all those with the symptoms. 
However, only some cases of shortness on my account are legitimate disease claims 
while others are putative. The scenario where all cases of extreme shortness are 
considered signs of disease raises an issue about what it is that we are classifying—
clinical problems or underlying causal mechanisms. I have resisted putting into my 
explication of legitimate disease claim that it refer to the lowest level cause of theoretical 
abnormality—below which there is only normal biological function. This specification 
would allow us to dismiss some high-level-of-analysis abnormalities (one’s with difficult 
admixtures of theoretical and conventional senses of abnormality). Shortness itself, even 
if all extreme cases had good lower level explanations, like receptor mutations, would 
then not be a disease claim, but rather the disease would be the lower level abnormalities 
giving rise to the observable feature. This might greatly increase the number of diseases, 
as several distinct lower level models might give rise to the same observable signs and 
symptoms. I have chosen not to decide on this nosological issue in this essay, and leave it 
an open question. I believe that biomedical science is actually in the process of dealing 
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with this issue, particularly as more and more models of disease are bolstered by the 
information coming in the wake of the human genome project. 
 Acne is also a grossly observable clinical problem and an interesting case 
regarding the claim of disease. In a certain age group it is prevalent and mild. Is it just a 
normal aspect of development through puberty? Is it only extreme cases that are 
legitimate disease? In the Amazonian society that judged the rash of dyschromic 
spherocheatosis to be desirable, perhaps acne would also not be a clinical problem, nor a 
disease. In our own culture may be a case of medicalization. Patients who wish not to be 
afflicted with the problem and those with potential therapies conspire to cast the problem 
as a biological abnormality. Models of the mechanisms causing the development of acne 
(inflammation, sebum production, the cycle of epithelial cell turn-over, the colonization 
of follicles with Propionibacterium acnes, etc.) and those factors that exacerbate and 
alleviate its severity are also continuously under research (Wolff, et. al., 2005). The 
extremes of acne can cause severe scarring and involve extreme and abnormal amounts 
of inflammation, and represent strong putative claims for biological abnormality, if not 
legitimate status. The less severe cases of acne are only putative disease claims, and 
controversial ones as they may turn out to be just normal parts of development. 
Furthermore, tentative models tend to idealize the normal as the current conventional 
notions of youth, beauty, and desirable appearance. 
 
4.5.11 Implication for Discredited Disease Claims 
 There are disease claims that, in retrospect, we recognize as illegitimate. In 
hindsight they are speculative, sometimes intriguing, claims about biological 
abnormality. However, they are sometimes reminders of the terrible injustice and 
suffering that certain groups of people can inflict on others in the name of medicine and 
normality. Normativists and those with projects more activist than theoretical highlight 
these sorts of examples. On my account such cases are illegitimate disease claims 
because we now recognize that criteria 5 cannot be met; the theoretical models proposed 
were unacceptably biased and had very poor fit with the phenomena being described. In 
many of the most egregious cases the evidence available, even to contemporaries of those 
proposing the models, should have been enough to make these claims illegitimate. Of 
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note, though, is that even these poorly veiled attempts at passing off personal and social 
agendas as theoretical abnormality did posit causal explanations in order to medicalize 
the condition. These examples usually involve aspects of human behavior and gross 
physical anatomy and thus mixtures of conventional and theoretical senses of 
abnormality. Some illegitimate claims were due, in part, to an inability to explore causes 
below a certain level of analysis. Biomedical theorists had to make due with what could 
be observed, and with the types of evidence that could be gathered to test hypotheses.136 
 Masturbation and homosexuality have been discussed as illegitimate disease 
claims, as have drapetomaia and dysaesthesia aethiopsis. These are all attempts to pass 
off value judgments as theoretical abnormality and thus employ medicine to enforce 
social and political agendas. There is no shortage of such attempts to medicalize certain 
conditions today so as to shift the nature of condemnation from the political and religious 
spheres and into the medical sphere, where purportedly nature and science can emphasize 
where the boundary between normal and abnormal resides. These controversies are 
similar to the abortion debate, where science is unfortunately asked to determine the 
boundary between human personhood and mere living cells. The theoretical model 
offered by Rush to explain what we now recognize as vitiligo was a poor model and has 
extremely poor fit with the actual phenomena being modeled. It is an illegitimate disease 
claim even if we want to believe that Rush’s was a more honest attempt at a theoretical 
and descriptive model than Cartwright. Cartwright clearly was repackaging his own 
personal politics and values. Normativists often do not highlight the history of the 
refutation of Rush’s disease claim and its replacement with models for the abnormality 
actually involved with vitiligo. The story involves more than shifting social practices and 
perspectives. 
                                                 
136 As mentioned, looking forward we might expand the number of diseases by deciding 
that claims must be made in reference to the lowest level of analysis for which a model 
posits theoretical abnormality, we might also look backwards and see different ways of 
categorizing based on issues with levels of analysis. In the past there were diseases that 
we now recognize as merely being signs or symptoms, or even recognize as normal 
processes that can cause harm. There are also examples of illegitimate claims that have 
been split up into combinations of illegitimate and legitimate disease claims as more 
evidence and models of lower level phenomena became available. Perhaps the cases of 
hysteria and melancholia are examples. 
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 We should not conclude that all judgments of biological abnormality are equally 
conventional and ultimately based on widespread social practice. On my position, what 
needs to be done is careful analysis of each putative disease claim. Each claim needs an 
assessment of the qualities of the science being appealed to, and a close examination of 
the senses of normality involved.  
  
4.5.12 Some Current Controversial or Interesting Putative Disease Claims 
 There are many interesting and controversial disease claims in contemporary 
American society. These are usually cases where a clinically identifiable problem is 
postulated to be due to an underlying biological abnormality, and thus deserving of 
medical diagnosis and intervention. This often involves issues about the designation of a 
disease claim, as legitimate, opening access to medical insurance and disability coverage. 
The case of obesity as a putative disease is interesting when compared and contrasted to 
alcoholism or other substance abuse syndromes. Some of these controversial putative 
diseases involve very specific claims about causation. An example would be the 
tremendous grass roots movement to validate the claim that autism is linked to childhood 
vaccinations. Regardless of good evidence and expert consensus, those believing this 
connection exists have been very resilient (see Institute of Medicine, 2004). This 
controversy has even resulted in the forgery of evidence, its publication and then its 
retraction from a prestigious medical journal (Specter, 2009). Evaluating and settling 
controversies about putative disease claims involves difficult issues. Who bears the 
burden of proof for producing the evidence, and who should foot the bill? How fast 
should we expect the evidence? Effectively dealing with such issues requires some 
combination of improved basic scientific literacy by the public and a willingness to 
recognize and trust expert consensus. It would also help if the media were not so 
obviously commercialized and determined to sell entertainment at the expense of fact 
checking and reasonable skepticism. The media continually reports on the latest ‘big 
discovery’ as if it were a reliable and settled view, when in reality it is merely an 
interesting and poorly understood new piece of evidence or a very speculative new 
model. The behavior of the pharmaceutical industry, as well as the organized profession 
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of physicians, could also be criticized at length. I shall examine just a few examples of 
current controversial putative disease claims. 
 Fibromyalgia is a putative disease claim. It is part of a family of putative chronic 
pain disorders. Each of these is identifiable as a clinical syndrome. This family includes 
fibromyalgia, irritable bowel syndrome, irritable bladder syndrome, and 
temporomandibular disorder. Fibromyalgia is characterized by chronic and diffusely 
distributed pain, particularly in response to tactile pressure on the surface of the body, 
along with increased fatigue, and possibly cognitive deficits. There are screening criteria 
to identify those likely to have fibromyalgia. The criteria consist of a history of the 
symptoms for at least 3 months with pain affecting all 4 body quadrants, both lateral 
sides, and above and below the waist. In addition, characteristic pain must be elicited at 
least 11 of 18 classic ‘tender points’ when a standard amount of force is placed on the 
skin over these body areas. An excellent review of the history of the clinical problem, 
current models of the biological systems involved, their normal function and the 
abnormalities that purportedly cause fibromyalgia, and current interventions, is available 
in Clauw (2009). 
 Irritable bowel syndrome presents as otherwise unexplainable abdominal pain, 
often with intermittent changes in bowel habits, including bouts of diarrhea or 
constipation, and complaints of bloating, bowel urgency and tenesmus. It is a diagnosis of 
exclusion, meaning that the responsible physician rules out all other causes of such 
symptoms before considering irritable bowel as a diagnosis. It is also sometimes called a 
‘functional disorder’ which basically means that no underlying theoretical abnormality 
can be associated with the clinical syndrome. At the current time the consensus on this 
disorder is that it involves a psychosomatic component, and this is why designations such 
as ‘functional disorder’ and ‘diagnosis of exclusion’ are quickly mentioned by 
professionals reviewing the disorder. Khan and Chang (2010) present an excellent review 
of the clinical syndrome, how to diagnose and categorize it, assess its severity, and a 
review of possible treatments, along with speculations for some mechanisms at work. 
 Chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) is a name given to the clinical problem of 
unremitting fatigue resistant to rest and unrelated to exertion. The symptoms are vague, 
and it is a controversial diagnosis, and certainly considered a diagnosis of exclusion by 
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responsible physicians. A review of hypothetical etiologies is given in Craig and 
Kakumanu (2002). Many of those searching for an explanatory model have focused on 
viral etiologies. Recently, associations between a family of murine leukemia viruses and 
chronic fatigue syndrome have increased hope of those advocating for this putative 
disease claim. However, the controversy has merely increased and recent editorials in the 
journals The Lancet and Science make clear that this disease claim is putative and still 
very controversial:  
 
There is a general consensus that CFS is a heterogeneous family of disorders, and 
it seems most likely that these disorders arise from a constellation of 
pathophysiological causes. The results in the Archives of Paediatrics and 
Adolescent Medicine [providing some evidence of a link between CSF with a 
specific virus] received great media attention. But they do not prove that CFS is a 
physical disease. CFS is still far from being a well-defined entity. When the 
totality of available evidence is considered, the uncertainty around our 
understanding of the physical–psychological interaction taking place in patients 
with CFS only strengthens the case for giving research into chronic fatigue the 
high priority it deserves (Editorial The Lancet, 2010, p. 930). 
 
The stormy debate over a potential cause of chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) is 
nearing hurricane force. Last month, it prompted headlines suggesting that 
researchers have reached a dead end, scores of blog posts from disappointed 
patients, and accusations that scientists had gone beyond their data. The 14-
month-old row intensified when four papers appeared in Retrovirology suggesting 
that reports linking the virus XMRV to CFS were based on false positives. The 
debate began in 2009 with a report in Science that XMRV, a retrovirus recently 
reported to have been found in prostate tumors, had been detected in 67% of a set 
of CFS patients but in only 4% of controls (Science, 9 October 2009, p. 215). 
Since then, one other group has found XMRV like viruses in CFS patients’ blood. 
But several teams have failed to detect the virus in CFS or cancer patients or in 
healthy people. Researchers have struggled to explain the discrepancies (Science, 
17 September 2010, p. 1454). The potential link to CFS has had important 
consequences: Some CFS patients have begun taking antiviral drugs, which can 
have side effects. Last month, after being briefed on the original XMRV studies, 
advisers to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration recommended that CFS 
patients be barred from donating blood (Kaiser, 2011, p. 17). 
 
The federal government has funded a large $1.3 million experiment with standardized 
criteria and techniques to try and settle some of these controversies with chronic fatigue 
syndrome. 
 Another interesting putative disease claim is that of Morgellons disease. In 2001 
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Mary Leitao reportedly observed a small fiber emerging from the facial rash of her two 
year old son, and then observed more emerging from different parts of his body. These 
fibers returned at intervals and she began a crusade to discover the cause and gain 
legitimacy for what she believes is a poorly understood disease. She has largely been 
dismissed by the established medical community and even accused of having a 
psychological disorder and of using her son as a means of attention.137 Mrs. Leitao has 
helped develop an international non-for-profit patient advocacy group. The organization 
has exerted enough pressure to cause the United States Centers for Disease Control to 
establish an epidemiological investigation into these claims of a new disease. Details can 
be found www.cdc.gov/unexplaineddermopathy. Further characterization of the disease, 
including symptoms, pictures of representative fibers taken from patients, and case 
reports can be found at the advocacy web-site: www.morgellons.org. This patient 
advocacy web site says of this condition: 
 
Morgellons disease is a poorly understood condition which a growing number of 
physicians believe to be a chronic infectious disease. The disease can be both 
disabling and disfiguring. The symptoms include itching, biting and crawling 
sensations, “filaments” or fibers which emerge from the skin, skin lesions which 
range from minor to disfiguring, joint pain, debilitating fatigue, changes in 
cognition, memory loss, mood disturbance and serious neurological 
manifestations. Although the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
is currently investigating the disease, it is not yet fully recognized by the medical 
community. At this time, the cause of Morgellons disease is unknown and there is 
no known cure. Morgellons Disease is best explained in detail by our Case 
Definition (from www.morgellons.org/faq-home.htm taken 3/16/11). 
 
In contrast conservative physicians believe that the symptoms and signs of this disease 
are actually due to a persistent delusion on the part of the patients (and their families). 
They prefer to diagnose patients having these symptoms with delusions of parasitosis 
(see Accordino, et. al., 2008). An excellent review of the story of Morgellons and a 
sociological analysis of the interplay between the patient advocacy group and the 
established medical field are offered in Fair (2010). 
 For these putative disease claims, the legitimacy issue concerns the quality of (or 
                                                 
137 Several physicians who examined Mrs. Leitao’s son have speculated she suffers from 
Munchausen’s by proxy. Which is itself a putative psychological disease. 
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even existence of) any scientific models explaining the normal and abnormal functioning 
of a circumscribed biological system implicated in causing the symptoms. From this 
perspective the four disease claims above are putative, but have importantly different 
assessments as to how close to legitimacy they may be. For example, fibromyalgia is the 
closest to being a legitimate disease claim. The models are more advanced and more 
likely to be seriously considered not only by experts in the appropriate fields (neurology, 
psychiatry and rheumatology), but also more likely to be accepted by established 
practitioners of clinical medicine. Such acceptance is not fool-proof, but is frequently a 
reliable proxy usable by the non-expert regarding the quality of the biological models 
involved. Morgellons is the worst off regarding legitimacy. It is still considered an 
illegitimate disease claim by experts and the established medical community, and there is 
little in the way of models of abnormal versus normal function. What biological system 
has gone haywire and is producing those colorful fibers emerging from irritated skin? 
What is its otherwise normal function? Somewhere between these two, regarding distance 
from legitimacy, are chronic fatigue syndrome and irritable bowel disease—both 
diagnoses of exclusion, and both still controversial topics amongst the specialized fields 
that deal with these clinical problems (gastroenterology and neurology). 
 I have discussed the putative claim of spermatorrhea above and raise it again only 
to point out that there are potentially many similar examples. Alternative scientific and 
ontological frameworks might provide many putative disease claims. For instance, 
various types of witchcraft practiced around the world might have syndromes and 
putative diseases for which they offer intervention. From the modern Western medical 
perspective these are illegitimate disease claims. Homosexuality was also discussed 
above as being an illegitimate claim, but one that might re-emerge as a putative claim if 
certain research projects progressed or if certain personal or political agendas pushed for 
a biological explanation. Controversy over the extent to which sexual preference is a 
choice versus a genetic predisposition continues. This putative disease claim would prove 
to be a difficult analysis due to the controversial issues involved with describing any 
human behavior as abnormal. Next I will examine some issues with psychiatric disease 
claims. 
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4.5.13 Implications of My Position for Psychiatric Disease Claims 
 I shall briefly sketch a few implications of my account for disease claims in 
psychiatry. This topic is one much discussed in the philosophy of medicine. Many of the 
recurring issues for putative disease claims mentioned so far become particularly 
noticeable when human behaviors are being classified as abnormal. Such behaviors are 
always the subject of personal and community judgments as far as conventional 
normality and abnormality. Our perspective on what is and is not acceptable can be 
difficult to put aside when thinking theoretically about gross anatomy and behavior. 
Furthermore, explaining human cognition, its normal operation, and the normal functions 
that allow it, are daunting tasks. As discussed in Chapter 2, psychology and psychiatry 
tend to be more prone to paradigm shifts and conflicts over what constitutes the core 
techniques and models defining these disciplines. For these reasons psychiatry has 
developed an approach to diagnosis that avoids (as much as possible) unnecessary 
theoretical and etiological requirements for diagnosis. The diagnoses of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000) for the most part focus on signs and 
symptoms. Essentially the diagnostic criteria consist of features that hang together as a 
syndrome or features that together constitute what I have been calling a clinical problem. 
This allows diagnosis to be based on clinical history and observable patterns of behavior, 
regardless of underlying biological (or psychological) causation. Psychiatric diagnosis 
also relies heavily on criteria requiring that the behavioral or cognitive difficulties being 
considered interfere with normal day to day functionality. Normal here is conventional 
and relative to the lifestyle and community of the patient. Consider the criteria for 
diagnosing pathological gambling from the current DSM: 
 
A.) Persistent and recurrent maladaptive gambling behavior as indicated by five 
(or more) of the following: 
 
1. is preoccupied with gambling (e.g., preoccupied with reliving past 
gambling experiences, handicapping or planning the next venture, or thinking 
of ways to get money with which to gamble) 
 
2. needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve the 
desired excitement 
 
3. has repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or stop gambling 
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4. is restless or irritable when attempting to cut down or stop gambling 
 
5. gambles as a way of escaping from problems or of relieving a dysphoric 
mood (e.g., feelings of helplessness, guilt, anxiety, depression) 
 
6. after losing money gambling, often returns another day to get even 
("chasing" one's losses) 
 
7. lies to family members, therapist, or others to conceal the extent of 
involvement with gambling 
 
8. has committed illegal acts such as forgery, fraud, theft, or embezzlement to 
finance gambling 
 
9. has jeopardized or lost a significant relationship, job, or educational or 
career opportunity because of gambling 
 
10. relies on others to provide money to relieve a desperate financial situation 
caused by gambling 
 
B.) The gambling behavior is not better accounted for by a Manic Episode. (APA, 
2000, p. 671) 
 
 
 Psychiatry does actively seek models of the theoretical biological causation of 
observed behavioral syndromes. The degree to which these models are accepted as 
speculative or hypothetical versus accurate and unlikely to be significantly modified 
varies between disease claims. It is also currently fashionable in psychiatry to appeal to 
biological models at lower levels of analysis than mental mechanisms. The models 
describing the neural pathways involved in schizophrenia are increasingly felt to have 
good fit with the phenomena and are beginning to offer a lower order explanation of the 
observable behavior and psychological malfunction, and explanations of why certain 
pharmaceutical interventions alter these behaviors and experiences. Other examples of 
more putative disease claims for which biological models are being developed include 
alcohol addiction, pathological gambling, autism, the attention deficit disorders, the 
dyslexias, bipolar syndromes, and many more. These are all putative disease claims and 
differ in the degree to which their models are considered to have good fit and lack bias. I 
shall leave it to the reader to investigate the speculative models of abnormal biological or 
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cognitive function backing these putative claims. Most psychiatric diseases on my 
account are putative, with some closer to legitimacy than others. Those that completely 
lack or have almost no theoretical biological or psychological models of causation, such 
as some personality disorders, are far from legitimacy. Disease claims like schizophrenia 
are closer.  
 I do not see any fundamental reason that psychiatry or psychology should be 
distinguished from the rest of medicine and biology. These fields are making honest 
attempts to understand the phenomena in question with an eye on alleviating the suffering 
of patients. As long as the disorders that their patients are suffering are hypothesized to 
be caused by underlying malfunctions whether biological or psychological, and as long as 
models of such dysfunction are posited as verifiable through empirical investigation, then 
no distinction is needed. The fact that most of the disease claims of psychiatry remain 
putative is evidence of how difficult it is to study and explain behavior and phenomenal 
experience, and how difficult it is to put aside conventional judgments of what counts as 
normal and abnormal regarding such behavior and conscious experience. 
 
4.5.14 Notions of Health on My Theory 
 On my account, the negative notion of health as the absence of detectable 
legitimate disease seems unproblematic. This would just be the absence of any known 
biological pathology. However, a positive notion of health is not so simple. This would 
be a completed theory of normal human biological form and function. This requires a 
completed theory of human aging and also a theory of normal human cognition. This may 
also require a theory of the ideal human environment, perhaps including the ideal social 
and community environments. A positive sense of complete human health may require 
more than just theoretical models of biological functions. It would probably require what 
in philosophy is sometimes called a theory of ‘human nature.’ 
 
4.4.15 Implication for Boundary Disputes 
 Similar to my brief comments on psychiatry, I cannot do justice to the difficulty 
of many of the boundary issues influenced by taking a position on how disease claims 
differ regarding legitimacy. My position does have implications for discussion of the 
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many boundary issues I highlighted in the introduction to this chapter. It is important to 
remember that we can use other factors besides legitimate claims of disease to settle 
boundary issues or policy problems involving boundary issues. Boundaries between 
biologically normal functions and abnormal that arise from theoretical models can be 
ignored in determining other boundaries. Ethical and practical reasons can be seen as 
more important in helping demarcate a boundary. Unfortunately many people realize it is 
easier to appropriate the authority of theoretical science than argue on practical or moral 
grounds. Appropriating the authority of science allows policy makers to avoid 
accusations of poor practical or ethical insight—it removes chances for political criticism. 
For this reason, appeal to the boundary set by legitimate disease versus other kinds of 
clinical problems or other types of human ill is hard to resist when arguing about where 
to set other boundaries. Equally disturbing is the opposite trend to dismiss scientific 
consensus if it appears to help draw a boundary that is practically undesirable, such as 
those who remain dissidents concerning the science on global warming or childhood 
vaccination causing autism (see Specter, 2009). 
 However, even if we have a reliable theoretical boundary between normal and 
abnormal biological function, how this informs our ethical or policy debates is still a 
decision that needs to be made carefully. Just because theoretical science has developed 
in such as way as to explain the normal function of certain biological parts of certain 
species is no reason to accept such function as the best situation either ethically or 
practically. There is no simple equation here. Rape, enslavement, murder, racism, etc, 
might be naturally evolved or statistically prevalent behaviors, but discovering this would 
not fix their moral status. Similarly, in medicine, just because something is not a 
biological abnormality according to our best biological models, does not mean that we 
might not end suffering by intervening to change biology or anatomy. The difficult 
questions remain even if we get some input from a scientific model of biological 
functionality. 
 For legitimate and illegitimate disease claims the boundary between normal and 
abnormal biological function could aid in decisions to set boundaries between therapy 
and extra-therapeutic medical intervention. It could aid decisions about setting 
boundaries for the role of physicians in society, and for what we owe each member of 
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society as far as basic heath care and restoration of normal functionality. My position, 
however, leaves open a large indeterminate area of putative disease claims. Furthermore 
the prospects that science will make significant progress in a short period of time is 
unlikely, especially in the time frame that policy decisions must be made. So even if we 
can determine that some disease claims are legitimate, many of the ones we are most 
interested in will be putative and again we will have to rely on ethical deliberation and 
political negotiation to decide as a community how to proceed.   
 
4.6 CONCLUSION: NATURALIST OR NORMATIVIST?  
 In this large fourth chapter of my project I have provided an account of what 
makes for a legitimate disease claim. Diseases are biological abnormalities in structure or 
function. The sense of abnormality at work in disease claims is a theoretical sense and is 
made in reference to the simplified theoretical model of the biological system being 
implicated. The legitimacy of the claim depends on the virtues of the scientific models 
being appealed to in the claim. The sense of abnormality is not a type of conventional 
sense, and is not in reference to widespread community values and practices. Perhaps a 
naturalist would argue that my position on science discussed in the second chapter is a 
complex way of allowing the conventional judgments of the scientific community to 
determine abnormality. My response would be that the process of refining and testing 
models involves interacting with the natural world—there is input from sources other 
than human values or opinions. Human empirical knowledge is perspectival, but it is not 
the same thing as any individual human’s or any community’s simple opinion or 
evaluation of phenomena. Biological model building may start off with inspiration from 
conventional senses of what is normal and abnormal, but as theory develops and is 
challenged and refined, so as to gain fit and accuracy, and avoid bias and 
misrepresentation, it creates another sense of normality. My position makes me a kind of 
anti-normativist since I reject that all disease claims are ultimately conventional 
judgments of value. My position, however, may not be attractive to naturalists, especially 
those wanting abnormality to be statistical or warranted by evolution. Perhaps my 
position is a weak-naturalist position. However, my position accurately captures the 
concept as currently used by physicians and biomedical researchers. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
 My main thesis is that the core notion involved in the modern concept of disease 
(taken broadly as pathology) is biological (or psychological) abnormality in form or 
function, for a circumscribed biological (or psychological) system, contrasted against a 
theoretical sense of biological normality. Based on this conception, criteria were provided 
for distinguishing legitimate disease claims from both putative and illegitimate claims. 
My account puts the burden of legitimacy, objectivity, and respectability for the 
particular claims of disease onto science and the models it creates. Some scientific 
models eventually emerge from the complex process by which science creates, evaluates, 
and refines its simplified explanations. Often these models include descriptions of the 
normal functions, as well as possible malfunctions, of the biological systems involved. 
These models (including accompanying details about normality and abnormality) can 
have varying degrees of several virtuous qualities, including accurate representational fit. 
I argue that this sense of normality/abnormality, which is simultaneously created along 
with the other descriptive details of the biological model to which it belongs, is an 
importantly distinct sense. It is as scientifically respectable as other parts of the 
description and explanation of the phenomena in question. This is how science 
determines what is normal and abnormal in a way that allows disease to be as naturalistic 
and as objective as other scientific categorization concepts like species, virus, or sex. 
 In chapter 2, I gave a gross overview of science as well as a brief sketch of what it 
produces and how. Biological science produces simplified representational models of 
complex empirical phenomena. These models are originally hypothetical and go through 
a complex selective process that eventually rejects, modifies, or increasingly validates the 
model. I discussed some of the virtues and vices such human-created representational 
models can and do have, and suggested that specialists, as well as educated adults, can 
and do asses these virtues and vices. In particular, models should have good fit with the 
phenomena they represent and as little personal or social bias as possible, especially 
when they contain descriptions of normal and abnormal processes or structures that are 
grossly observable. However, many virtues and vices as well as (more and less reliable) 
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clues to these qualities are available for those evaluating particular scientific models. 
When science has trouble or cannot yet uncontroversially work out normal variation from 
pathology in certain descriptive models of biological process, then disease claims based 
on those models will be suspect, controversial or otherwise putative. 
 Chapter 3 argues that there are three importantly different senses of normality 
and, conversely, of abnormality. Judgments or ascriptions of normal and abnormal can 
appeal or refer to different sources for their authority or force. Theoretical senses of 
abnormality appeal to the simplified scientific models (particularly those in biology and 
psychology) that in the process of describing the phenomena in question also designate 
which processes and structures are normal and abnormal. Statistical senses of 
abnormality refer to actual measurements of parameters of the phenomena in question. 
Conventional senses appeal to personal or social norms or to judgments concerning what 
is proper. Distinguishing and trying to disentangle these different senses of abnormality 
when considering controversial disease claims is important. Clarity regarding possible 
equivocation across these senses provides insight regarding charges that certain disease 
claims are merely social constructions or are the inappropriate medicalization of a 
problem. In chapter 3, I also discuss Ron Amundson’s (2000) argument that, in biology, 
we should stop using the term normal. In arguing against Amundson, I highlighted the 
importance, for a naturalistic concept of disease, of being able to distinguish normal 
variation in form and function from pathological variation. 
 In chapter 4, I discussed naturalism and normativism about disease claims and 
provide my own account. I contrast my own project and perspective with other reasons 
for interest in the concept of disease. This chapter examined the relationship between 
controversies over the boundary between disease and non-disease and some other 
controversial boundary issues. Unfortunately, when a particular disease claim is putative 
or otherwise in question, the other distinctions or issues that one desires to resolve by 
appeal to the disease claim will not themselves be clear or uncontroversial. This chapter 
presented the main problem for normativism and naturalism. Normativists must explain, 
in a satisfying way, the uncontroversial cases of disease and how these are significantly 
different from the obviously illegitimate disease claims they often highlight. Naturalists 
must explain how science can provide a relatively objective distinction between normal 
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and abnormal that does not primarily rely on social norms or personal judgments. 
Similarly the naturalist must explain how to distinguish normal variation from pathology. 
Chapter 4 ends with my ideal criteria for a legitimate disease claim and with an 
examination of interesting cases designed to clarify and challenge my account. 
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